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Chapter 1
Introduction
This collection of essays explores questions related to long-term issues in insurance and health
economics. However, the first five chapters cover heterogeneous topics and look at miscella-
neous issues from differing points of view. Chapters 2, 4 and 5 develop and test empirical
models and their predictions, while chapter 3 surveys the theoretical and empirical literature,
and chapter 6 presents a theoretical model. Chapter 7 posits some policy implications and
discloses possible future extensions to chapters 4, 5, and 6.
The so-called Sisyphus syndrome is the concern of chapter 2: Increased past health care ex-
penditure is shown to increase the share of aged individuals which in turn results in additional
current expense. Chapter 3 examines life-cycle effects of social security in an open economy.
Surveying the theoretical and empirical literature, it seeks to endogenize demographic change.
Long-term common trends in private insurance benefits are analyzed in chapter 4: Possible
hedging strategies in and between both the United States and Switzerland are identified in
the long term. In addition, short-term correlations between unexpected deviations of social
and private insurance benefits are estimated.
The following two chapters address issues regarding risk selection in long-term health insur-
ance. Taking up community-rated premiums, chapter 5 studies whether the volume of risk
adjustment changes when its formula is complemented by an additional criterion and simu-
lates a possible cap on the volume. Chapter 6 explores the concept of guaranteed renewability,
which is a more market-based solution. Does it survive when death and a positive transition
probability from high- to low-risk status are modelled?
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2“The Sisyphus syndrome in health revisited”, chapter 2, notes that when the task is about
to be completed, ironically work must start all over again. To see the analogy, consider an
initial decision to allocate more resources to health. The likely consequence is an increased
number, and prolonged lifespan, of survivors, who will exert additional demand for health
care. With more resources allocated to health, the cycle recurs again. The objective of this
chapter is to improve on earlier research that failed to find evidence of a Sisyphus syndrome
in industrialized countries. This time, however, albeit signs of such a cycle exist, the effect is
non explosive.
Both chapters 2 and 3 deal with a feedback process in a long-term setting. While chapter
2 looked at how additional health care expenditure increases remaining life expectancy and
drives the process, chapter 3 examines the effect of old-age provision, health insurance, and
long-term care insurance on decisions throughout one’s lifetime. Demographic change is usu-
ally perceived as an exogenous shock impinging on social security, with the economy treated
as a closed system. This chapter argues that demographics is the aggregate of individual
decisions influenced by social security. This claim is supported by both theoretical argument
and empirical evidence, with regard to decisions over the life cycle spanning educational ef-
fort, marriage, number of children, divorce, retirement, and effort to extend one’s life. These
feedback relationships are shown to hamper employment and growth, and thus to undermine
the financial viability of today’s social security schemes – with increasing openness of the
economy (“globalization”) exacerbating problems.
Chapters 4 to 6 survey long-term issues in the insurance industry, including varying insurance
systems (community-rated and risk-rated systems). Chapter 4 looks at short- and long-term
correlations of trend deviations in different lines of insurance and points to a conflict of interest
between consumers and insurers. Consumers face positive correlation in their assets (health,
wealth, and wisdom; in analogy to the theory of chapter 2, that is based on the same three
assets, see Figure 2.1), causing them to demand a great deal of insurance coverage. Insurers,
from the other standpoint, eschew positively correlated risks. It can be shown that insur-
ance contributes to a reduction of consumers’ asset volatility only if unexpected deviations
of payments from expected value correlate negatively across lines of insurance. Analyzing
deviations from trend in aggregate insurance payments, one finds that private U.S. (but not
Swiss) insurance has a hedging effect for consumers, whereas both social insurance schemes
Introduction 3
expose consumers to excess asset volatility. In the insurance systems of both countries, the
private component fails to offset deviations in the social component, and vice versa. As to the
supply of insurance, cointegration analysis indicates the absence of common trends. Insurance
companies could therefore offer combined policies to the benefit of consumers, hedging their
underwriting risk both domestically and internationally.
One solution for dealing with risk selection in long-term health insurance is to impose commu-
nity rating by law; the other is to make contracts incentive-compatible. Chapter 5 is devoted
to the first and chapter 6 to the latter. When premiums are community-rated, risk adjust-
ment serves to mitigate competitive insurers’ incentive to select favorable risks. Based on age
and sex as the sole criteria, risk adjustment in Switzerland has increased by 80 percent in
volume (since its introduction in 1996), attaining as much as 31 percent of health insurers’
total income. This development has triggered calls for capping risk adjustment. At the same
time, the debate revolves around a refinement of the adjustment formula by factoring in hos-
pitalization or living in a nursing home during the previous year. Inclusion of this criterion is
found not only to increase the volume but also the distribution of risk adjustment between
consumers. It also would increase the opportunity cost of capping risk adjustment in terms
of increased incentives for risk selection.
Chapter 6 is titled “Can guaranteed renewability survive in the presence of death?” and
is based on the seminal contribution by Pauly et al. (1995) regarding time consistency and
guaranteed renewability (GR) in insurance contracts. GR denotes that both parties are always
willing to continue the sequence of contracts even after the occurrence of a loss or a change in
risk status. In return, the contract is frontloaded in order to generate the necessary reserves.
However, frontloading can become excessive. This chapter adds to the debate by introducing
the full set of relevant transition probabilities. Whereas Pauly et al. (1995) consider only the
likelihood of a favorable risk turning into an unfavorable one during the planning period,
both the possibility of returning to favorable risk status and death are accounted for here.
Returning to favorable risk status can reduce the amount of frontloading in a model covering
more than three periods – with the amount of reduction increasing with the probability of
returning to favorable risk status. Moreover, it is shown that once death and the cost of dying
are included in the model, then the critical value of time preference that is still compatible
with GR decreases, causing demand for GR contracts to increase. In conclusion, once the
4underlying Markov model is completed, GR cannot be said to survive but to mitigate the
problem of risk selection in health insurance to an even greater extent than previously claimed.
Note that Peter Zweifel co-authored chapters 2-5, Lukas Steinmann co-authored chapter 2,
and Miche`le Sennhauser co-authored chapter 5. The undersigned author was at least equally
responsible for the intellectual input of chapters 2, 4 and 5, while the principal contribution to
chapter 3 is by Peter Zweifel. Chapter 2 appeared in the International Journal of Health Care
Finance and Economics, and chapter 3 in the Zeitschrift fu¨r die gesamte Versicherungswis-
senschaft. Chapter 4 has been submitted to the Journal of Risk Management in Financial
Institutions, chapter 5 to the Journal of Health Economics, and chapter 6 will be submitted
to the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.
Patrick Eugster
Zurich, March 2008
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Chapter 2
The Sisyphus syndrome in health
revisited
2.1 Introduction
When the British National Health Service was created, its founders expected the problem of
ill health to fade away. After all, once people have access to good medical care, they should live
healthy and happy to the end of their lives. History has proven this expectation to be entirely
false. Indeed, decision makers in health policy are haunted by a quite different suspicion,
which Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) dubbed the Sisyphus syndrome. Health care services could
be something like the work of Sisyphus, a Greek hero who was ordered by the Gods to push
a big rock uphill. But just before the very top, the rock would slip from his hands so he had
to start all over again.
Consider the following sequence of events in health care. Initially, politicians decide to allocate
more resources to health. If effective this intervention causes people that would have otherwise
died to survive. With more survivors around, there will be additional demand for health care
services. To the extent that this is financed out of private resources, there is not too much of
a problem. Individuals will adjust their health insurance policies accordingly and allocate a
greater share of their income to health care. However, most of these services are covered by
public health insurance. Rather than accepting to pay themselves, especially older voters have
an incentive to get politicians to reallocate the public budget in favor of health. The increase
7
8in health care expenditure (HCE ) again creates survivors. Thus, the Sisyphus syndrome can
go into its next turn.
For the Sisyphus syndrome to exist, two (possibly lagged) relationships must be operative.
1. Health care expenditure (HCE ) must have the effect of increasing remaining life ex-
pectancy (RLE ). For policy, this effect is of particular importance if it occurs at re-
tirement age because in systems financed by a payroll tax, retired individuals do not
contribute to the financing of health care anymore. In tax-based systems, their contri-
bution decreases to the extent that their income drops after retirement.
2. Increasing RLE must translate (through a changed planning horizon and through an
increased number of survivors) into an impact on health care spending.
However, the second relationship is confounded in that lower rather than higher RLE is
sometimes associated with HCE. Evidence is accumulating that much of lifetime HCE is
spent during the last year before death [Lubitz and Riley (1993); Zweifel et al. (1999)]. In
this case, HCE does not generate survivors that will spend more private HCE and exert
pressure for more public HCE in the future. At the macroeconomic level, the share of the
population that is in their last year of life is reflected by the mortality rate. A high mortality
rate (which itself may depend on previous HCE ) is associated with high HCE in the current
period while mitigating the dynamics of the Sisyphus syndrome.
As to relationship (1.), Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) found that prior HCE in OECD countries
did increase RLE at ages 40 and 65. But with regard to relationship (2.), they were not able
to establish a statistical link between RLE and either public or private HCE. The dampening
effect of mortality was not accounted for. In all, a Sisyphus syndrome could not be said to
exist.
The objective of this chapter is to revisit these findings. In the light of improved specification,
data, and econometric methodology, what can be said about the effect of HCE on RLE,
especially at higher ages? Is it still true that no evidence can be found of a feedback, from
increased RLE to HCE? And is it necessary to control for the mortality rate? Accordingly,
the plan of this chapter is as follows. In section 2.2, a review of the relevant literature is
provided, followed by a more precise restatement of the Sisyphus syndrome. Section 2.3 is
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devoted to econometric specification, a description of the data base, and variable definitions.
The new empirical evidence is presented in section 2.4, while section 2.5 contains a conclusion.
2.2 Survey of the literature
2.2.1 The production of health
The seminal article continues to be Auster et al. (1969), who related age- and sex-adjusted
mortality rates of U.S. states to medical care inputs, schooling, income, and environmental
variables. Schooling was negatively related to mortality, medical care inputs not consistently
so, while higher income tended to cause an increase in mortality. Hadley (1982) refined this
approach, using county groups as unit of analysis. Again, education was negatively related
to mortality, income negatively to infant mortality but in mixed ways to adult mortality. A
new finding is that most age-sex specific mortality rates depend negatively on medical care
spending, with an elasticity of -0.15. Focusing on the elderly, Hadley (1988) found elasticities
in the -0.25 to -0.44 range.
An early international study of the production of health is the one by Stewart (1971). Using
the nations of the Western hemisphere in the mid-1960s as the unit of analysis, he related life
expectancy at birth to medical inputs, literacy rates, and the availability of potable water.
All three inputs had small marginal effects in the case of the United States, whereas literacy
and potable water showed significant effects in the less developed countries of the group.
Cochrane et al. (1978) based their analysis on a cross-section of 18 developed countries as
of 1970. In their correlation analysis, a greater number of physicians goes along with higher
rather than lower mortality (with no attempt to control for reverse causation). Mortality
rates correlate negatively with income per capita, suggesting that the positive effect found
by Auster et al. (1969) might be limited to the United States. They also tested the effects
of cigarette and alcohol consumption, with mixed effects. The ambiguous role of income may
be due to failure to account for unfavorable life styles that accompany the achievement of
higher (labor) income. This is the conclusion that can be drawn from Gerdtham and Ruhm
(2006), who find that out of 9 specific causes of mortality in OECD countries, 6 tend to
be negatively related to income, while mortality from heart disease displays a strong and
significant positive relationship. At the same time, there is evidence in 5 out of 9 cases that
10
a higher degree of demand pressure in the economy (proxied by a lower unemployment rate)
may drive up mortality rates.
Working with a 1980 cross section of OECD countries, Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) introduced
lagged HCE (the lag being 10 years due to data availability) as an explanatory variable on
the grounds that earlier medical interventions have assured the survival of individuals that
make up the current population. Also they replaced mortality by remaining life expectancy
(at ages 40 and 65) to better represent the planning situation of forward-looking individuals.
Lagged HCE proved significant, with an elasticity (at the mean) of 0.15.
More recently Frech III and Miller (1999) review research performed by noneconomists (fo-
cused on low-income countries), which tends to support the notion that literacy and diet but
not medical care resources are determinants of health. They analyze an OECD cross section,
in the main making remaining life expectancy (RLE ) at ages 40 and 60 as of 1993 the de-
pendent variable. The explanatory variables include GDP, the consumption of tobacco and
alcohol, and the consumption of animal fats. The authors introduce lags of up to ten years
(depending on data availability) to capture lifetime effects because variations in most of these
variables are unlikely to affect health right away. Rather than considering total HCE only,
they single out pharmaceutical consumption to find that this component matters far more
than does total HCE, which fails to have a significant effect on RLE. In their analysis of a
cross section for the year 2000, Miller and Frech III (2004) complement their set of explana-
tory variables with obesity (which proves significant with the expected sign) but continue
to find that pharmaceutical consumption importantly contributes to both unadjusted and
disability adjusted RLE at age 40 and 60. Their specification is double logarithmic through-
out, resulting in the estimation of constant elasticities which necessarily imply decreasing
marginal productivity of HCE as soon as HCE differs more strongly between countries than
does life expectancy (both relative to a benchmark, e.g. the United States).
Although this review may not be complete, the paucity of studies on the production of health
is striking. By way of contrast, there has been much more research into the determinants of
HCE (to be reviewed in section 2.2.2 below). Indeed, one might argue that the separate esti-
mation of a production function is not necessary, based on a duality argument. If individuals
acted as perfect cost minimizers in their production of health, the cost function [or an expen-
diture share function prior to normalization of some price, cf. e.g. Christensen et al. (1973)]
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contains all the information relating to the production technology. However, the estimation
of a separate production function of health can be justified by the following arguments:
1. Beyond differentiating between medical and broadly economic explanatory variables,
it is still not clear which inputs belong in the health production function and whether
their marginal productivities are stable across countries and across time.1
2. The health production technology is stochastic rather than deterministic. The deploy-
ment of both medical and nonmedical inputs does not always prevent death, i.e. a
health outcome that differs strongly from the one intended. This also implies that cost
minimization is possible only on expectation, with large deviations that serve to qualify
the duality argument.
3. In the case of health, prices contained in the cost or expenditure share function are
average prices prior to insurance and public subsidies, while prices governing individual
cost minimization are marginal prices often close to zero and different from average
prices.
4. Cost minimization is not a very credible hypothesis in health since decisions frequently
are made under the influence of physicians. A distortion results to the extent that
physicians act as imperfect agents of their patients. Moreover, HCE at the aggregate
level may well reflect political institutions.
Conclusion 1. The estimation of a production function for health apart from a cost or
expenditure (share) function can be justified. The emerging consensus seems to be that at
least some components of health care inputs contribute to health with a lag and decreasing
marginal effect.
2.2.2 The health care expenditure (HCE) function
Kleiman (1974) was one of the first to relate HCE to GDP using a cross-section of OECD
country data. He also included the population share of those aged 64+ but was unable to
find a statistically significant effect. Accordingly, Newhouse (1977) focused on the relationship
between per capita GDP and HCE, using a cross-section of OECD countries. The computed
1We owe this important point to one of the referees.
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income elasticity indicated that health care is a luxury good. This finding was confirmed by
Maxwell (1981) in a broad international survey.
In another regression analysis based on OECD data, Leu (1986) reintroduced the share of
persons aged less than 15 years and more than 65 years. However, his main innovation was
the argument that a greater share of public in total HCE facilitates budget maximization by
bureaucrats, which can be restrained by direct democracy or through central control, as in
countries with a National Health Service. These predictions were confirmed but failed to be
replicated by later studies.
In their first attempt at identifying the feedback from remaining life expectancy RLE to
HCE as part of the Sisyphus syndrome, Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) found RLE at age 65+
to be even negatively related to HCE, although without statistical significance. Public HCE
turned out to be as much of a luxury good as private HCE, with income elasticities far above
unity. In a recent analysis of 70 year old Americans, Lubitz et al. (2003) again fail to find a
relationship between differences in RLE (indicated by the presence of functional limitations)
and projected future HCE. However, as will be argued in 2.2.3 below, it is sufficient for such
a relationship to hold in a subset of the population in order to fuel the Sisyphus syndrome.
Collating information from three years to form an OECD panel data set for the first time,
Gerdtham et al. (1992) were able to introduce several new explanatory variables, such as
physician density, the share of inpatient to total HCE, as well as dummies for fee-for-service
payment and budgeting caps. In the present context, it is interesting to note that a 10
percent increase in the share of inhabitants aged 64+ (relative to the 15 to 64 age group)
was estimated to increase HCE by almost 2 percent, in contradistinction to all studies cited
so far.
Extending the period covered to 1970-1991, Gerdtham et al. (1998) introduced a whole host
of additional institutional variables. Among them, public reimbursement, capitation of physi-
cians, and patient-first payment with later reimbursement consistently are associated with
lower HCE. Tobacco consumption proves to be a significant predictor of higher HCE. With
regard to the share of the elderly population (75+ this time), there is no indication of a
significant effect (negative if anything).
A recent concern has been the possibility of spurious regression results due to nonstationarity
of time series, in particular HCE and GDP. Without directly addressing the nonstationarity
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issue, Barros (1998) related the growth of HCE from 1960 to 1990 in OECD countries to
the growth of GDP. The dummy variables representing gatekeeping systems, public reim-
bursement, and integrated systems, respectively, all prove insignificant once initial conditions
are controlled for. Implied income elasticities range between 0.62 and 0.92. In their survey,
Gerdtham and Jo¨nsson (2000) report very mixed results of studies applying tests designed
to detect nonstationarity. Since the emphasis of this chapter is not on the estimation of the
income elasticity of HCE, this route is not pursued. Rather detrending is sought by trans-
forming the dependent variable into the health share in GDP, resulting in the expenditure
share function suggested by duality (normalization by a price should be avoided in this con-
text, see section 2.3). In addition, public debate revolves much more about the share of GDP
claimed by HCE rather than about HCE per se.
Conclusion 2. With one exception [Gerdtham et al. (1992)], there is no evidence to the
effect that a high share of individuals at or in retirement age leads to higher HCE. Other
consistently significant regressors are GDP and likely tobacco consumption.
2.2.3 A combined view: the Sisyphus syndrome
The theoretical starting point of this study is the fact that an individual not only has to man-
age his or her health stock but also a stock of wealth and a stock of human capital (”wisdom”,
see Figure 2.1). The dynamic optimization problem amounts to a series of portfolio choices
determining the shares held in the guise of wisdom, wealth, and health. Formal modelling has
concentrated on the health and wealth components of this portfolio [see Grossman (2000) for
a comprehensive review]. Certainly with regard to the health component, this lifetime asset
management is conditioned by environmental influences (e.g. degree of industrialization, de-
gree of urbanization). The left-hand portion of Figure 2.1 thus shows the production part of
the Sisyphus model.
The right-hand side of Figure 2.1 contains the derived demand part of the model. HCE is
triggered by a gap between desired and actual health stock and influenced by the institutional
characteristics of the health care system and relative prices. This implies that HCE is an
endogenous determinant of health, a fact that has not been duly recognized in those existing
studies on the production of health that introduce contemporaneous HCE as an exogenous
explanatory variable. Next, the input of HCE increases (possibly with a lag) actual health
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Figure 2.1: Sisyphus Syndrome
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stock. If actual health stock remains below a critical level, death occurs, and the Sisyphus
cycle comes to an end. If however the stock is sufficient to ensure survival, the individual
concerned can count on performing the cycle for a number of periods. The expected number
of future rounds defines his or her remaining life expectancy (RLE ).
Thus, the feedback from HCE to actual health stock determines the number of survivors
who are able to exert demand for health care and hence cause HCE. It is this feedback that
is responsible for what can be called the Sisyphus syndrome: Given that HCE is increased
exogenously (e.g. by an expansion of public health insurance coverage), more individuals
survive the cycle. Moreover, these individuals have a longer planning horizon thanks to an
increased RLE. This also means that the optimal health stock should have a higher value,
which by itself makes the gap between desired and actual health stock larger, thus calling for
additional HCE again (see dashed arrow in Figure 2.1). On the other hand, the direct effect
of HCE is to close the gap between desired and actual health stock. Therefore, the net effect
of HCE on the size of this gap remains an open issue, to be examined empirically.
This model motivates the creation of an explanatory variable that has not been introduced
in previous work. It will be called SISYPH because it reflects the potential strength of the
Sisyphus syndrome. SISYPH is the product of two factors: The first is RLE which shows
the number of cycles an individual of a given age expects to perform. However, if the relative
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number of such individuals in the population is small, RLE by itself will have a small impact
on the whole system. Therefore, RLE needs to be weighted by the share of the population
at that age as the second factor. Since individuals at retirement age cannot be expected to
contribute much to the financing of future HCE (creating a budgetary problem for policy
makers), the share of those aged 65 and older will be used in the following.
This description of the Sisyphus syndrome is still not complete, however. Some individuals,
having exerted demand for HCE on the expectation to survive for at least one more period,
in fact die. Since the gap between desired and actual health stock likely is large in this event,
these individuals will have driven up HCE in the current period while not contributing to the
Sisyphus syndrome in the future. Therefore, this confounding effect (discussed in section 2.1)
must be taken into account in order to avoid the risk of overestimating the dynamics of the
syndrome. The share of deathbound individuals in a population is given by the mortality rate,
MORT. This constitutes another explanatory variable that has been disregarded in published
work on HCE.
2.3 Specification, data base, and variables
The theoretical considerations laid out in the preceding section provide guidance as to the
specification of the relationships constituting the Sisyphus syndrome. Ideally, the hypothesis
should be tested using individual panel data; however, data availability dictates the use of
aggregate indicators.
In the present situation, two issues need to be clarified. One is choosing the right lags. It
turned out that if both GDP and HCE have the same lag, multicollinearity becomes severe.
Since the main focus of this chapter is on the effect of HCE, GDP is interpreted as a budget
constraint rather than a lifestyle variable in the following, suggesting a zero lag, while HCE,
alcohol consumption, and calorie intake are subjected to different lags. Preliminary estimates
showed tobacco consumption to be insignificant, likely because the data base contains too
many gaps with respect to this variable. The lags tested for are 3, 5, and 10 years, causing
the sample to vary both in terms of countries and years covered due to missing values. A
Hausman (1978) test is applied to select the preferred lag. It must be admitted of course that
any lags exceeding 10 years cannot be discovered in this way.
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The other issue is the choice of a random effect vs. fixed effect specification. The advantage
of the random effects specification is that it preserves degrees of freedom; on the other hand,
the country-specific component of the error term has to be independent of the explanatory
variables for consistency. Fixed effects provide more information about the peculiarity of
a country, but with 30 country-specific dummy variables, multicollinearity quickly becomes
a problem. One solution is to drop insignificant dummy variables, which however entails a
possible type II error each time. The regression strategy adopted here therefore is to estimate
both variants and to decide again on the basis of a Hausman (1978) test.
In view of the uncertainty surrounding the production of health, a specification permitting
variable marginal effects is retained for the first part of the Sisyphus model. This consists of
Equations for remaining life expectancy (RLEF, RLEM ) at age 60, the population share of
individuals aged 65 and more (POP65, not available according to gender), and the mortality
rate of the population as a whole (MORT ). Subscripts i (countries) and t (year) are dropped
for simplicity except for the error terms and k = 3, 5, 10. In the case of random effects, one
has,

RLEF
RLEM
POP65
MORT
 =
α+ β1GDP + β2GDP2 + β3HCE−k + β4HCE2−k
+β5ALC−k + β6ALC2−k + β7CAL−k + β8CAL2−k
+υi + εit
(2.1)
Since these Equations have the same explanatory variables, the β1...β8 denote vectors con-
taining four elements. The same holds true of υi and εit which describe a two-factor random
effects specification, with no correlation across the four Equations assumed.
In the fixed effects alternative, the United States serves as a benchmark. The maximum of
29 dummy variables, Di is not attained because of multicollinearity. Interestingly, the same
10 countries had to be deleted from the four Equations, yet despite this similarity between
countries excluded, it proved impossible to benefit from the similarity of those retained.
Attempts to group countries with a common dummy variable were not successful. The fixed
effects Equation thus is defined as follows,
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
RLEF
RLEM
POP65
MORT
 =
α+ β1GDP + β2GDP2 + β3HCE−k + β4HCE2−k
+β5ALC−k + β6ALC2−k + β7CAL−k + β8CAL2−k + γ′Di
+µit
(2.2)
The variables are defined as follows (see Table 2.1 for a statistical description) with k =
3, 5, 10,
• RLEF : Remaining life expectancy of females at age 60
• RLEM : Remaining life expectancy of males at age 60
• POP65 : Population share of individuals aged 65 and more
• MORT : Mortality rate of the population, both genders, all ages, deceased per 100,000
inhabitants
• HCE/GDP : Share of health care expenditure in GDP, both nominal, in percent
• ALC−k: Alcohol consumption per capita, in litres, lagged k years; ALC2−k: ALC−k
squared
• CAL−k: consumption of kilocalories per capita, lagged k years; CAL2−k: CAL−k
squared
• GDP : GDP per capita, nominal but converted in US$ 1,000, GDP2 : GDP squared
• HCE−k: Total health care expenditure per capita, nominal but converted in US$ 1,000,
lagged k years; HCE2−k: HCE−k squared
• RPH : Price index of health care services relative to price index of GDP
• SISYPH : Predicted RLE, averaged over gender, multiplied by POP65 : [for details, see
Equation (2.3)].
The source of all these data is OECD (2001), a source known for several difficulties. One of
them is national differences with regard to the delimitation of the health care sector, resulting
in different baskets of services, another, the lack of comparability and precision of health care
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of variables, 1970-2000
Overall 1970 1970 2000 2000
mean mina maxa mina maxa
RLEF 21.973 16.0 20.9 18.2 22.9
RLEM 17.678 14.1 17.8 16.0 21.4
POP65 13.369 3.1 14.1 5.3b 17.8b
MORT 845.888 852.3 1328.5 670.9b 1173.5b
HCE/GDP 7.571 2.584 6.951 5.412b 12.865b
RPH 89.820 54.8 121.6 98.6 108.1
GDP 15.762 0.272 5.027 2.974 42.315
HCE−10 0.522 0.006 0.144 0.082 2.820
ALC−10 11.018 0.9 23.7 1.4 16.6
CAL−10 3.048 2.096 3.467 1.870 3.705
̂SY SIPHc 272.165
N 233
aThe minima and maxima for 1970 and 2000 were taken over the whole sample available even if the
observation was not used in the estimation of Table 2.5.
b1999
cEstimated variable, see Equation (2.3) in the text. Values for 1970 and 2000 not available due to missing
values of either P̂OP65, R̂LEF or R̂LEM .
deflators. In view of these difficulties, HCE was not deflated using national price indexes but
by the exchange rate when converting the figures into US$ [avoiding PPP indicators that
may contain additional measurement error; see Gerdtham and Jo¨nsson (1991)].
The variable SISYPH is constructed using predicted values from Equation (2.1) or Equa-
tion (2.2) as follows,
̂SISY PH = (R̂LEF + R̂LEM)/2 ∗ P̂OP65 (2.3)
Finally, the derived demand part of the model is specified as an expenditure share, in keeping
with the duality considerations of section 2.2.1. Thus, the core Equation for the health share
in the GDP reads as follows with the correct error term added and the dummy variables if
needed according to the model in use,
HCE/GDP = α′ + β′1GDP + β
′
2RPH + β
′
3M̂ORT (2.4)
+β′5 ̂SISY PH + error
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Again, no correlation of error terms with those of Equations (2.1) and (2.2) is admitted. In
contradistinction to Equations (2.1) and (2.2), these Equations do not contain squared terms
anymore to avoid extreme multicollinearity. The variable ̂SISYPH already depends on all
values of squared regressors [see Equation (2.1) and Equation (2.2)], while for RPH there is
no theoretical reason to enter a squared value when the dependent variable is interpreted as
a cost share Equation.
2.4 Estimation results
2.4.1 Production of health
As stated at the beginning of section 2.3, Hausman specification tests were performed to
establish both a preferred error structure and choice of lag. In addition, Arellano-Bond tests
were used to determine the order of average autocovariance in residuals. Fixed effects (FE)
versus Random effects (RE) matched with lags of (3, 5, 10) years makes for 6 elements that are
pitted against each other (a combination without replacement), or 6!(6−2)!2! = 15 possibilities.
This totals 15 combinations where each such combination is to take FE as the maintained
hypothesis and to test the RE against it.
It turns out that in all of the 15 comparisons, the FE alternative never dominates without an
exception of at least one lag in at least one Equation making up (2.1) or (2.2). By way of
contrast, the RE specification dominates without exception in three of these 15 paired tests,
and in an additional three with no more than one exception. On the other hand when the
Hausman test is applied to the three lags, (3, 5, 10) dominate in (6, 2, 7) comparisons. Both
lags 3 and 10 have five exceptions, but in lag 3, they are multiple in one case. Therefore, the
evidence suggests a random effects specification with a lag of k = 10 years.
The influence of HCE on Remaining Life Expectancy (RLE)
In the original article by Zweifel and Ferrari (1992), remaining life expectancy of males and
females at ages 40 and 65 was distinguished, the main motivation being the quadrupling of
observations. However, the differences between ages 40 and 60 in the present work proved
minimal when the critical values were computed where additional HCE does not affect RLE
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at the margin. As the policy focus is on individuals approaching retirement, only gender-
specific results for age 60 are shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Remaining life expectancy at age 60, 1970-2000
Females Males
RLEa Coefficient z P > z Coefficient z P > z
GDP 0.122 5.43 0.000 0.077 4.90 0.000
GDP2 -0.002 -3.91 0.000 -0.001 -2.95 0.003
HCE−10 2.045 4.82 0.000 2.022 4.49 0.000
HCE2−10 -0.565 -3.60 0.000 -0.491 -2.95 0.003
ALC−10 -0.043 -0.70 0.484 0.022 0.23 0.822
ALC2−10 0.002 1.02 0.307 -0.001 -0.22 0.827
CAL−10 0.786 0.65 0.515 -0.723 -1.08 0.281
CAL2−10 -0.083 -0.50 0.614 -0.135 1.53 0.125
constant 18.572 9.11 0.000 16.883 13.94 0.000
Wald χ2(8): 210.64 338.33
Prob > χ2: 0.0000 0.0000
1− var(εit)var(RLEF ) : 0.601 0.559
N 303 303
aNote: Included in this Equation are (frequency): Australia(21), Austria(29), Belgium(22), Canada(12),
Denmark(18), Finland(17), Germany(13), Ireland(15), Japan(2), Luxembourg(4), New Zealand(19), Nor-
way(29), Portugal(15), Spain(13), Sweden(16), Switzerland(25), United Kingdom(18), U.S.A.(15)
Contemporaneous GDP (in US$) is associated with higher RLE in both sexes (with females
possibly affected more strongly), confirming results found by Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) as
well as Frech III and Miller (1999). A decreasing marginal effect of income cannot be excluded.
The earlier study by Zweifel and Ferrari is also confirmed in that HCE−10 results in higher
current RLE for both sexes. Since the squared explanatory variable proves highly significant,
a critical value can be calculated beyond which additional lagged HCE is counter-productive
(flat-of-the curve medicine). Among women, this is approximately US$ 1,800, among men,
US$ 2,060, compared to a mean value of US$ 1,375 in 2000. With regard to the lifestyle
indicators, (lagged) consumption of calories and alcohol do not show an influence. Similar
findings would have been attained with a lag of 3 rather than 10 years.
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Influence of HCE on 65+ Population Share
In order to determine the pressure of individuals faced with a given RLE, their population
share must be accounted for, resulting in the variable SISYPH [defined in Equation (2.3)].
However, the population share of individuals 65 and older might depend on (lagged) HCE.
Table 2.3: Share of individuals aged 65 and older, 1970-2000
POP65a Coefficient z P > z
GDP 0.115 6.64 0.000
GDP2 -0.002 -4.67 0.000
HCE−10 0.626 1.35 0.177
HCE2−10 -0.170 -0.97 0.333
ALC−10 0.174 2.75 0.006
ALC2−10 -0.005 -2.89 0.004
CAL−10 -0.274 -1.40 0.161
CAL2−10 0.050 1.80 0.071
constant 11.270 14.15 0.000
Wald χ2(8): 332.63
Prob > χ2: 0.0000
1− var(εit)var(POP65) : 0.190
N 394
aNote: Included in this Equation are (frequency): Australia(21), Austria(30), Belgium(30), Canada(30),
Denmark(19), Finland(19), France(2), Germany(14), Ireland(30), Japan(2), Luxembourg(12), Netherlands(2),
New Zealand(20), Norway(30), Portugal(20), Spain(29), Sweden(17), Switzerland(26), United Kingdom(25),
U.S.A.(16)
The results of Table 2.3 do suggest endogeneity of POP65, but not with regard to HCE−10.
Specifically, higher GDP goes along with a higher share of aged people (up to some US$
28,750), whereas HCE does not have a discernible effect. The first of these two statements
holds also for a lag in HCE, CAL and ALC of 3 years; however, HCE−3 would have attained
statistical significance. In the life style domain, alcohol consumption clearly serves to increase
this share, but with decreasing effect at the margin. The other lifestyle variable does not
contribute to the determination of POP65, regardless of the choice of lag.
Influences on Mortality
Since mortality is not a core variable of the Sisyphus syndrome but mainly serves to take the
surge in HCE towards the end of human life into account, no gender-specific regressions are
presented in Table 2.5. In accordance with early research on the United States [Auster et al.
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(1969)], higher contemporaneous GDP might possibly increase mortality at the high end of
the sample (beyond US$ 35,000; the same holds for HCE−10, beyond US$ 1,490, driving
home the argument made above that mortality occurs sooner or later). None of the lifestyle
variables are statistically significant. All of these statements prove robust to a lag of 3 rather
than 10 years.
Table 2.4: Influences on mortality, 1970-2000
MORT a Coefficient z P > z
GDP -8.319 -3.46 0.001
GDP2 0.118 1.84 0.065
HCE−10 -203.305 -5.68 0.000
HCE2−10 68.349 4.02 0.000
ALC−10 -16.843 -1.85 0.065
ALC2−10 0.452 1.78 0.075
CAL−10 86.145 1.32 0.188
CAL2−10 -15.036 -1.78 0.075
constant 1025.007 8.42 0.000
Wald χ2(8): 431.15
Prob > χ2: 0.0000
1− var(εit)var(MORT ) : 0.574
N 351
aNote: Included in this Equation are (frequency): Australia(19), Austria(30), Belgium(26), Canada(28),
Denmark(16), Finland(16), Germany(13), Ireland(27), Luxembourg(10), New Zealand(19), Norway(28), Por-
tugal(19), Spain(27), Sweden(14), Switzerland(21), United Kingdom(24), U.S.A.(14)
2.4.2 Explaining the Health Share in the GDP
In keeping with arguments proffered in section 2.2.1, the dependent variable here is
HCE/GDP. In the earlier estimation of the Sisyphus syndrome by Zweifel and Ferrari (1992),
an attempt was made to distinguish between private and public HCE to see whether the
feedback from RLE to HCE is particularly marked in the public domain. However, the pub-
lished literature does not make this distinction because the assignment of total HCE to these
two components is far from perfect in many countries, resulting in measurement error (we
thank Pedro Pito Barros, Lisbon, for calling our attention to this). With HCE/GDP being
the dependent variable, resulting in a filtering out of common trends, measurement errors
are expected to play a more important role to begin with. Therefore, the distinction between
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the private and public components is not made here. All endogenous variables estimated in
section 2.4.1 enter with their predicted values, using a lag of 10 years (except for GDP).
Again, the fixed-effects (FE) and the random-effects (RE) specification is based on a Hausman
test. This time, FE dominates. This divergence from the health production part of the model
is puzzling at first sight. However, the production of health depends largely on internationally
available medical technology, whereas HCE (as argued at the end of section 2.2.1), is also
determined by institutional factors that are not so well presented exclusively by an error
component whose autocorrelation coefficient is an average over all countries. Indeed, Canada
and Germany differ comparatively little (some two percentage points) from the United States
(the reference country), Australia, Austria, Portugal and Switzerland form an intermediate
group (around three percentage points), while Luxembourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom
are estimated to lie four percentage points below the United States, ceteris paribus. Other
countries can not be assigned to one of the groups, either because they fall in between or
because they had to be dropped due to multicollinearity (15 cases).
In principle, there could be a problem in particular with the lower bound being zero for HCEGDP .
However, calculations using extreme value combinations of explanatory variables inducing low
predicted values of HCEGDP still produced estimates well within the positive range. This result
is mainly due to the small effect of GDP on the health share. In spite of the political debate
on its rise in major industrial countries, no significant effect of GDP can be discerned. This
means that the estimated income elasticity of HCE is 1.14 (apart from the Sisyphus effect,
see below).2 This is lower than most elasticities in Gerdtham et al. (1992) but higher than
the estimates presented in Gerdtham et al. (1998). As to the role of relative price RPH,
the theoretical prediction would be that both private and public decision makers tend to
substitute health goods for other commodities (aggregated in the GDP) when RPH is high.
The positive coefficient of RPH indicates that the implied price elasticity is slightly below
one.3 Another prediction, already of relevance to the Sisyphus syndrome, is not confirmed,
2The income elasticity of HCE can be calculated as follows. UsingHCE ≡ (HCE/GDP )∗GDP, one obtains
∂HCE
∂GDP
= ∂(HCE/GDP )
∂GDP
∗GDP + HCE
GDP
. The first derivative equals β′1+β
′
3
∂M̂ORT
∂GDP
+β′4
∂ ̂SISY PH
∂GDP
from Equation
(2.4); therefore, the elasticity is given by e(HCE,GDP ) = (β′1+β
′
3
∂M̂ORT
∂GDP
+β′4
∂ ̂SISY PH
∂GDP
)× (GDP )2
HCE
+1 = 1.14
evaluated at sample means (see Tables 2.1 and 2.5).
3Since HCE/GDP is formed using nominal figures, it contains RPH. Noting that RPH = PH/PGDP
(the ratio of the health to the GDP deflator), and using lower case symbols for real quantities, one has
(hce/gdp) ∗RPH = ...β′2 ∗RPH + ..., or hce ∗RPH = ...β′2 ∗RPH ∗ gdp. Differentiating with respect to RPH,
one obtains, hce ∗ (1+ η) = β′2 ∗ gdp, where η is the elasticity of the demand for health care (hce) w.r.t. RPH.
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Table 2.5: Health share in the GDP, 1970-2000
HCE/GDP na Coefficient z P > z
Dum Australia 19 -3.057 -7.90 0.000
Dum Austria 26 -3.167 -8.62 0.000
Dum Canada 12 -2.179 -5.35 0.000
Dum Denmark 16 -2.466 -6.26 0.000
Dum Finland 15 -3.238 -8.21 0.000
Dum Germany 11 -1.640 -3.89 0.000
Dum Ireland 15 -2.706 -6.27 0.000
Dum Luxembourg 4 -4.375 -8.45 0.000
Dum NewZealand 16 -3.679 -9.29 0.000
Dum Norway 28 -3.515 -9.64 0.000
Dum Portugal 8 -2.890 -6.33 0.000
Dum Spain 10 -4.001 -8.83 0.000
Dum Switzerland 21 -3.081 -8.14 0.000
Dum UnitedKingdom 17 -3.906 -9.89 0.000
GDP -0.020 -1.13 0.260
RPH 0.012 2.03 0.042
M̂ORT 0.010 1.72 0.085
̂SISY PH 0.069 2.98 0.003
constant -18.092 -1.59 0.112
Wald χ2(18): 524.26
Prob > χ2: 0.0000
1− var(εit)var(HCE/GDP ) : 0.847
N 232
aNote that n is the number of country-specific observations, with the benchmark U.S.A. being in the sample
14 times.
viz. that a higher mortality rate in a given year means a greater number of individuals in
their last year of life, causing HCE to be high in that year. The coefficient of M̂ORT is
positive but nonsignificant.
Of course, the variable of crucial interest is ̂SISY PH, the remaining life expectancy at age
60 weighted by the share of individuals close to retirement age. It has a highly significant
coefficient, possibly raising the scepter of an aging population that keeps the spiral in motion
indefinitely.
Solving for η, one obtains η = β′2 ∗ (HCE/GDP )−1 − 1. Evaluated at the sample means, this amounts to
−0.99.
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Conclusion 3. The reestimation of the feedback relationship, linking (population share-
weighted) remaining life expectancy to the health share in the GDP, yields preliminary sta-
tistical evidence of a Sisyphus syndrome.
2.4.3 Assessing the strength of the Sisyphus syndrome
The estimates presented in the previous section allow to conclude that there is some prelimi-
nary evidence that between 1970 and 2000 a Sisyphus syndrome may have existed. The open
question remains of whether the syndrome may be a phenomenon of sufficient importance to
merit attention for some or all OECD countries. This calls for the evaluation of the partial
derivative ∂HCE/∂HCE−10: If in a given year during the period of observation, HCE was
stepped up, to what extent will later HCE be higher as a consequence of the syndrome (the
lag being 10 years as established through specification tests)? If this derivative should exceed
unity, this would constitute evidence of a locally explosive cycle; a globally explosive situa-
tion can be excluded because all derivatives to be evaluated have critical values where they
become zero (linear and quadratic regressors have opposite signs in Tables 2.2 to 2.4). The
identity
HCE ≡ (HCE/GDP ) ∗GDP (2.5)
may be used to obtain Equation (2.6), establishing the link between HCE/GDP and
HCE−10:
∂HCE
∂HCE−10
=
=
∂((HCE/GDP ) ∗GDP )
∂HCE−10
=
∂(HCE/GDP )
∂HCE−10
∗GDP + (HCE/GDP ) ∗ ∂GDP
∂HCE−10
=
∂(HCE/GDP )
∂HCE−10
∗GDP (2.6)
since ∂GDP/∂HCE−10 is assumed to be zero due to the long lag.4
4However, other contributions found a significant influence of (contemporaneous) HCE on the GDP rate
of growth [see e.g. Devarajan et al. (1996) or Beraldo et al. (2007)]. Estimating the elasticity of GDP with
respect to HCE−10 at the sample means yields e(GDP,HCE−10) = 0.37. This estimate is at the high end
because it fails to control for increased inputs of labor and capital as well as technological change. In addition,
replacing sample means by minimum and maximum values for the year 2000 yields e(GDP,HCE−10) ² (-0.681,
0.378), a range compatible with the assumption introduced.
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Now HCE−10 influences current HCE through SISYPH, which is designed to capture the
impact of population-weighted RLE on the demand for health care and hence HCE [see
Equation (2.3) again]. Implicit differentiation then yields,
∂(HCE/GDP )
∂HCE−10
=
=
∂(HCE/GDP )
∂SISY PH
∗ ∂SISY PH
∂HCE−10
=
∂(HCE/GDP )
∂SISY PH
1
2
[
∂RLEF
∂HCE−10
+
∂RLEM
∂HCE−10
]
∗ POP65, (2.7)
since ∂POP65/∂HCE−10 may be set to zero, according to Table 2.3. Substituting (2.7) into
(2.6) and noting that GDP is measured in thousands of US$ and therefore needs to be
rescaled, one obtains,
∂HCE
∂HCE−10
=
=
1
2︸︷︷︸∗∂(HCE/GDP )∂SISY PH︸ ︷︷ ︸∗
 ∂RLEF
∂HCE−10
+
∂RLEM
∂HCE−10︸ ︷︷ ︸
∗POP65︸ ︷︷ ︸∗GDP︸ ︷︷ ︸∗ 11000︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0.5 ∗ 0.069 ∗ (1.46 + 1.51) ∗ 13.60 ∗15.76∗0.001 ≈ 0.021
(2.8)
The derivatives come from Tables 2.2 and 2.5 but have to be evaluated at specific values
because the regressors of Table 2.2 appear not only in linear but also in quadratic form.
Neglecting estimated coefficients that are nonsignificant and inserting overall sample means
one concludes that US$ 1 of HCE−10 induces some US$ 0.02 of current HCE due to the
dynamics of the Sisyphus syndrome. Assuming exponential decay, one could say that 68
percent of a one-time shock to HCE is carried over to the following year (0.6810 ≈ 0.02).
This is far enough from unity to suggest that the cycle is not explosive.
Conclusion 4. The Sisyphus syndrome seems to have been of some importance during the
observation period, with an estimated 68 percent of one US$ of additional HCE carrying over
to the following year, which points to stability.
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter started from the notion that the production of health and the determination
of health care expenditure (HCE ) should be analyzed jointly. Short of adopting the dual-
ity argument to the effect that estimating either a production function or an expenditure
(share) function is sufficient, the two links are seen as constituting a dynamic feedback rela-
tionship. Once HCE is stepped up exogenously, it may well (with a lag) increase remaining
life expectancy and hence the planning horizon of an individual considering an investment in
health. This should increase demand for HCE, resulting in a feedback that constitutes the
Sisyphus syndrome. The macroeconomic importance of this syndrome crucially depends on
the remaining life expectancy of those who are at retirement age, beyond which they con-
tribute little to the financing of HCE. These considerations call for the construction of the
variable ̂SISY PH, which is the remaining life expectancy at age 60 weighted by the share
of individuals aged 65+, the age discrepancy caused by data availability.
From 1970 to 2000 and among OECD countries, there is confirming evidence for both links.
Prior HCE is positively related both to remaining life expectancy at age 60 and the popu-
lation share of the aged 65+ and hence the ̂SISY PH variable. In its turn, ̂SISY PH proves
to be a significant determinant of the health share in GDP . An initial HCE increase of US$
1 is estimated to still result in US$ 0.02 a decade later as a result of the Sisyphus syndrome.
Assuming exponential decay, 68 percent of a one-time shock thus are estimated to carry over
to the following year. Since the income elasticity of HCE is estimated to be close to one
ceteris paribus, much of the observed increase of the health share in the GDP can be traced
to the Sisyphus syndrome.
However, one might argue that a Sisyphus syndrome does not really exist. For one, GDP
could have been interpreted as a lifestyle variable rather than indicating a budget constraint.
This would have called for the introduction of lags for this variable, which could have pointed
to delayed adjustments of HCEGDP even exceeding the 30 years covered by the present sample.
In addition, in view of the high degree of multicollinearity between HCE and GDP regardless
of the lag selected (simple correlation coefficients always in excess of 0.8538), the estimated
effects of lagged HCE on remaining life expectancy likely would have dropped and possibly
could have lost significance. In that event, there would be no evidence of HCE contributing to
the growth of a population segment that has a particular interest in the increased provision of
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health care services in a later period. Finally some OECD countries have missing values more
often than others, which may introduce a selection bias to the extent that those not reporting
have less problems with rising HCE (which are interpreted as a reflection of the Sisyphus
syndrome in this chapter). The countries more consistently represented in the sample might
therefore introduce a bias in favor of finding such a syndrome.
While such arguments cannot be rejected out of hand, there are at least two considerations
that speak against these. The first is that the hypothesis of a Sisyphus syndrome as a dynamic
relationship puts emphasis on lags. Specifically, in previous research on the production of
health, contemporaneous HCE was not found to consistently lower mortality rates or increase
longevity. However, when introducing a lag of ten years, both Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) and
Frech III and Miller (1999) were able to relate remaining life expectancy to previous HCE,
and this lag is replicated in the present study. Second, the link between production and factor
demand theory suggests use of an expenditure share function (HCE/GDP) which is much less
influenced by a time trend thanHCE itself. And it is with such a detrended dependent variable
that ̂SISY PH, whose construction is entirely motivated by the maintained hypothesis, proves
highly significant.
On the whole, the evidence suggests that a Sisyphus syndrome may have been operative in
the OECD countries until the end of the past century. Although its dynamics are far from
explosive, it mirrors the concern of policy makers that the decision to increase health care
expenditure could have some similarity with the proverbial ride on a tiger.
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Chapter 3
Life-cycle effects of social security
in an open economy:
A theoretical and empirical survey
3.1 Introduction
The conventional view of the relationship between demographic and social security (alter-
natively, the term social insurance will be used) is that exogenous demographic change has
impacts both on the financing and the benefits side of social security. Usually, the economy
is treated as a closed system, abstracting from both trade flows and migration of factors of
production. If taken into account, these flows tend to be subsumed under ’effects of globaliza-
tion’, which often serve as a scapegoat for the future problems several social security systems
are facing.
This chapter purports to propose a radically different view, which however is firmly rooted in
economic theory. It recognizes the fact that demographic change is nothing but the aggregate
of decisions made by individuals in the course of their life cycle. For example, the low share of
young individuals in a population can ultimately be traced to the decision of potential parents
not to have children or of actual parents to refrain from having additional children. As will be
argued below, this (and other such decisions) may be influenced by social security. Therefore,
the vantage point of analysis will be turned around, with emphasis placed on the impact
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social insurance has on individual decisions, which in the aggregate manifest themselves as
demographic change.
The following methodology will be adopted. Throughout, the argument will be couched in
terms of a marginal change (i.e. a moderate expansion or curtailment of social security) rather
than in terms of two worlds, one with and the other without social security. While comparing
two entirely different worlds would provide for sharp contrasts and crisp hypotheses, empirical
evidence comes from the analysis of marginal changes of existing systems. In addition, the
financing side is always distinguished from the benefits side. For example, an increase of
contributions levied by a scheme for the provision for old age (OA) may occur without any
adjustment of claims to future benefits, or benefits may be curtailed without a decrease in
contributions. For example, in 2003 the Swiss federal government lowered the multiplier used
for translating contributions into claims against the public pension system by decree in an
attempt at staving off a deficit. Measures of this type cause the taxation element inherent
in social security in the interest of redistribution to be enhanced, since current beneficiaries
continue to obtain benefits in excess of the present value of their contributions [see Breuer
(1999)].
In some systems (such as Germany and Switzerland), however, additional contributions paid
do result in additional claims against the public OA scheme, at least in principle. For sim-
plicity, this link will be neglected in the analysis, also because it does not exist in social
health insurance (HI) and long-term care insurance (LCI), the two other branches of social
security that presumably have a connection to decisions with demographic implications [other
branches such as unemployment insurance and family allowances are neglected either because
their connection to the decisions analyzed here is too weak or because they are less important
financially, cf. OECD (1996)].
Finally, the analysis will follow an individual over a stylized life cycle characterized by an
educational phase, marriage, and creation of a family, possible divorce, retirement, and death.
This means that certain aspects of work life (such as the length of the work week and duration
of unemployment) are disregarded. However, decisions concerning migration are taken into
account where appropriate.
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3.2 Educational effort and social insurance
3.2.1 Financing of social security and educational effort
This section expounds the impact increasing contributions to HI, OA and LCI may have on
schooling. From an economic perspective, contributions to HI and LCI are roughly comparable
to a tax on labor income. As always, such a tax has a substitution and an income effect. It
makes leisure as the alternative to labor income less costly, causing it to be demanded in
greater quantity, to the detriment of work (substitution effect). However, the reduction in
disposable income occasioned by social security contributions may be important enough to
cause individuals with a low labor income to work more rather than less (income effect). These
two impacts on lifetime labor supply will be addressed again in a separate section. For the
majority of workers in industrial countries, the income effect is unlikely to dominate, resulting
in a positive wage elasticity of labor supply. Indeed, a recent German study incorporating
life cycle effects finds a wage elasticity of labor supply of 0.6 for women and 0.8 for men
[Fenge et al. (2002)]. Conversely, higher contributions to social security are thus predicted to
discourage labor supply.
An expansion of social security therefore is expected to result in a permanent decrease of
expected labor income over the life cycle. This has an impact on educational effort as soon
as young decision makers consider education not only a cultural enrichment but also an
investment. Expected future returns from additional educational effort therefore will be lower,
causing some of possible investment on schooling not to occur. One would therefore expect an
expansion of social security in the case of HI and LCI to have a negative effect on educational
investment. This impact may be mitigated to some extent if vocational training (where usually
contributions to social security must be paid) is substituted by university studies (where
contributions usually are waived).
Table 3.1: Predicted effects of social security’s financing on educational effort
OA HI LCI
Effect on education – – –
In the case of OA, the precise nature of the link between contributions and future benefits
is decisive [see e.g. Lau and Poutvaara (2006)]. Ko¨thenbu¨rger and Poutvaara (2006) model
a closed economy in which reducing social security contributions encourages investment in
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human capital. A similar result was obtained by Echevarria and Iza (2006), complemented
by a simulation using different parameter values. However, contributions may give rise to
claims more than proportionally (as is typical of buildup phases). During this time OA may
even serve to increase the rate of return on educational investment and therefore induce
additional educational effort. Indeed, such an effect was found by Flam and Risa (1995) in
their empirical study. All effects are summarized in Table 3.1.
Turning to the role of increased globalization and economic openness, social security may
induce migration of the labor force. As long as there are differences between countries in
terms of contribution rates to OA (compared to benefits), workers may seek to earn their
incomes in a country offering them a more favorable benefit-contribution ratio than their
home country. Therefore, social insurance in the (less expensive) foreign country may achieve
a surplus from migration, while social insurance in the (expensive) home country risks to end
up in deficit. However, it was impossible to find empirical evidence of migration of workers
induced by social security arbitrage.
3.2.2 Social security benefits and educational effort
With regard to HI, increased benefits should have an enhancing effect on educational effort.
For HI secures access to medical care designed to maintain health status at a level that
enables the young to pursue an education at all. Moreover, it reduces the risk of a future
health loss that (due to lack of medical care) is so grave as to result in a partial or full loss
of labor income, an effect that is of particular value to highly educated individuals.
In most industrial countries, OA benefits guarantee a minimum retirement income regardless
of educational effort. In this way, OA causes a reduction of the marginal return to investing
into education. However, this impact should be of minor importance at the time of deciding
about education since rational individuals will discount benefits of OA heavily as they occur
much later (see Table 3.2). In fact, there is some evidence that the subjective rate of discount
is between 6 and 20 percent p.a. [Lawrance (1991); Coller and Williams (1999)]. On the other
hand, OA may encourage the choice of occupations that yield a higher return to education
due to increased risk [Anderberg (2000)]. With regard to globalization, Poutvaara (2007)
constructs a theoretical model with mobile workers who decide about their investment in
education. He shows that if the home country offers flat-rate OA benefits, then its workers
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invest more than in a closed economy because they hold the prospect of moving to the foreign
country, where OA benefits increase with income.
Table 3.2: Predicted effects of social security’s benefits on educational effort
OA HI LCI
Effect on education (–) + (–)
The benefits of LCI have two objectives. One is to prevent people from ending up in poverty
for the last years of their life, the other, less prominent, to secure their bequeathable wealth.
Concerning the first objective, LCI has the same effect as a supplement to OA and should
therefore tend to somewhat discourage educational effort. As to the second objective, be-
queathable wealth mainly stems from labor income earned over the life cycle. Protection of
this wealth adds to its utility and hence should encourage educational effort as a means to
create it. However, the predicted impact of LCI is minimal because final wealth will be pos-
itive only with a relatively low probability and because there must be relatives and friends
worthy of the bequest. Finally, not only are these effects reduced by the respective probability
weightings but also by discounting to present value (see Table 3.2). Not surprisingly, it has
proved impossible to find supporting empirical evidence.
Conclusion 5. The financing of the three branches of social security analyzed has a negative
predicted overall impact on educational effort beyond the legal minimum. The ambiguous (OA,
LCI) or countervailing (HI) influences of benefits are deemed to be too weak to counterbalance
the clearly negative ones of contributions.
The macroeconomic importance of this conclusion is evident. If social security should end up
discouraging educational effort, it jeopardizes the future competitiveness of a country. With
wage rates and employment increasing at a slower pace, this in turn creates problems for the
financing of social security. This feedback effect constitutes a first indication that assuming
economic growth to be exogenous to social security, as is usual for predicting its financial
status, is deficient in that this disregards the effect social insurance itself may have on growth
[see e.g. Echevarria and Iza (2006)].
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3.3 Marriage and social insurance
3.3.1 Financing of social security and marriage
Often marriage provides the opportunity for one of the two partners to withdraw from the
labor market. This decision is the more likely the smaller the concomitant loss of labor
income. Since disposable labor income is reduced by social security contributions, nonmarket
work becomes more attractive. In most countries, claims to HI and LCI are not affected as
long as the working partner continues to pay contributions, while OA benefits are reduced
to married couples in most OECD countries to reflect cost saving achieved by jointly living
(Table 3.3 lists all effects). To the extent that mainly the less qualified worker shifts his or her
activity into the household, increasing openness of the economy should reinforce this effect.
The reason for this is the fact that globalization puts pressure especially on the wage rates of
less qualified workers, thus reducing the opportunity cost of withdrawal [most likely women
who on average continue to earn a lower wage rate than their male partners, cf. Disney and
Whitehouse (2002)].
Table 3.3: Predicted effects of social security’s financing on marriage
OA HI LCI
Effect on marriage (+) + +
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be empirical evidence regarding these predictions. The
closest analogy is income taxation, which also serves to reduce disposable income (without
however giving rise to future claims). The effects of taxation on marriage have been the sub-
jects of empirical research. For example, Alm and Whittington (1997) find that the changing
tax burden associated with marriage has an effect on the timing of marriage.
3.3.2 Social security benefits and marriage
Two persons living together in one household benefit from the advantage of risk diversifica-
tion. Specifically, a minor health loss incurred by one partner can be taken care of by the
other without having recourse to medical services. However, HI makes this advantage less
decisive by facilitating access to formal medical services. HI could therefore cause marriage
contracts not to be concluded or concluded later in life. However, in some countries (such as
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Germany), HI covers nonactive family members as well without a surcharge. In these coun-
tries, this constitutes an advantage that may neutralize or even overcompensate the negative
impact HI otherwise would have on marriage.
Similar arguments can be made with regard to OA. In some countries, married women are also
covered without an additional contribution. This feature of OA benefits constitutes a definite
incentive favoring marriage. Once more however, benefits are far in the future, causing them
to be discounted to present value and reducing their impact.
Table 3.4: Predicted effects of social security’s benefits on marriage
OA HI LCI
Effect on marriage (+) – –
[0 also possible] [(+) also possible]
With regard to LCI, the notable fact is that the married spouse provides the major part of
long-term care [Schneekloth and Pothoff (1993)]. With LCI, these informal services tend to
be substituted by formal ones provided in homes and by professional service providers. Thus,
LCI serve to somewhat undermine the motivation for marriage (its effects again occurring
far in the future). Some preliminary evidence refers to the United States and a proposal
to extend Medicaid to cover families with two rather than one parent present [Yelowitz
(1998)]. Moreover, teenage marriages and pregnancies out of wedlock are found to be more
frequent when public support (such as Aid for Mothers with Dependent Children, AFDC)
is substantial in comparison to obtainable labor income [Bernstam and Swan (1986)]. These
benefits would be lost if parents were to marry or live jointly in a household. Table 3.4 shows
the considered effects of social insurance benefits on marriage. An opening of the economy
probably would not have an additional impact, and there are no empirical studies investigating
these additional effects.
Conclusion 6. The financing side of social insurance creates incentives in favor of marriage,
while the benefits have mixed predicted effects. OA benefits favor married couples, while HI
and LCI tend to have weak negative effects on marriage.
On the whole, social security may have an impact on the civilian status of a population.
This impact likely has limited influence on economic development, with the exception of an
increase of the aggregate cost of health care because of a further growth of the number of
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single-person households, who have to rely to a greater extent on the benefits of HI and LCI
than married individuals [Zweifel and Breyer (1997), ch. 11.2].
3.4 Number of children and social insurance
3.4.1 Financing of social security and number of children
Additional contributions to be paid to social security (HI, OA, and LCI) reduce disposable
income over a major part of the life cycle. One possibility of neutralizing this reduction is to
keep the number of children low or to refrain from having children. A negative relationship
between social insurance and the number of children (who originally were a source of security
in the family) has been theoretically argued by Felderer (1992). Empirical evidence has been
provided by Cigno and Rosati (1996), showing that in England, Germany, Italy and the
United States expansions of OA coverage were linked to a reduction in birth rates. However,
other branches of social insurance not considered here might encourage having children. For
example, German unemployment insurance, the replacement rate increases from 65 to 75% of
the previous wage when there are children [Hujer and Schneider (1989)]. Table 3.5 summarizes
the effects of financing on children.
Table 3.5: Predicted effects of social security’s financing on the number of children
OA HI LCI
Effect on the number of children – – –
Economic openness is predicted to reinforce this negative relationship because children con-
stitute an impediment to mobility, making it more costly for parents to migrate in an attempt
to avoid an unfavorable benefit-contribution ratio of social insurance. However, there do not
seem to exist empirical studies concerning such a reinforcement effect.
3.4.2 Social security benefits and number of children
Again, the different branches of social insurance need to be distinguished. In principle, chil-
dren increase the risk of incurring medical expenditures. By covering this cost to a great
extent, HI mitigates this risk, thus encouraging larger families.
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With regard to OA, there is potential substitution between support provided by children
to their retired parents and the benefits of OA. An expansion of OA quite likely causes
a reduction of support provided by children (Table 3.6). The evidence comes mainly from
developing countries where children still importantly contribute to the livelihood of their
parents [Lillard and Willis (1997); Swidler (1986)]. More recently, Ehrlich and Kim (2007)
have analyzed a panel of 57 countries covering 33 years. They find that birth rates are
negatively related to OA benefits, holding constant the gender ratio, net growth of marriages,
female labor force participation, and the gender ratio of educational attainment among others.
While marriage partners provide most informal long-term care, children (especially daughters)
are an important source as well. To the extent that social insurance provides financial support
for formal services, substitution again is likely to be triggered, causing children to curtail their
provision of services. However, this effect usually lies far in the future at the time of marriage,
and the likelihood of LTC is still low [although increasing, see Stru¨we (1996), Schma¨hl and
Rothgang (1996)], causing them to be second-order.
Table 3.6: Predicted effects of social security’s benefits on the number of children
OA HI LCI
Effect on the number of children (–) + (–)
With migration between open economies children who live abroad have reduced value to
potential parents. Indeed, Schrieder and Knerr (2000) find evidence suggesting that once
children have left their native community in Cameroon, the amount of money remitted to
their parents is low unless they stand to receive a bequest. This means that parents’ efforts
at influencing or even controlling children’s behavior become costly and often ineffective.
This is even more true when children know that thanks to OA and LCI there is no threat
of their parents’ spending their last years of life in poverty. Moreover, LCI helps securing
their inheritance at any rate. Given these difficulties, the incentive to have children at all is
weakened even more [Lindbeck et al. (1999)].
Conclusion 7. Both contributions and benefits of social insurance are likely to cause a sub-
stitution of children by social security benefits, thus reducing population growth.
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3.5 Divorce and social insurance
As a rule, the effects of social insurance on divorce should be the mirror image of those on
marriage.
3.5.1 Financing of social security and divorce
When considering dissolving the marriage, the partner concerned frequently must take into
account that she will have to return to work. The more contributions to social insurance reduce
disposable income from work, the less attractive this alternative becomes. This implies that
the financing side of social insurance may stabilize marriage [an effect which may be viewed
critically, see e.g. Estes (2004)]. Table 3.7 summarizes the effects.
Table 3.7: Predicted effects of social security’s financing on divorce
OA HI LCI
Effect on divorce – – –
3.5.2 Social security benefits and divorce
Having HI makes it easier for singles to cope with sickness because HI enables them to rely on
formal medical care with little if any out-of-pocket payment. As to OA, pensions of married
couples usually fall short of the double of the pension of a single person in most industrial
countries, reflecting the cost savings achievable by jointly living in a household [Disney and
Johnson (2001)]. The closer the equivalence of differences in pensions and costs of living, the
more OA benefits are neutral with regard to divorce. It is the LCI benefit that lowers the cost
of divorce. Since singles rely less on unpaid long-term care services provided by the marriage.
Thus, this serves to reinforce the effects of HI, which has already been found to facilitate
singly living (see Table 3.8).
Table 3.8: Predicted effects of social security’s benefits on divorce
OA HI LCI
Effect on divorce (–) + +
Studies relate the increase in the number of single older women since 1950 in the United
States to the expansion of OA benefits [Costa (1999)]. This result probably has little to do
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with the openness of the economy (as in the case of the marriage decision, see the pertinent
section above).
Conclusion 8. While contributions to social insurance create an incentive to avoid divorce,
its benefits work in favor of divorce. The effects of the latter presumably outweigh the former.
However, an increase of the divorce rate induced by social insurance should not have much of
an impact on the economy because it also causes the rate of labor participation to increase. In
fact, one-third of the increase of female participation rates in the United States during 1960 to
1980 can be explained by the increase of divorce rates; moreover, women in marriages at risk
work more hours than do others [Johnson and Skinner (1986)]. This increase of labor supply
could even enhance growth at the macroeconomic level, giving rise to a positive feedback on
the financing of social insurance. On the other hand, singles are more likely to claim benefits
especially of HI and LCI [Klein (1996)], so the overall impact of this feedback may well be
unfavorable. In other words, since the so-called biological rate of return of pay-as-you-go
social security importantly depends on the rate of growth of the active population [Aaron
(1996)], its effect on divorce tends to jeopardize the financial equilibrium of social insurance
in the long run.
3.6 Retirement and social insurance
3.6.1 Financing of social security and retirement
An important motive for deferring retirement is the prospect of earning extra labor income.
However, to the extent that contributions to social insurance do not create well-defined in-
dividual claims (HI, LCI), they make deferral less attractive while encouraging earlier retire-
ment. In the case of OA, additional contributions usually do found claims to future benefits.
Where this is not the case, workers tend to retire early [Boldrin et al. (1999)]. This makes
the expected impact of OA benefits on labor supply ambiguous [for the role of future claims
in the context of unemployment insurance, see Atkinson and Micklewright (1991)], however,
their expansion on the whole seems to have contributed to earlier retirement [Viebrok (1997)].
Table 3.9 summarizes the effects.
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Table 3.9: Predicted effects of social security’s financing on early retirement
OA HI LCI
Effect on early retirement 0 + +
[(+) also possible]
In the context of globalization, this effect is but reinforced because the portability of benefits
increases the choice of locations for life in retirement. Being very recent, these tendencies
have not yet been empirically studied.
3.6.2 Social security benefits and retirement
With regard to HI, the following effect is to be expected theoretically. Since utilization of
medical care entails minimum out-of-pocket expense, other impediments become decisive.
These impediments are the opportunity costs associated with travel and waiting time. Their
importance has been documented e.g. by Leu and Doppmann (1986) [cited in Zweifel and
Breyer (1997), ch. 4.4]. In retirement, these time costs lose relevance. By retiring, individuals
benefit from lower opportunity costs. Conversely, an expansion of HI arguably encourages
earlier retirement (Table 3.10), which permits the insured to have unfettered access to medical
care.
The connection with OA is more direct as OA benefits serve to mitigate the loss of income
that would go along with retirement. Moreover, early retirement almost without exception
does not entail an actuarially fair reduction of benefits. This of course cannot but increase the
incentive to retire from active life. In the case of Germany, Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel (1997)
as well as Siddiqui (1997) were able to show the expected effect; for the case of Switzerland,
see Baldenweg-Bo¨lle (1998), ch. 7; for the Netherlands, see Heyma (2004); for the U.S., see
Burtless (1986).
Table 3.10: Predicted effects of social security’s benefits on early retirement
OA HI LCI
Effect on early retirement + + –
Migration as part of increased openness presumably reinforces these effects in two ways.
First, by spending time abroad, workers get to know different legal systems and lifestyles,
which serves to widen their choice of locations for retirement. And among those additional
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locations, there may be one that makes early retirement particularly attractive. Second,
provided the elderly are successful in having contribution rates increased rather than their
pensions curtailed, high-wage earners are predicted to go elsewhere [Leers et al. (2003)].
This train of thought also establishes a connection with educational effort (see above). In-
creasingly, this effort does not occur in schools but during professional activity. The earlier
expected retirement, the shorter the payback period to educational investment, and the less
therefore the incentive to invest. This is the conclusion reached by Jensen et al. (2004), who
then compare retirement benefits to old-age benefits (which are paid regardless of employ-
ment status), with old-age benefits clearly inducing longer learning. However, there does not
seem to be empirical evidence relating to a reduction of continued training caused by earlier
retirement.
Turning to LCI, the need for long-term care usually occurs at a time when the child (usually
the daughter) is approaching retirement herself. With less LCI coverage, many daughters
presumably would choose retirement in order to have time for providing support to their
parents. With ample LCI coverage, they tend to continue work. Supporting empirical evidence
has been found for the United States by Ettner (1995) as well as Wolf and Soldo (1994).
Therefore, LCI may work against a tendency to quit the work force. However, this effect is
limited to those still rare cases where at least one elder in fact becomes a long-term care
patient. Therefore, on the whole the likely effect of social insurance is to encourage early
retirement.
Conclusion 9. The financing of social insurance makes early retirement attractive. The
benefits of health insurance (HI) and old age provision (OA) have the same effect, whereas
long-term care insurance (LCI) may weakly encourage deferred retirement. On the whole, the
three branches of social insurance analyzed tend to reduce labor supply at higher ages.
As noted already in the context of Conclusion 1, this constitutes another instance where the
impact of social security on aggregate labor supply and hence income likely is unfavorable,
creating the potential for negative feedback that on the long run may drive social insurance
schemes into deficit.
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3.7 Life expectancy and social insurance
3.7.1 Financing of social security and life expectancy
Admittedly individuals cannot choose their time of death. However, they certainly can un-
dertake efforts that influence their remaining life expectancy by investing in prevention and
medical care. In each individual case, early death may occur in spite of these efforts; however,
at the level of entire populations, such effects are discernible [Frech and Miller (2001), Zweifel
et al. (2005)]. Therefore, the argument proceeds as though everyone had influence on his or
her time of death.
Table 3.11: Predicted effects of social security’s financing on life expectancy
OA HI LCI
Effect on life expectancy 0 0 0
Since most individuals nowadays live to retirement, contributions to OA are a fixed cost once
they are retired. As such, they do not have any relevance for efforts to increase life expectancy.
As to the financing of HI and LCI, contributions do not increase with age (in spite of a growing
risk that would call for an adjustment if they were risk-based as in commercial insurance).
However, even private insurers fail to fully adjust HI premiums to this risk [Herring and
Pauly (2001)]. This fact implies that as far as HI and LCI are concerned, the marginal cost
of living another year is a constant; the financing side of social insurance thus is predicted to
have no influence on efforts to increase remaining life expectancy (see Table 3.11), and there
is no empirical evidence for such an influence.
3.7.2 Social security benefits and remaining life expectancy
Since OA benefits are paid as a regular income rather than a lump sum capital, longer life does
not entail a reduced quality of life (due to fewer resources available per period). The contrast
can be seen by comparing OA with a private life policy that pays a capital to survivors at a
specified age. If beneficiaries had to live off this capital for the remainder of their lives, they
would be constrained to spend less per period to balance an increase in longevity, causing a
decrease in the quality of life. Longer remaining life expectancy would thus entail a financial
sanction that is absent from current OA systems.
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the argument. The curve RR′ symbolizes the boundary of attainable
combinations of remaining life expectancy and quality of remaining life years (determined at
least in part by income per year) if a private insurer paid out a capital at age 60 (say). It
indicates that more life years can only be had at the cost of a sacrifice in terms of quality
of life. By way of contrast, the boundary QQ′ symbolizes a typical public OA system, which
guarantees an annual pension regardless of the number of years lived. As a matter of fact,
the beneficiary needs to live another year to receive the OA benefit. On the other hand,
preferences are represented by indifference curves that show a certain level of expected utility
(EU). What Figure 3.1 shows is that while the individual seems to be indifferent between
RR′ and QQ′ at point S∗, in fact he or she would opt for S∗∗ on QQ′ if given a choice, since
EU1 > EU0. However, this choice goes along with a higher life expectancy R∗∗ (compared to
that pertaining to point S∗) and a lower quality of life. Also note that a transition to a point
like S′ (associated with reduced remaining life expectancy) is excluded if S∗ was an initial
optimum. Thus, the prediction is that current public pension systems encourage people to
strive for a long life.
Figure 3.1: The predicted effects of a fixed-income vs. a lump-sum pension system
R
R’ Q’
Qualityof life = f(..., income/period)
Q
S*
EU
0
EU
1
S**
S‘
R**
Q**
RR‘ : Boundary of feasible set if
Remaining Life Expectancy
Q*
As to HI, it has the property of decreasing the price of medical care at the time of utiliza-
tion, including those that serve to increase life expectancy. In the same vein, LCI subsidizes
services that improve the quality of life, usually when time of death is near. The majority of
beneficiaries have financial reserves that would last only for a short stay in a nursing home.
Without LCI coverage, they would soon suffer a big reduction in quality of life that would
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undermine their interest in prolonging life. Therefore, the easing of the trade-off between
longevity and quality of life noted in the case of OA is even more marked in the case of LCI.
Table 3.12: Predicted effects of social security’s benefits on life expectancy
OA HI LCI
Effect on life expectancy + + +
The prediction that current OA systems increase remaining life expectancy was tested by
Philipson and Becker (1998). Using information about retired employees of U.S. government,
they distinguished groups according to their claims to future benefits. The group with the
lowest expected benefits, amounting to less than US$ 1,000 a year, had 40 percent survivors
at the age of 80 whereas the group with the highest, 63 percent. Clearly, it is inappropriate
to attribute the entire difference to the incentives that emanate from the prospect of a higher
OA benefit. Federal employees of the top group, being more educated and earning higher
incomes, presumably would have had a higher remaining life expectancy even without the
incentive of the OA benefit. Finally, these effects have little to do if at all with the degree
of openness of an economy, mainly because they do not depend on the choice of residence in
the country or abroad. Conclusion 6 summarizes Tables 3.11 and 3.12.
Conclusion 10. Whereas contributions to social security (HI, OA, LCI) do not have an
impact on longevity, clear incentives to prolong life emanate from benefits, which are con-
ditioned on survival without exception. This effect is reinforced when the three branches of
social security are considered in combination.
Current institutional design not only of HI but also of the other branches of social security
could therefore have at least some impact on the aging of population. Individuals profit
considerably from not having to bear the risk of excessive remaining life expectancy. When
deciding about contributions to social security, policy makers need to account for these effects
lest they jeopardize the financial equilibrium of the system.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, demographic change was not viewed as predetermined but endogenous, i.e. the
consequence of individual decisions over the life cycle. The three branches of social security
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considered (health insurance HI, old age provision OA, and long-term care insurance LCI)
have been found to influence individual decisions at several stages of the life cycle. The
findings of this chapter are summarized in Table 3.13. The entries show that in the majority
of cases, decisions are modified in a way as to lower labor supply and hence long-run economic
growth, resulting in a reduction rather than increase of future contributions to social security.
While many of the theoretically predicted impacts have not been systematically tested to this
date, there is at least preliminary evidence supporting some of them. However, this evidence
is not firm enough to permit estimation of a net effect where social security contributions
and benefits have opposing impacts, e.g. divorce.
Table 3.13: Overview of theoretically predicted effects on life-cycle decisions
Effects of OA, HI, LCI
Decision Contributions Benefits Globalization
Theory Evid. Theory Evid. Theory Evid.
Education – on wage n.a. +/– on wage n.a. + n.a.
Marriage – on LS (X) +/– on LS (X) 0 n.a.
Children + on LS (+) on LS (X) + n.a.
– on future LS X
Divorce – on LS n.a. + on LS (X) 0 n.a.
Retirement – on LS (X) – on LS X + n.a.
Life Exp. 0 on LS (X) 0 on LS (X) 0 n.a.
RLE (X) + on RLE (X)
Note: Evid. = evidence, Life Exp. = life expectancy, LS = labor supply, RLE = remaining
life expectancy, (X) = (some) confirming evidence, n.a. = not available
Clearly, the relationships expounded here are important also for private insurance. However,
private insurance differs from social security in three aspects. First, private insurers make
less favorable risks pay higher premiums, thus providing them with an incentive to improve
their risk profile. Second, private insurers are very much aware of moral hazard, i.e. the
changes in behavior induced by the very conclusion of an insurance contract. For example,
many of them write policies in HI with cost sharing or with limited choice of physicians and
hospitals (managed care options) in order to limit moral hazard effects. Third, the contracts
written by private insurers do not have (at least under conditions of competition) the degree
of homogeneity that characterizes social security, where homogeneity even is an objective
in itself. Therefore, their incentive effects are not as bundled and unidirectional as those
emanating from social security.
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An important finding is that globalization, i.e. the transition to more open economies, tends
to exacerbate the negative feedbacks an expansion of social security may have on economic
growth. Systems run into problems sooner mainly because some of those who can benefit from
increased mobility seek to avoid the financial burdens imposed on them by social insurance.
In sum, the life-cycle effects of social security in open economies serve to constrain policy
makers in their pursuit of the re-distributional goals they have traditionally been seeking to
attain.
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Chapter 4
Correlated risks: A conflict of
interest between insurers and
consumers and its resolution
4.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with a potential conflict between consumers and insurers which arises
from their respective risk management objectives. Individuals as the potential purchasers of
insurance need to manage three assets over their life cycle, health, wealth, and wisdom (skills
of value in the labor market). Impulses impinging on these three assets tend to be positively
correlated, serving to boost demand for insurance by risk-averse individuals. However, to the
extent that benefits paid deviate from expected value (due to clauses in the small print on
the one hand and customer accommodation policy on the other), these deviations should be
negatively correlated across the different types of insurance held by an individual.
Insurers on their part shy away from covering risks that are positively correlated. While
diversified shareholders might opt for the increase in total variance of underwriting results,
they likely are concerned with the demand reaction of existing policyholders who dislike the
increased risk of insolvency Cummins and Sommer (1996). Moreover, profitability may suffer
because of the need for additional reserves to maintain solvency. Finally, management (having
most of their wealth and wisdom tied to the company) seeks to limit underwriting risk.
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This chapter purports to find out whether deviations of actual from expected insurance pay-
ments are indeed positively correlated across lines of insurance, which would serve to enhance
demand but hamper supply, thus creating a conflict of interest between consumers and insur-
ers. As in earlier work by Zweifel (2000) and Zweifel and Lehmann (2001), the investigation
is carried out at the aggregate level. Deviations from expected value are associated with
differences between observed and trend values of insurance payments. The countries studied
are the United States and Switzerland for maximum contrast. Apart from the fact that the
U.S. economy is 35 times bigger than the Swiss, there are important institutional differences.
While private insurance in the United States has been rather competitive, a tight cartel im-
posed uniform products and premiums in Switzerland until 1992. In turn, Swiss social health
insurance is individually contracted whereas U.S. employers (except small businesses) are
mandated to offer health insurance policies as a fringe benefit to their workers. Compared
to earlier research, much longer observation period (22 years or more), permitting improved
tests for long-term trends are available this time. The absence of common trends in insur-
ance payments would indicate a possibility for insurers to hedge their underwriting portfolio
domestically or even across countries.
The next section (section 4.2) presents the relevant literature regarding demand for insurance
in the presence of multiple risks and develops a test showing whether insurance payments
reduce or increase volatility of personal assets. Section 4.3 describes the data, while section 4.4
explains the empirical approach. Section 4.5 shows the short-term and sections 4.6 and 4.7
the long-term results. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Multiple risks: theory and stylized facts
4.2.1 Multiple risks in insurance economics
Multiple risks are of relevance for both the demand and supply of insurance. On the demand
side, the classics by Arrow (1971) and Mossin (1968) show the conditions for demand for
coverage to be positive if the relevant loss is associated with just one source of risk. Ideally,
the contract would cover every possible loss regardless of its cause. However, both problems
of asymmetric information (potential for both adverse selection and moral hazard) and regu-
lation have prevented the writing of such contracts. The result is that markets for insurance
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are incomplete; see e.g. Doherty and Schlesinger (1983b), Mayers and Smith, Jr. (1983),
Schlesinger and Doherty (1985), as well as Gollier and Schlesinger (1995) for an analysis of
such markets.
Doherty and Schlesinger (1983b) and Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) show that independent
insurance payments are suboptimal from the viewpoint of the consumer even in the case
where losses are independent of each other. With two positively correlated losses, demand
for insurance coverage is higher than in the case of independent losses, as demonstrated by
Doherty and Schlesinger (1983a).
For insurers on the other hand, hedging their underwriting risks by combining lines of in-
surance that are negatively correlated seems natural. Positive correlation requires additional
reserves for solvency and thus limits the supply of insurance. However, this argument over-
looks three facts. First, assuming that insurers want to limit volatility, they can still hedge by
holding assets that are positively correlated with their liabilities. After all, investment income
importantly contributes to the bottom line of most companies. Second, as long as increased
risk goes along with increased profitability, an insurance company may still be attractive to
investors. The CAPM applied to insurance indicates that the underwriting beta is of crucial
importance [Zweifel and Eisen (2003, ch. 6.2); Zweifel and Auckenthaler (2008)]. Finally, it is
not clear that the owners of a company want management to eschew risk. Shareholders hold
a call option whose value increases with the variance of the underlying, and it is the negative
demand response of (informed) insurance purchasers that exerts a counter influence. However,
Cummins and Sommer (1996) present empirical evidence suggesting that this counter effect
is strong enough to cause insurers to limit their risk exposure. In sum, positive correlation of
risks makes consumers increase their demand for insurance coverage but insurers to reduce
their supply. These contradicting responses point to a conflict of interest.
4.2.2 How are assets of individuals correlated?
Individuals own three assets, health, wealth, and wisdom (skills generating labor income).
They are subject to impulses that lead to variations in the total value of their portfolios.
Table 4.1 presents the seven impulses that are typically distinguished in (social) insurance,
along with their hypothesized correlations. The impulses considered are illness, accident,
disability, old age, unemployment, increase of family size, and death of the main breadwinner.
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Table 4.1 can be read as follows. Given that someone is old (I4), there is probably a negative
effect on increase in family size (I6). This points to a negative partial correlation. Family
size in turn does not affect age; therefore, total correlation is negative. If on the other hand
someone is sick at home in bed (I1), he or she is unlikely to cause an accident (I2), a negative
partial correlation. However, it could also be that bad health is a result of an accident, a
positive partial correlation. It is hypothesized that total correlation tends to be negative in
this case since the first effect probably dominates.
Table 4.1: Impulses and their hypothesized correlations
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7
I1: Illness
I2: Accident –?
I3: Disability – +
I4: Old age + + +?
I5: Unemployment + +? +? +?
I6: Increase in family size +? 0 0 – +?
I7: Death of main breadwinner – – – + 0? 0
+ positive correlation; – negative correlation; 0 no correlation; +? possible positive correlation; –? possible
negative correlation
Table 4.2 matches the seven impulses considered to the three assets affected. For instance,
disability (I3) is assumed to have a strong influence on all three assets, while old age (I4) is
hypothesized to influence health and wisdom but not wealth due to the fact that after retire-
ment, wealth varies little with age (retired individuals consuming just about their pension).
Table 4.2: Impacts of impulses on individual assets
Health Wealth Wisdom
I1: Illness ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
I2: Accident ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
I3: Disability ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
I4: Old age ∗ 0 ∗
I5: Unemployment ∗ ∗∗ ∗
I6: Increase in family size ∗ ∗∗ ∗
I7: Death of main breadwinner ∗ ∗∗ 0
∗∗ strong effect; ∗ medium effect; 0 no effect
Combining the entries in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, one sees that the three assets are likely to be
positively correlated. Empirical research appears to support this notion. Bartel and Taubman
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(1979), Mitchell (1990), and Ettner (1996) establish a positive correlation between health
and wealth. Rosen and Taubman (1982) and Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) find a positive
relationship between wealth and wisdom, whereas Grossman (1975) and Kenkel (1991) present
empirical evidence to the effect that wisdom and health are positively correlated.
Positive correlations between assets can lead to vicious cycles. Absent insurance, a person
suffering a health loss will not only experience a drain on financial wealth but also have
less opportunity to maintain the level of wisdom (through professional training). An optimal
insurance system should avoid such vicious cycles by offsetting these losses. It is therefore
important to determine how payments of insurance are correlated.
4.2.3 An application of portfolio theory
Since the seminal contribution of Markowitz (1959), it is accepted that risk-averse individ-
uals seek to maximize expected return (µ) on their portfolio subject to a given amount of
volatility (σ), i.e. attaining their efficient portfolio frontier in (µ, σ)-space. Now the different
private and social insurance policies held by consumers can be viewed as assets constituting a
portfolio. Since premiums are non-stochastic by and large, they will be ignored in the follow-
ing. Payments, on the other hand contain a stochastic element for the insured. For example,
ignored or forgotten clauses in the small print in private insurance and missing contribution
years or change of employers in social insurance may cause payments to be below expected
value. Conversely, consumer accommodation policy sometimes results in benefits that are
higher than could be expected. In sum, there is reason for volatility in payments (σ > 0).
Table 4.3: Comparison of nominal rates of return on private and social insurance
1960-2007 0 1974-1979
Private rf 0 Social lw Private rf Social lw
United States 6.92 6.98 8.07 10.03
Switzerland 4.27 2.491 4.90 n.a.
Sweden 8.22 7.69 9.62 11.87
Denmark 10.01 7.702 16.38 13.17
United Kingdom 8.58 8.55 13.01 17.04
Austria 7.093 6.234 8.83 10.49
Japan 5.255 8.33 7.90 13.46
Turning to expected returns (µ), there could considerably be differences between the different
lines of insurance and particularly between private and social insurance. The rate of return
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on private insurance policies can be equated to the risk-free rate of interest on the capital
market, while the one on social insurance can be approximated by the growth in wages, in
keeping with the seminal argument by Samuelson (1958). However, no systematic difference
between the two rates before tax can be inferred from Table 4.3. During the period 1960 -
2007, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and Austria exhibit long-term rates of interest that
exceed the growth of labor incomes, while the opposite holds true for Japan. However, during
1974 - 1979, the rate of interest was below the growth rate of wages and salaries both in
Sweden and Austria. As an approximation, it seems legitimate to infer equality between
the rates of return on private and social insurance. Additionally a conventional two-sided
t-Test on the equality of means between the two time-series on return rates revealed a highly
significant difference only for Denmark. In all the remaining countries the null Hypothesis on
the equality of the two means could not be rejected on a one percent level. The (µ, σ)-criterion
can therefore be reduced to volatility (σ). Accordingly, an ideal insurance system therefore
should minimize total asset variance to which consumers are exposed.
Suppose there are two impulses, death of main breadwinner and accidents, affecting assets X
and Y (e.g. health and wealth). Asset values in money terms, including expected payments
for claims, are labelled Xa and Y a (e.g. life insurance and accident insurance). Unexpected
deviations from expected benefits are symbolized by x and y, respectively. Total asset variance
then amounts to
Var(Xa + x+ Y a + y) =

Var(Xa)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+Var(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+Var(Y a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+Var(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
2 · Cov(Xa, Y a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+2 · Cov(Xa, x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+2 · Cov(Xa, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+
2 · Cov(Y a, x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+2 · Cov(Y a, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+2 · Cov(x, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
(4.1)
Four out of the six covariances can be set to zero for the following reasons. In the case
of Cov(Xa, x) and Cov(Y a, y), this is due to the very definition of unexpected deviations
(x, y). In addition, Cov(Xa, y) and Cov(Y a, x) are (close to) zero because normally insurance
covers just one type of loss, regardless of the occurrence of another impulse. For example,
premature death usually does not trigger a payment under the title of accident insurance. As
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to Cov(Xa, Y a), it is positive as long as the policies feature cost-sharing provisions because
the two impulses still result in lowered asset values. In all, the sign of Cov(x, y) proves crucial
for total asset variance. If this covariance is negative, it reduces the total amount of asset
variance, if positive, increases it. Thus, to the extent that correlations between unexpected
deviations in insurance payments are positively correlated, they expose consumers to excess
asset volatility, preventing them from reaching the efficient frontier in (µ, σ)-space.
In sum, positive correlations between stochastic deviations in insurance payments cause inef-
ficiencies in the insurance system as a whole. This conclusion forms the basis of the empirical
tests to be carried out in sections 4.4 to 4.7 below. Admittedly, correlation reflects linear
dependence only. Recently, copula theory has been developed to model hidden nonlinear de-
pendencies that might be responsible for fat tails in the loss distribution [see e.g. Embrechts
et al. (2003), Embrechts (2008)].6
4.3 Data
The analysis deals with yearly data for insurance claims paid in the United States and Switzer-
land. They cover the period 1970 - 2004 in the case of the United States for private insurance
and from 1980 - 2001 for social insurance. The data is taken from the Life Insurers Fact Book
2003 and 2005, published by the American Council of Life Insurers. They are complemented
by information from National Health Expenditures 2003 and 2004 published by the U.S. De-
partment of Health & Human Services for the years 1960 - 2004. The data on social insurance
come from the OECD Social Expenditure Database 2004, covering 1980 to 2001.
In the case of Switzerland, the source is Die privaten Versicherungseinrichtungen in der
Schweiz, published by the Federal Agency for Private Insurance (Bundesamt fu¨r Privatver-
sicherung) for the years 1975 - 2004. Data on benefits paid by social insurance again come from
the OECD Social Expenditure Database 2004, covering the years 1980 - 2001. Explanations
and labels for lines of insurance distinguished are given at the end of appendix B.
The information on GDP was taken from the national accounts statistics’ published by the
OECD, who revised the pre- 1989 figures for Switzerland. The data for the Swiss GDP is
estimated from 1989 backwards. Comparison with the data provided by the Swiss Statistical
6However, most copulas deal with losses at the level of an individual company, whereas the present inves-
tigation uses data aggregated over all insurers of a country. In addition, the data entering calculations are
deviations from trend values taken from an ordinary least squares estimation.
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Office shows them to be almost identical. To keep matters simple, all data was taken from
one source; they are in millions of national currency throughout.
4.4 Econometric specification
The most simple way to obtain time series estimates of unexpected short-term deviations from
expected values is to define them as deviations from trend. Aggregate insurance payments
increase progressively over time due to inflation. The estimation procedure therefore includes
a linear and a quadratic time trend to accept for inflation. The same regression Equation is
used for all insurance lines,
Ii,t = βi,1 + βi,2 · Tt + βi,3 · T 2t + ²i,t, (4.2)
where I is payment in insurance line i, t denotes the year of observation, Tt is the time trend,
and ²i,t is the error term.
The first objective is to identify short-term correlations between regression residuals since
individuals as well as insurers try to avoid positive correlations. In Zweifel (2000) as well as
Zweifel and Lehmann (2001), positive correlations between payments prevail for the period
1975 - 1993.
A regression system for private, social, and both private and social insurance is estimated.
This amounts to three regression systems for each country. Since numbers of observations
differ, longer time series are reduced to the length of the shortest one. For the case of U.S.
private insurance, the system reads,

PLIDt
PLIDIt
PLAIt
PHIt
PHI2t

=

β1,PLID β2,PLID β3,PLID
β1,PLIDI β2,PLIDI β3,PLIDI
β1,PAI β2,PAI β3,PAI
β1,PHI β2,PHI β3,PHI
β1,PHI2 β2,PHI2 β3,PHI2

·

1
Tt
T 2t
+

²PLID,t
²PLIDI,t
²PAI,t
²PHI,t
²PHI2,t

, (4.3)
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with E(²²′) = Ω. A Breusch-Pagan chi-square test indicates that Ω cannot be considered
diagonal; therefore, the error terms are correlated across Equations.
Next, each Equation is estimated individually for each line of insurance in order to maximize
the number of observations. The calculation of pairwise correlations between residuals indi-
cates whether unexpected negative (positive) deviations from trend in one line occur along
with negative (positive) deviations from trend in another line of insurance within a given year.
This is interpreted as positive short-term correlation at the level of the individual insured; a
discussion of possible errors of aggregation taken from Zweifel (2000) is given in appendix A.
To analyze the common long-term trends that may characterize insurance payments, a coin-
tegration analysis using the GDP as the cointegration variable is performed Greene (2003,
ch. 20.4.3). First, time series need to be tested for their stationarity. Usually, one uses first
differences; however, the objective here is to identify common trends rather than avoiding
spurious correlation in specifying a model explaining the development of claims paid. There-
fore, the variables are left in levels. Next, since two time series can only be cointegrated if they
are of the same order, the integration order of each series is checked and reported. Finally,
an augmented Engle-Granger test that accepts the null hypothesis of no cointegration will
be sufficient to conclude that the two variables have no common trend. Critical values are
taken from Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, ch. 20.6). If on the other hand the null hypoth-
esis is rejected, then cointegration may be inferred even though strictly speaking it has not
been verified Greene (2003, p. 656). So whenever the residuals of Equation (4) below exhibit
stationary properties, a common trend can be said to exist:
Ii,t = γ1 + γ2 ·GDPt + µi,t, (4.4)
with µi,t assumed i.i.d. This choice can be justified for two reasons. First, with income elastici-
ties above one and rate elasticities low for major lines of insurance [SwissReinsurance (1989)],
It is likely to be dominated by movements in GDPt. Second, testing for cointegration with
GDP is far easier than using one, several, or all remaining lines of insurance as variables of
cointegration (however see section 4.7 below). The residuals serve as input to the augmented
test based on a specification without a trend variable. The auxiliary regression then reads
(dropping the i subscript for simplicity),
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(µˆt − µˆt−1) = ϕ2 · µˆt−1 + ϕ3 · (µˆt−1 − µˆt−2) + νt, (4.5)
with νt assumed i.i.d. The parameter ϕ2 provides an indication of whether It and GDPt show
some form of common trend. If this should be the case for several lines of insurance, then
their payments would tend to move parallel in the longer term, permanently subjecting the
insured to extra volatility of their assets. In addition, insurers would have no opportunity
to combine the lines affected in order to hedge their underwriting risk within the country
considered.
However, increasingly insurance companies operate internationally, which provides them with
opportunities for global diversification. Therefore, as a last step, an additional cointegration
analysis involving the private lines of U.S. and Swiss insurance is performed in section 4.7.
If unexpected deviations of payments show a common trend across countries, then global
diversification within the same line of insurance is possible. Since social insurance will continue
to be national schemes for some time to come, this last step applies to private insurance in
the United States and Switzerland only.
4.5 Analysis of short-term correlations
The short-term analysis tries to ascertain whether deviations from expected value of claims
paid are positively or negatively correlated across different lines of insurance within the same
country [see Equation (4.1)]. Section 4.5.1 deals with the United States, while section 4.5.2
is devoted to Switzerland.
4.5.1 United States
The evidence for the United States derived from the trend estimations are presented in Ta-
bles 4.4 to 4.6. In private insurance (Table 4.4), four out of ten correlations are significantly
negative and just two are positive. Interestingly, it is payments of private health insurance as
reported by the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (PHI2), which cover the years
1960 - 2004 [rather than 1970 - 2004 as in the case of (PHI)] that correlates negatively with
three of the other private insurance lines, viz. private life insurer’s death payments (PLID),
health insurance written by life insurers (PHI), and their annuity payments (PLAI). Disabil-
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ity payments (PLIDI) and annuity payments (PLAI) provided by life insurers also correlate
negatively with each other.
Table 4.4: Correlations of trend deviations in U.S. private insurance, 1965 - 2004
PLID PLIDI PLAI PHI PHI2
PLID 1.000
PLIDI −0.0534 1.000
(0.7435)
PLAI −0.0227 −0.3417∗ 1.000
(0.8896) (0.0282)
PHIa 0.4830∗∗ 0.1358 0.4584∗∗ 1.000
(0.0033) (0.4366) (0.0056)
PHI2b −0.3514∗ 0.2105 −0.4383∗∗ −0.5516∗∗ 1.000
(0.0262) (0.1922) (0.0047) (0.0006)
*,** coefficient significant at the five and one percent level, respectively
Note: The time series PHI and PHI2 refer to the same type of payments; only the source of data differs.
Therefore, the negative correlation between the two is puzzling.
a1970 - 2004
b1960 - 2004
On the other hand, deviations in payments for health insurance by private life insurers (PHI)
correlate positively with those in death (PLID) and annuity (PLAI) payments. This indi-
cates a part of insurance business where consumers would benefit from risk diversification.
One way could be to offer them combined policies; however, insurers appear to be unwilling to
write such policies. On the whole, however, U.S. purchasers of private insurance are exposed
to little excessive risk.
In U.S. social insurance, the picture is quite different, as evidenced in Table 4.5. Social
disability benefits (SDCB), worker’s compensation (SWCB), survivor’s (SSB) and health
(SHB) benefits show five significant positive correlations. Old age (SOACB), paid sick leave
(SPSB), family cash (SFCB) and unemployment (SUB) benefits all show at least one sig-
nificant positive correlation. In total 15 (or 54 percent) out of 28 correlations are significantly
positive, the coefficients ranging from 0.44 to 0.94. Just two correlations indicate a negative
relationship. U.S. social insurance thus seems to contribute little to asset stability for con-
sumers. This result is in keeping with findings reported in Zweifel (2000), whose data base
did not include OECD sources.
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Table 4.6 shows the cross-correlations between private and social insurance. The only line
of private insurance showing significant (positive) correlation is health insurance (PHI2)
as reported by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Therefore, while U.S.
private insurance fails to consistently make up for unexpected shortfalls in the benefits of its
social counterpart (and vice versa), it at least does not cause much excess asset volatility for
consumers.
In sum, U.S. private insurance seems to considerably reduce the volatility of personal assets,
contrary to social insurance which may well expose consumers to excess volatility. The in-
terplay between private and social insurance does not alleviate the problem, leaving asset
volatility unaffected.
Table 4.6: Correlations of trend deviations in U.S. private and social insurance, 1980 - 2004
PLID PLIDI PLAI PHI PHI2
SDCB 0.1436 0.2790 −0.1358 0.2016 0.5015∗
(0.5239) (0.2086) (0.5467) (0.3682) (0.0174)
SWCB −0.0211 0.3357 −0.1055 0.1521 0.5314∗
(0.9256) (0.1266) (0.6403) (0.4993) (0.0109)
SOACB −0.0268 0.0604 −0.2457 −0.2593 0.2701
(0.9058) (0.7895) (0.2704) (0.2440) (0.2240)
SPSB −0.3367 −0.1628 −0.3591 −0.4135 0.4683∗
(0.1255) (0.4690) (0.1007) (0.0558) (0.0280)
SSB 0.2115 0.3337 0.0304 0.3112 0.2641
(0.3447) (0.1290) (0.8931) (0.1586) (0.2349)
SFCB 0.1113 0.3175 0.0619 0.3054 0.2840
(0.6218) (0.1500) (0.7845) (0.1670) (0.2003)
SUB −0.3437 0.0431 −0.3343 −0.3070 0.5746∗∗
(0.1173) (0.8488) (0.1284) (0.1647) (0.0052)
SHB 0.2407 0.3455 −0.1405 0.3005 0.3582
(0.2806) (0.1152) (0.5330) (0.1743) (0.1017)
*,** coefficient significant at the five and one percent level, respectively
4.5.2 Switzerland
For Switzerland, the evidence is reported in Tables 4.7 to 4.9. In private insurance, there
are three (out of six) significant correlations, all positive and ranging from 0.42 to 0.72
(Table 4.7). Two of them are due to life insurance (PLID), one to general liability insurance
(PGI). Since all the remaining correlations suggest a positive relationship as well, it must
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be said that payments by Swiss private insurance tend to increase rather than reduce the
volatility of consumers’ assets. Again, this finding is in accord with those of Zweifel (2000),
although the time series used here cover ten more years.
Table 4.7: Correlations of trend deviations in Swiss private insurance, 1975 - 2004
PLID PGI PAI PHI
PLID 1.000
PGI 0.5262∗∗ 1.000
(0.0028)
PAI 0.1507 0.4153∗ 1.000
(0.4266) (0.0225)
PHI 0.7223∗∗ 0.3252 0.1763 1.000
(0.0000) (0.0795) (0.3514)
*,** coefficient significant at the five and one percent level, respectively
Social insurance in Switzerland again shows a less favorable picture than in the United States.
No less than 16 out of 36 correlations are significantly positive in Table 4.8, with a maximum
value as high as 0.97. The main source of the problem is unemployment insurance (SUB),
whose benefits exhibit a significant relationship with six other insurance lines. This reinforces
the findings of Zweifel and Lehmann (2001), who report 6 positive out of 10 correlations for
the period 1970 to 1990. Therefore, Swiss social insurance seems to cause consumers to be
rather far away from their efficient frontier in (µ, σ)-space.
Table 4.9 shows the cross-correlations between Swiss private and social insurance. Whereas
only one correlation coefficient is significantly negative, 6 out of 36 are clearly positive, with a
maximum of 0.75. The responsibility for this lies mainly with the benefits of private accident
insurance (PAI), which accounts for five positive relationships. Similar results were found by
Zweifel and Lehmann (2001); they reinforce the impression that the United States insurance
system does a much better job than its Swiss counterpart when it comes to filling unexpected
shortfalls in the benefits paid by either private or social insurance.
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In all, the insurance system of Switzerland offers vast opportunity for efficiency improvements
both in its private and its social components. Regarding the interplay between the two,
the insurance system of both Switzerland and the United States fail to fill the gaps in one
component by extra payments in the other.
Table 4.9: Correlations of trend deviations in Swiss private and social insurance, 1980 - 2004
PLID PGI PAI PHI
SDCB −0.2741 −0.3367 −0.1105 −0.3242
(0.2171) (0.1255) (0.6244) (0.1411)
SOIB 0.4159 0.2214 0.4621 0.4739
(0.1788) (0.4892) (0.1304) (0.1196)
SOACB −0.0075 0.3053 0.6116∗∗ −0.1704
(0.9735) (0.1671) (0.0025) (0.4482)
SPSB −0.2479 0.3025 0.2886 −0.0850
(0.4372) (0.3392) (0.3630) (0.7928)
SSB −0.0279 0.3226 0.5258∗ −0.1856
(0.9018) (0.1431) (0.0120) (0.4082)
SFCB −0.3094 −0.1032 0.2932 −0.5406∗∗
(0.1612) (0.6477) (0.1854) (0.0094)
SHTB −0.0529 0.3570 0.5803∗∗ −0.2590
(0.8151) (0.1029) (0.0046) (0.2445)
SUB −0.2500 −0.0132 0.4251∗ −0.4167
(0.2619) (0.9535) (0.0486) (0.0537)
SHB 0.1230 0.5396∗∗ 0.7491∗∗ 0.1940
(0.5855) (0.0096) (0.0001) (0.3869)
*,** coefficient significant at the five and one percent level, respectively
4.6 Long-term analysis
Especially for the insurer, year-to-year movements of claims are of limited relevance. When
looking for hedging opportunities in their underwriting business, they need to know whether
claims tend to move parallel in the longer term. This issue calls for cointegration analysis.
In cointegration analysis, the time series need to be of the same order of integration. A
standard Dickey-Fuller (DF) test applied to first differences without a time trend suggests
that most of the series are I(1) [see Table 4.10; the critical values are based on Fuller (1976)
after interpolation]. If this test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root, then this is reported
in Table 4.10 as I(1). If the null hypothesis is not rejected, pointing to a higher order of
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Table 4.10: Order of integration as indicated by the standard Dickey-Fuller test
USA Switzerland
t I(1)? t I(1)?
PLID −3.859∗∗∗ I(1) −3.425∗∗ I(1)
PLIDI −10.683∗∗∗ I(1)
PLAI −6.034∗∗∗ I(1)
PHI −4.714∗∗∗ I(1) −2.847∗ I(1)
PHI2 −6.699∗∗∗ I(1)
PGI −6.737∗∗∗ I(1)
PAI −4.485∗∗∗ I(1)
SDCB −1.480 not I(1) −3.877∗∗∗ I(1)
SWCB −1.991 not I(1)
SOACB −3.557∗ I(1),trend −4.049∗∗∗ I(1)
SPSB −2.974∗ I(1) −3.411∗∗ I(1)
SSB −2.756∗ I(1) −4.148∗∗∗ I(1)
SFCB −4.109∗∗∗ I(1) −2.665∗ I(1)
SUB −4.087∗∗∗ I(1) −2.768∗ I(1)
SHB 0.033 not I(1) −1.816 not I(1)
SOIB −2.890∗ I(1)
SHTB −4.723∗∗∗ I(1)
GDP −4.035∗∗ I(1),trend −3.019∗∗ I(1)
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10, 5, 1 percent level
integration, then an additional DF test with a time trend is performed. In all, three U.S. and
only one Swiss time series cannot be said to be integrated of order one, i.e. I(1).
Additionally, the more powerful Dickey-Fuller GLS test (accounting for autocorrelation in
the error term) as proposed by Elliot et al. (1996) is carried out. The results are presented
in the appendix B; they largely coincide with those of Table 4.10. Whenever the conclusion
of both tests is that a series is not I(1), it is excluded from the analysis below. If just one
test indicates the differenced series to have a unit root, then it is still analyzed but the
results appear in bold italics in Table 4.11 to indicate that they need to be interpreted with
caution. This testing strategy results in the exclusion or qualification of U.S. life insurance
(PLID) as well as workers’ compensation (SWCB), health insurance (SHB), disability cash
benefits (SDCB), and paid sick leave benefits (SPSB) in U.S. social insurance. In the case
of Switzerland, social health insurance (SHB) had to be dropped.
As can easily be seen from Table 4.11, none of the remaining lines of private insurance are
cointegrated with the GDP of the respective country. This means that there is an absence of
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Table 4.11: Results of cointegration (cointegration variable: GDP )
USA, 1975 - 2004 Switzerland, 1975 - 2004
ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID −0.2409 No −0.1441 No
PLIDI −0.4669 No
PLAI −0.2128 No
PHI −0.3648 No −0.1063 No
PHI2 −0.3092 No
PGI −0.7146a No
PAI −0.5706 No
SDCB −0.3024∗ Yes −0.0963 No
SWCB
SOACB −0.6347∗ Yes −0.1532 No
SPSB −0.2626 No −0.7492∗∗ Yes
SSB −0.2970 No −0.3212 No
SFCB −0.2712 No −0.2777 No
SUB −0.6139 No −0.4035 No
SHB −0.3082 No
SOIB −0.7511 No
SHTB −0.2793 No
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 5, 2.5, 1 percent level
asignificant at the 10 percent level
common trends, creating hedging possibilities. Specifically, private U.S. health insurers might
consider writing umbrella-type policies covering several risks. Turning to social insurance,
one notes that possibly disability benefits (SDCB) and definitely old age benefits (SOACB)
exhibit a common trend with GDP . The scope for hedging thus is more limited. In the case of
Switzerland, private insurers could also create combined products that would serve to reduce
asset volatility for consumers. The same is true of social insurance, with the sole exception
of paid sick leave (SPSB), whose benefits are clearly trending with the Swiss GDP .
Finally, the question needs to be addressed of whether certain lines of private insurance are
more amenable to hedging than others. This calls for performing a cointegration analysis with
one of the other lines of insurance rather than GDP serving as the cointegration variable.
In Tables 4.12 and 4.13, only domestic alternatives are considered. In the United States (Ta-
ble 4.12), not a single line of business is cointegrated with any other, with the one possible
exception of health insurance combined with life insurers’ death payments. In Switzerland
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(Table 4.13), accident insurance (PAI) and general liability insurance (PGI) share a signifi-
cant common trend; otherwise there is no trace of parallel long-term movements.
Table 4.12: Cointegration of private insurance in the U.S.A.
PLID PLIDI
ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID
PLIDI −0.2330 No
PLAI −0.2796 No −0.0980 No
PHI −0.5080a No −0.1378 No
PHI2 −0.0691 No −0.4320 No
PLAI PHI
ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID
PLIDI
PLAI
PHI −0.3604 No
PHI2 −0.2353 No −0.4397 No
acoefficient significant at the 10 percent level
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 5, 2.5, 1 percent level
Table 4.13: Cointegration of private insurance in Switzerland
PLID PHI
ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID
PHI −0.5001 No
PGI −0.1457 No −0.1770 No
PAI −0.1499 No −0.1224 No
PGI
ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID
PHI
PGI
PAI −0.8913∗ Yes
*,**,*** is significant at 5, 2.5, 1 percent level
In conclusion, payments of private insurance are predominantly devoid of common trends
both in the United States and Switzerland, providing ample opportunity to offer combined
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insurance contracts. In social insurance, a few common trends can be identified which limit
somewhat the scope for umbrella-type policies.
4.7 Possibilities of international diversification
Increasingly, insurance companies operate globally. Therefore, it is natural to ask whether
claims development in the United States and Switzerland permit a degree of global hedging
(which of course must be of limited extent in view of the much smaller Swiss market). Again,
cointegration tests serve to provide evidence on this issue; however, contrary to section 4.6,
they involve the same line of business in the United States and Switzerland. If the two time
series turn out not to be cointegrated, there exists the possibility of international hedging for
private multinational insurers. For example, they could offer life insurance both in the United
States and Switzerland, benefiting from the fact that the two claims processes exhibit different
trends. This choice is not available to social insurers for some time to come, motivating this
investigation to be performed for private insurance only.
Throughout, the U.S. variable is used as the regressor. As shown in Table 4.14, all but one line
of business (payments for death by Swiss life insurance PLID−CH, with U.S. life insurance
annuity payments PLAI − US) are not cointegrated. These two lines of insurance are the
only ones that should not be used for diversifying the companies’ underwriting risk.
In the case of the United States and Switzerland, international diversification of the under-
writing risk by private insurers therefore is entirely possible. These hedging opportunities go
some way towards mitigating the conflict of interest between consumers (who would like to
transfer positively correlated risks) and insurers (who eschew these risks) of the same country.
4.8 Conclusion
The starting point of this chapter is the argument that insurance payments contain a sto-
chastic element. To the extent that these elements are positively correlated, they expose
consumers to excess asset volatility. At the same time, insurers shy away from underwriting
positively correlated risks. Equating these stochastic elements to trend deviations in aggre-
gate insurance payments, the contribution of insurance to the reduction of consumers’ asset
volatility is reflected by the degree of negative correlation between the deviations in the differ-
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Table 4.14: Cointegration tests of Swiss and U.S. lines of insurance
PLID − US PLIDI − US
ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID − CH −0.2520 No −0.2349 No
PHI − CH −0.1986 No −0.2213 No
PGI − CH −0.3960 No −0.2371 No
PAI − CH −0.1750 No −0.2155 No
PLAI − US PHI − US
ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID − CH −0.3268∗ Yes −0.3683 No
PHI − CH −0.1813 No −0.2278 No
PGI − CH −0.5823a No −0.4479 No
PAI − CH −0.3738 No −0.2853 No
PHI2− US
ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID − CH −0.4906 No
PHI − CH −0.2903 No
PGI − CH −0.5736 No
PAI − CH −0.2051 No
asignificant at the 10 percent level
*,**,*** is significant at 5, 2.5, 1 percent level
ent lines of private and social insurance. However, at least in the case of the United States and
Switzerland, these deviations are found to often correlate positively, especially in Swiss social
insurance. To overcome this inefficiency, insurers in the two countries could write combined
policies. However, for this to be feasible in the long term, the claims processes must not ex-
hibit common trends. Cointegration tests show this to be the case almost without exception.
Finally, multinational insurers have the additional option of hedging a line of their business
in the United States by underwriting the same type of risk in another country (Switzerland
for example). This again proves to be possible with very few exceptions.
In sum, this research suggests that consumers both in the United States and Switzerland
fail to reach their efficient frontiers in (µ, σ)-space as far as their assets ’insurance policies’
are concerned. It also finds scope for additional hedging by private insurers, domestically
as well as globally. However, some open questions need to be addressed in future research.
First, similar investigations should be carried out for additional countries to check whether
truly global hedging opportunities exist in the underwriting of personal insurance. Second,
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analysis of individual data would be extremely valuable (see the remarks in section 4.2.3
on copula theory as well). As already discussed in Zweifel (2000), aggregation creates the
danger of finding positive correlations in the aggregate that do not exist at the individual
level. Likewise, the results of the cointegration tests reported here need not carry over to
individual insurance companies. However, the results presented in this chapter do seem to
raise issues of considerable importance worthy of additional research effort.
Appendix A
This appendix is devoted to the criticism of testing an individual theory with aggregate data
and is adopted from Zweifel (2000). Suppose two individuals i and j with assets X and Y
experience deviations from their expected payments. Aggregate covariance is then given by,
Cov(xi + xj , yi + yj) = E(xi + xj)(yi + yj)
= Cov(xi, yi) + Cov(xj , yj) + Cov(xi, yj) + Cov(xj , yi).
This formula is used to discuss three points:
1. Positive correlation induced by macroeconomic factors While within individual covari-
ances could well be negative or zero the last two terms can nevertheless be positive.
This could be due to a recession or some other macroeconomic shock. Suppose a reces-
sion triggers increased losses with regard to skills and health. If both payments must
be financed out of a given budget for social insurance, then a budget cut might com-
pel negative deviations in payment xi to individual i and yj to individual j yielding
Cov(xi, yj) > 0, while within individual covariances remain zero. This is possible but
unlikely.
2. Numbers effect of macroeconomic factors Since it is possible that within individual co-
variances are positive for all claimants, macroeconomic factors could increase total co-
variance by each additional individual considered. This however is not quite convincing.
Aggregate deviations in unemployment insurance (leading proxy of macro influence) is
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correlated with deviations in private insurance in 2 out of 9 cases (see Tables 4.6 and
4.9). Macroeconomic shocks do not seem to support the findings presented here.
3. Failure to filter out nonexpected components The estimation procedure uses a quadratic
time trend. Residuals are assumed to be orthogonal in this estimation procedure. How-
ever, insurance benefits do not need to follow a quadratic time trend perfectly. In this
case some parts of the estimated unexpected benefits are in fact expected which may
be positively correlated whenever there is a common triggering event. This may be
the case e.g. in the United States where social health benefits and social disability cash
benefits correlate with ρ = 0.94. However, the correlation between social health benefits
and private health insurance is not significantly positive in either country while they
certainly share a common triggering event. The positive correlation of the expected
payment did not spill over in unexpected deviations. So this cannot be decisive in every
case.
The short discussion illustrates that no criticism provides an alternative consistent explana-
tion of the observed phenomenon. Nevertheless the theory should be estimated using indi-
vidual panel data to correctly answer all the questions addressed.
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Appendix B
Table 4.15: GLS cointegration: optimal lags and order of integration
United States Switzerland
opt.lag TSa I(?) opt.lag TSa I(?)
PLID 9 −1.840 not I(1) 3 −4.425∗∗∗ I(1),trend
PLIDI 1 −5.382∗∗∗ I(1),mean −− –
PLAI 5 −2.917∗ I(1),trend −− –
PHI 0 −5.307∗∗∗ I(1)b,trend 5 −2.629∗ I(1),trend
PHI2 0 −9.074∗∗∗ I(1)b,trend −− –
PGI −− – 1 −5.384∗∗∗ I(1),trend
PAI −− – 1 −2.383∗ I(1),mean
SDCB 4 −3.231∗∗ I(1),trend 0 −4.976∗∗∗ I(1)b,trend
SWCB 0 −1.991 not I(1) −− –
SOACB 0 −3.557∗ I(1)b,trend 0 −4.074∗∗ I(1)b,trend
SPSB 6 2.400 not I(1) 0 −3.411∗∗ I(1)b,mean
SSB 7 −4.786∗∗∗ I(1),trend 0 −4.083∗∗ I(1)b,mean
SFCB 0 −4.134∗∗ I(1)b,trend 0 −2.665∗ I(1)b,mean
SUB 7 −4.483∗∗∗ I(1),trend 0 −2.768∗ I(1)b,mean
SHB 3 −3.378∗∗ I(1),trend 0 −2.195 not I(1)
SOIB −− – 0 −3.554∗ I(1)b,trend
SHTB −− – 0 −4.704∗∗∗ I(1)b,trend
GDP 0 −4.035∗∗ I(1)b,trend 0 −3.091∗∗ I(1)b,mean
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10, 5, 1 percent level
aTS = test-statistic
bZero lag length indicated by Ng-Perron sequential t (1995); standard Dickey-Fuller test with interpolated
critical values according to Fuller (1976)
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Table 4.16: Labels for insurance benefits, with sources
United States (P= private, S=social)
PLID Life insurer’s death payments; Life Insurers Fact Book (LIFB)
PLIDI Life insurer’s disability payments and retained assets; LIFB
PLAI Life insurer’s annuity payments; LIFB
PHI Health insurance; LIFB
PHI2 Health insurance; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
SDCB Disability cash benefits; OECD Social Expendit. Database (OECD SED)
SWCB Worker’s compensation cash benefits; OECD SED
SOACB Old age cash benefits; OECD SED
SPSB Paid sick leave benefits; OECD SED
SSB Survivor’s benefits total; OECD SED
SFCB Family cash benefits; OECD SED
SUB Unemployment benefits; OECD SED
SHB Health benefits; OECD SED
Switzerland (P= private, S=social)
PLID Life insurance; Bundesamt fu¨r Privatversicherungen
PGI General liability insurance; Bundesamt fu¨r Privatversicherungen
PAI Accident insurance; Bundesamt fu¨r Privatversicherungen
PHI Health insurance; Bundesamt fu¨r Privatversicherungen
SDCB Disability cash benefits; OECD SED
SOIB Accident insurance (disability and survivors); OECD SED
SOACB Old age cash benefits; OECD SED
SPSB Paid sick leave benefits; OECD SED
SSB Survivor’s benefits total; OECD SED
SFCB Family cash benefits; OECD SED
SHTB Housing benefits total; OECD SED
SUB Unemployment benefits; OECD SED
SHB Health benefits; OECD SED
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Chapter 5
Capping risk adjustment?
5.1 Introduction
When premiums are community-rated, risk adjustment is introduced in order to reduce com-
petitive insurers’ incentive to select favorable risks [for a general discussion on risk adjustment
see Ellis and Van de Ven (2000) or Van de Ven et al. (2003), relating to five European coun-
tries]. Although risk adjustment in Switzerland is based solely on age and sex, it already
redistributes a significant amount of money between individuals [regarding the insufficiency
of these two criteria, see Van Vliet (2006)]. Its volume amounted to CHF 4.8 billion (bn.)
(or some 1 percent of Swiss GDP or 21 percent of payments) as of 2005. This amount of re-
distribution has given rise to an extensive political discussion. In addition, refining the Swiss
volume of risk adjustment scheme has not been debated scientifically.
The present chapter purports to achieve two objectives. First, it investigates the consequence
of complementing the risk adjustment formula by a criterion that has been found to be
particularly effective [Beck et al. (2006)], viz. “Hospitalization or living in a nursing home
during the previous year”. Second, it seeks to answer the question of how the volume of
risk adjustment could be reduced at minimum cost in terms of increased incentives for risk
selection.
Accordingly, the main results are twofold. The introduction of the criterion “Hospitalization or
living in a nursing home during the previous year” would inflate the volume of risk adjustment
in every canton of Switzerland, in some of them by more than 50 percent. Reducing the volume
of risk adjustment (at the national level) from an estimated CHF 5.375 bn. to CHF 4.5 bn. (as
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of 2005) would reduce cross-subsidization in favor of consumers above 55 by approximately
12 percent while relieving the burden of those below 55 by about 6 percent, using the canton
of Zurich as the reference case.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 is devoted to a description of
the data basis, descriptive statistics, and checks of the representativeness of the data. Section
5.3 shows how the volume changes when the additional criterion is introduced. Section 5.4
then takes up the issue of capping the volume of risk adjustment, distinguishing three levels,
viz. the level of the nation (level of total volume), the level of insurers, and the level of
the insured. The consequences for consumers, the insurers, and Swiss cantons are analyzed.
Section 5.5 sets up the optimization problem, while section 5.6 details the opportunity cost
of capping risk adjustment, illustrating with an empirical example. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Data basis, descriptive statistics, and representativeness
In order to carry out this research, three large Swiss health insurers provided individual health
insurance data. All holders of basic health insurance during the period 2001 to 2005 were
considered, totalling 2.78 million (mn.) individuals. Besides socioeconomic variables like age,
gender and canton of residence, data on ambulant and stationary health care expenditure
(HCE), expenditure for medication, and a variable indicating hospitalization in the previous
year were collected. To characterize the type of health insurance, the deductible and a variable
indicating choice between conventional and managed care contracts were included as well.
With 49.5 percent of women, the sample is well balanced with respect to gender. The market
share of the three insurers is stable across the age profile, amounting to 25 percent on average.
Across the 26 Swiss cantons, the three insurers are over-represented in eastern and central
Switzerland and under-represented in the northern and western parts of the country.
In Swiss health insurance, premiums are community-rated. They are uniform in 16 cantons,
the remaining cantons distinguishing high, medium, and low premium regions. In 2005, 32
percent of the population lived in cantons with uniform premiums, while 25 percent lived in
a high, 27 percent in a medium, and 16 percent in a low premium region.
With regard to the choice of contract, there is a clear trend toward higher deductibles.
Whereas in 2001, policies with the minimum deductible (which amounts to CHF 300, USD
250 at 2007 exchange rates) had a share of over 56 percent, this share had decreased to 50
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percent by 2005. The three highest deductibles (CHF 1,500, 2,000 and 2,500) increased in
importance from 12 to over 22 percent during the same period.
There is a similar trend in favor of managed-care contracts. Especially consumers aged 31 to
35 use this option, resulting in a share of 22 percent in this age group. However, older age
cohorts increasingly prefer managed-care contracts as well. Whereas 18 percent by 2005, only
10 percent of over 80 year old individuals had a managed-care contract in 2001.
In Swiss risk adjustment, only two criteria are considered, age and gender. The age classifi-
cation comprises 15 classes, starting from 19-25 and continuing in 5 year steps. By law, risk
adjustment must not lead to financial reallocation between cantons. The national volume of
risk adjustment therefore equals the sum of the cantonal volumes. Computing these volumes
using the sample data of the three insurers and their market shares yields a total of CHF
4.13 bn., the national countrywide volume being CHF 4.8 bn. [see KVG (2007)].
In all cantons, the calculated volume falls short of the official one (see Table 5.1). The dif-
ference is smallest in the canton of Zurich, Lucerne, and Valais, amounting to less than 10
percent. It is between 10 and 20 percent in 9 other cantons, with the maximum attained in
the canton of Basel-Stadt, where the three insurers only hold a very small market share of 9
percent. This marked discrepancy could reflect successful risk selection efforts. Selection ef-
forts have high expected return if targeted at a small population at risk [as shown in Zweifel
and Eisen (2003), ch. 5.5]. However, there is no significant (negative) correlation between
market share of the three insurers and deviation from the official figure of risk adjustment
volume, suggesting that risk selection is not the exposition.
Table 5.2 contains calculated payments per capita for all 30 groups used in risk adjustment,
along with their standard errors and official countrywide values. Young men have to pay the
highest contributions to risk adjustment (over CHF 2,000 per year), followed by young women
with CHF 1,773 per year. Over 90 year old women benefit the most from risk adjustment, to
the tune of over CHF 8,600, followed by women of age 86 to 90 with CHF 6,917 and men of
age 90+ with CHF 6,731. All age groups over 60 are cross-subsidized by risk adjustment.
A comparison with official values (see the last column of Table 5.2) shows these calculations
to be too high for younger and too low for older individuals, especially for women. Insurers
receive over CHF 12,000 for a 90+ year old woman and over CHF 9,500 for a man of the
same age, while the calculated values are CHF 8,673 and CHF 6,732, respectively. These
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Table 5.1: Volume of risk adjustment per canton, 2005
Cant. mn. CHF* mn. CHF** CHF per capita* CHF per capita**
ZH 735.82 796.47 712.59 771.32
BE 592.03 678.17 767.57 879.25
LU 193.80 211.23 690.70 752.81
UR 17.57 19.97 636.16 723.04
SZ 57.00 70.85 532.71 662.09
OW 13.01 16.41 496.63 626.44
NW 15.13 17.23 484.81 551.93
GL 16.52 19.89 544.36 655.60
ZG 47.57 54.14 565.55 643.69
FR 121.48 146.44 625.25 753.76
SO 122.07 154.65 614.44 778.43
BS 110.21 161.97 718.88 1′056.53
BL 149.81 172.14 696.53 800.34
SH 39.18 47.50 648.89 786.60
AR 20.10 24.85 482.77 596.77
AI 6.48 7.43 569.79 653.53
SG 196.02 238.19 544.53 661.68
GR 95.91 110.26 616.16 708.32
AG 259.61 312.05 573.24 689.02
TH 105.30 126.78 578.77 696.83
TI 226.03 270.02 869.03 1′038.14
VD 430.40 502.39 851.63 994.09
VS 160.39 170.13 684.74 726.33
NE 104.10 130.63 784.08 983.90
GE 257.43 333.04 816.24 1′055.99
JU 39.45 52.32 732.56 971.51
* Sample, ** Official data from KVG (2007). Note: 1 CHF = 0.83 USD (2007)
important deviations are mainly responsible for the underestimation of the total volume of
risk adjustment noted above. Table 5.2 also shows that the variance of payments increases
with age. While the standard deviation is CHF 494 for young women, it attains to CHF 1,770
for the oldest age class. A likely explanation is that cross-subsidies in favor of the elderly differ
more between cantons than those to the detriment the young.
Overall, calculated figures come close enough to official risk adjustment values to justify
the use of sample figures in the investigation below. Note that risk adjustment is paid by
the insured in the final analysis. Young people who are ’good risks’ pay more than their
actuarially fair premium. They subsidize ’bad risks’, mainly elderly people, who pay less
than their expected HCE.
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Table 5.2: Calculated and official risk adjustment payments per capita according to sex and
age, 2005
Men Average Std. Min Max Official value
19-25 −2, 006.50 505.52 −3006.17 −707.84 −1, 963.87
26-30 −1, 227.59 833.80 −2165.91 2287.40 −1, 889.64
31-35 −900.68 678.91 −1733.38 1202.03 −1, 771.42
36-40 −979.03 421.93 −1749.27 247.62 −1, 624.49
41-45 −828.69 351.55 −1435.17 −40.31 −1, 398.94
46-50 −543.46 465.97 −1615.88 349.08 −1, 091.94
51-55 −109.82 378.55 −977.63 714.71 −624.63
56-60 290.34 300.27 −557.57 815.53 13.40
61-65 884.74 418.34 228.53 1648.89 771.06
66-70 1, 560.60 598.50 187.69 2464.57 1, 638.40
71-75 2, 535.19 548.54 982.57 3435.54 2, 873.43
76-80 3, 208.98 653.35 1884.58 4128.30 3, 845.50
81-85 4, 127.79 1361.80 1261.52 6983.73 4, 986.30
86-90 5, 286.51 1208.24 2752.09 7945.75 6, 880.09
90+ 6, 731.78 1513.63 2945.10 8915.78 9, 541.96
Women Average Std. Min Max Official value
19-25 −1, 772.99 494.20 −2780.08 −974.44 −1, 484.37
26-30 −1, 024.61 461.54 −2211.50 −311.71 −946.01
31-35 −746.06 559.49 −1694.31 1125.73 −749.83
36-40 −961.00 328.45 −1576.69 −316.11 −924.81
41-45 −965.85 279.05 −1749.34 −535.99 −922.02
46-50 −732.01 309.04 −1295.60 −177.44 −646.82
51-55 −442.87 268.14 −1045.08 106.95 −235.80
56-60 −15.51 321.10 −512.16 841.85 205.36
61-65 443.65 247.14 19.55 764.95 737.31
66-70 981.80 395.53 210.13 1603.77 1, 415.39
71-75 1, 982.76 446.04 758.34 2662.32 2, 385.07
76-80 3, 136.84 656.22 1838.10 4406.12 3671.81
81-85 4, 641.23 775.55 2788.30 6111.25 5, 596.14
86-90 6, 917.12 987.66 5115.11 8382.98 8, 486.06
90+ 8, 672.75 1770.15 4464.86 11619.96 12, 457.28
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5.3 Hospitalization as an additional criterion
Current Swiss risk adjustment uses only the two criteria age and gender. However, hospital-
ization or living in a nursing home during the previous year is being debated in parliament
at the time of writing (2007). Beck (2004) and Beck et al. (2006) estimate that this criterion
has considerable predictive power in explaining future HCE. It is very easily collected; more-
over, being a dummy variable it does not make computation of risk adjustment payments
much more difficult. While the formula currently distinguishes 30 age-sex cells, the number of
classes would only increase to 60 [for a discussion on other alternatives and their drawbacks
see e.g. Lamers (1999), Van de Ven et al. (2004), Lamers and Van Vliet (2003b), Lamers and
Van Vliet (2003a), Ellis and Van de Ven (2000), Beck et al. (2006), and Van de Ven and
Schut (2007)].
Taking this additional criterion into account, calculated risk adjustment would increase from
CHF 4.13 mn. (as of 2005) to CHF 5.82 mn., i.e. by 40 percent. According to Table 5.3, every
canton would exhibit an increase. In absolute value, it correlates positively with the current
volume of risk adjustment. It is highest in the most populated cantons, such as Bern, Vaud,
and Zurich. In relative terms, the highest increase in volume occurs in the small canton of
Obwalden with over 70 percent.
Figure 5.1 illustrates age- and sex-specific effects of the additional risk adjustment criterion
in the case of the canton of Zurich. This criterion would cause persons with a hospital stay in
2004 to receive payments in 2005 regardless of age or gender. It is remarkable that until age
50, men receive higher payments (due to a higher rate of hospitalization) than do women.
With the additional criterion, women contribute less to risk adjustment and receive higher
amounts, with age group 51-55 marking the crossover (the group 66-70 is an exception).
5.4 Limiting the volume of risk adjustment
In view of the rapid increase of the volume of risk adjustment since its introduction in 1996
[KVG (2007)] there is a proposal to limit it to the 2005 value (CHF 4.8 bn.). Indeed, some
health insurers derive up to 31 percent of their revenue from risk adjustment payments.
This might undermine their incentive to compete for consumers. However, the consequence
of any cap is that differences in HCE between high and low risks are not fully compensated
Capping risk adjustment? 93
Table 5.3: Risk adjustment without and with the additional criterion, hospitalization or living
in nursing home during the previous year, 2005
Cant. mn. CHF* mn. CHF** CHF p.c.* CHF p.c.** % Increase
ZH 735.82 898.24 712.59 869.89 22.1
BE 592.03 833.26 767.57 1′080.33 40.7
LU 193.80 292.31 690.70 1′041.78 50.8
UR 17.57 26.00 636.16 941.41 48.0
SZ 57.00 84.29 532.71 787.71 47.9
OW 13.37 22.98 496.63 877.33 71.9
NW 15.13 21.35 484.81 683.76 41.0
GL 16.52 24.23 544.36 798.29 46.6
ZG 47.57 71.94 565.55 855.22 51.2
FR 121.48 184.14 625.25 947.79 51.6
SO 122.07 176.52 614.44 888.52 44.6
BS 110.21 171.37 718.88 1′117.84 55.5
BL 149.81 201.91 696.53 938.75 34.8
SH 39.18 59.72 648.89 989.04 52.4
AR 20.10 32.94 482.77 791.23 63.9
AI 6.48 9.58 569.79 842.08 47.8
SG 196.02 298.32 544.53 828.71 52.2
GR 95.91 137.59 616.16 883.88 43.5
AG 259.61 363.64 573.24 802.93 40.1
TH 105.30 173.73 578.77 954.85 65.0
TI 226.03 313.01 869.03 1′203.41 38.5
VD 430.40 593.60 851.63 1′174.55 37.9
VS 160.39 226.85 684.74 968.52 41.4
NE 104.10 166.65 784.08 1′255.26 60.1
GE 257.43 375.23 816.24 1′189.75 45.8
JU 39.45 54.38 732.56 1′009.75 37.8
* without hospitalization/nursing home
** with hospitalization/nursing home
anymore. This results in insurers having to bear additional risk, causing them to engage in
risk selection. A natural way to tackle the issue therefore is to cap the volume so that the
additional amount of risk borne by insurers is minimized. The limit may be imposed at three
levels.
• At the level of total volume. The amount to be paid or received by each insurer would
be calculated by multiplying the class-specific amount by the number of insured.
• At the level of insurers. The individual insurer would know to be paying no more than
a certain amount into the risk adjustment scheme (or receive no more than a certain
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Figure 5.1: Risk adjustment without / with hospitalization or living in nursing home during
the previous year, canton of Zurich, 2005
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amount from it). However, payments would need to be adjusted to changes in market
structure and enrollment.
• At the level of the insured. If payments are limited on an individual basis, premiums
would have to be split up in a risk and a redistribution component. Evidencing the
reduced redistribution part for low risks and the increased part for high risks, one
would achieve maximum transparency.
A cap at the individual level would therefore make low risks realize that they contribute to
redistribution twice. First, they pay a premium that exceeds their expected cost (solidarity
with higher risks). Second, they contribute to the subsidization of premiums of low-income
citizens through income taxation (solidarity with lower incomes). High risks with low incomes
would have to pay a higher premium than before but would receive more premium subsidies
as well. High risks with high incomes would also have to pay more (less cross-subsidization by
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low risks). Because most politicians prefer hidden redistribution processes to more transparent
ones, capping risk adjustment at the individual level is not pursued further.
Capping the volume at the level of insurers causes a different set of complications. The two
critical issues are the insured population and the number of insurers. Suppose two insurers
merge. Some individuals will react to such a merger, either by leaving the merged company
or by joining it. A new limit on risk adjustment would need to be calculated in this case.
Conversely, insurers could inflate the volume of risk adjustment by splitting up in several
different affiliates. Even without any merger activity, the issue remains of how to adjust the
caps to inflation, to specific health services inflation, and to technological change in health
care.
The last alternative to be examined is a cap on total volume. It has the advantage that neither
the insured population nor the market structure matters. The problem of adjusting the cap to
inflation or technological change remains the same, however. Still, limiting the total volume
of risk adjustment seems the most appropriate and plausible way.
A question that naturally arises at this point is who bears the consequences of a cap. Three
parties can be identified.
• The individual insured. A cap on volume causes premiums to converge towards risk-
rated values [with positive effects on moral hazard, e.g. Zweifel and Breuer (2006)].
• The insurers. In a system with community-rated premiums, risk adjustment is intro-
duced to eliminate (or reduce) incentives for risk selection. A cap on the volume of risk
adjustment benefits insurers with a favorable risk structure while punishing those with
an unfavorable one. Not being fully compensated anymore for enrolling unfavorable
risks, insurers will try to avoid them. Unfavorable risks then most likely find new cover
with an insurer that forms a conglomerate of affiliates, each of which has a uniform
premium with one affiliate accepting high risks and the other, collecting the low risks.
By placing unfavorable risks in the designated subpool, the risk-selecting conglomerate
approaches risk-rated premiums.
• The cantons. Capping risk adjustment increases the financial burden of cantons with an
unfavorable risk structure. However, the federal government is affected as well because
it matches the subsidies paid by cantons. Since premium subsidies are implemented at
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the cantonal level, generous cantons will attract more high risks and therefore have a
larger increase in their subsidies.
5.5 Optimal cap on the volume of risk adjustment
The volume of risk adjustment can theoretically be reduced by an arbitrary amount. One
could then analyze the effects on the three parties distinguished in the previous section. Here,
the question will be posed the other way round: If the volume of risk adjustment were to be
capped, how should this be achieved in an optimal way? Evidently, the opportunity cost in
the guise of increased incentive for risk selection should be minimized.
Risk adjustment based on age and gender is calculated in the following way,
RAa,g = L¯a,g − L¯ (5.1)
where a and g are indices for age and gender categories, RAa,g is the payment to (RAa,g < 0)
or from (RAa,g > 0) risk adjustment in group (a, g), L¯a,g is average HCE in group (a, g), and
L¯ is average HCE in the population as a whole. The volume of risk adjustment can then be
calculated as in Equation (5.2),
V = {
15∑
a=1
1∑
g=0
|RAa,g|na,g}/2, (5.2)
where the division by two avoids double counting. Equation (5.2) is illustrated by a simple
example in appendix A.
Risk adjustment is implemented in order to reduce health insurers’ incentive to compete for
favorable risks. Favorable risks contribute to their margin, which can be used to cover the
deficits generated by unfavorable risks. The insurer is exposed to a higher risk of insolvency
if these deficits are large. Reserves can be used to ensure solvency, but too many outliers
endanger the economic survival of the insurer. There are several methods for analyzing the
importance of such outliers, such as value at risk or expected loss at risk [see Hull (2006)].
However, the easiest way to proceed is to analyze the variance.
If one considers age and sex as the only determinants of HCE (which is in accord with current
Swiss risk adjustment), then variance in HCE across these groups is given by
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s2L =
∑
a
∑
g(L¯a,g − L¯)2na,g∑
a
∑
g na,g
(5.3)
where L¯ is total average HCE in a specific canton (recall that risk adjustment is calculated in
each canton separately), and L¯a,g is average HCE of a specific age and gender cell. As of 2006,
s2L is estimated by Beck et al. (2006) at CHF 12 bn.. Risk adjustment thus serves to reduce
the variance of HCE falling on insurers (and therefore mitigate the incentive to “skim the
cream”). This can be seen by plugging Equation (5.1) into Equation (5.3) and rearranging
terms,
s2L =
∑
a
∑
g RA
2
a,gna,g∑
a
∑
g na,g
(5.4)
and hence,
(
∑
a
∑
g
na,g)s2L =
∑
a
∑
g
RA2a,gna,g. (5.5)
Equation (5.5) shows that with a constant number of individuals in each age and gender cell,
risk adjustment payments must be increasing with increasing differences in HCE between
groups. This of course serves to increase the volume of risk adjustment as well. If age and
gender would be the only determinants of HCE [i.e. insurers have no private information about
individuals, contrary to the analysis by Shen and Ellis (2002b), Shen and Ellis (2002a)], then
risk adjustment would eliminate all risk induced by community rating. Prior to capping the
volume of risk adjustment, the expected variance borne by the health insurer (HI) would then
be zero,
s2HI = 0. (5.6)
Capping the volume of risk adjustment causes this variance to become positive. A possible
objective would therefore be to minimize its increase, subject to the volume of risk adjustment
not exceeding a certain limit. Risk adjustment payments R̂Aa,g are the decision variables in
the problem,
mindRAa,g sˆ2HI − s2HI s.t. V ≤ V¯ (5.7)
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where sˆ2HI means the variance when volume is capped and s
2
HI = 0 is the variance when the
volume is unrestricted.
Of course the optimization must take into account that risk adjustment is zero sum. This
however is always achieved since positive and negative payments cancel out.
If volume is defined as in Equation (5.2), optimization is difficult due to absolute values. An
alternative approach is therefore taken here. First, the positive half variance sˆ2HI+ (with the
restriction on volume), and then, the negative half variance sˆ2HI− (with the same restriction
on volume) is minimized, ensuring that risk adjustment is zero sum,
mindRAa,g[(sˆ2HI+) + (sˆ2HI−)]− s2HI . (5.8)
Because s2HI = 0, it is obvious that only the terms in brackets are relevant. The first term
can be broken down as shown in Equation (5.8),
min sˆ2HI+ =
∑
a
∑
g(xa,g − x¯)2na,g∑
a
∑
g na,g
s.t. xa,g > x¯. (5.9)
The symbols are defined as follows,
xa,g = (La,g − R̂Aa,g)
x¯ = L¯
xa,g − x¯ = (La,g − R̂Aa,g − L¯)
xa,g − x¯ = (RAa,g − R̂Aa,g). (5.10)
Here, R̂Aa,g > 0 if the insurer receives a payment from the risk adjustment and consumers
in the (a,g) cell receive a subsidy. Conversely, R̂Aa,g < 0 if it pays into the scheme and
consumers pay a transfer.
Since the restriction V ≤ V¯ always holds as an equality in Equation (5.6), the problem can
be solved using a Lagrangian,
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mindRAa,g Z = (sˆ2+)− λ(
∑
a
∑
g
R̂Aa,gna,g − V¯ ), ∀ R̂Aa,g > 0 (5.11)
=
∑
a
∑
g(RAa,g − R̂Aa,g)2na,g∑15
a=1
∑1
g=0 na,g
− λ(
∑
a
∑
g
R̂Aa,gna,g − V¯ )
where the subscript HI is dropped for simplicity. Equation (5.11) illustrates how positive
payments received from the risk adjustment scheme are optimally reduced. Payments into
the scheme (∀ R̂Aa,g < 0) are fully analogous.
The first order conditions for this problem are,
∂Z
∂R̂Aa,g
=
−2(RAa,g − R̂Aa,g)na,g∑
a
∑
g na,g
− λna,g = 0 (5.12)
∂Z
∂λ
=
15∑
a=1
1∑
g=0
R̂Aa,gna,g − V¯ = 0.
This is a system of linear Equations in R̂Aa,g and λ that has full rank and can therefore be
solved. An example with four risk classes is given in appendix B.
5.6 Consequences of capping risk adjustment
The volume of risk adjustment in Switzerland has increased significantly over the last 10
years. This is illustrated in Table 5.4. The average increase amounts to 6.76 percent per
year, attaining CHF 4.864 bn. in 2005. Placing a cap at CHF 5 bn. would be a binding
restriction most likely from the year 2006 on. Unless indexed (using e.g. the productivity
corrected deflator of HCE), the restriction would become more binding every year, inducing
ever stronger incentives for risk selection.
The question as to the optimal value of the cap cannot be addressed in this chapter. It requires
knowledge of citizens’ willingness to pay for avoiding risk selection efforts by health insurers
while keeping community-rated premiums. Experimental evidence concerning willingness to
pay for attributes of health services provision has been presented in e.g. Zweifel et al. (2006),
Telser et al. (2004), and concerning attributes of health insurance by Becker (2006) and
100
Table 5.4: Volume of risk adjustment paid between Swiss insured, 1996-2005
Year Volume (CHF mn.) Increase
1996 2,700
1997 2,920 +8.15%
1998 3,195 +9.37%
1999 3,366 +5.32%
2000 3,575 +6.19%
2001 3,826 +7.00%
2002 4,009 +4.77%
2003 4,250 +6.00%
2004 4,568 +7.45%
2005 4,864 +6.44%
Becker et al. (2007). However, willingness to pay for maintaining community-rated premiums
has not been measured to the knowledge of the authors. As a second best solution, parliament
could decide on the value of the cap, assuming that politicians represent the preferences of
the population.
While the political debate has focused on the national level, cantons will likely be affected
as well. As evident from Equations (5.10) and (5.12), the opportunity cost of a cap on risk
adjustment is linked to the dispersion of HCE in a canton, which varies between cantons.
If risk adjustment were to be limited, many citizens with low incomes would have to pay
higher premiums. This creates political pressure for increased redistribution through premium
subsidies. More generous cantons would be more prone to increasing their subsidies, which are
matched by the federal level, where a substantial amount of redistribution between cantons
takes place. Therefore, a limit on risk adjustment is likely to induce a certain amount of
cross-subsidization between cantons.
A final issue is the impact of an additional criterion (e.g. hospitalization or living in a nursing
home during the previous year) on the volume of risk adjustment. First, it is not clear whether
the volume increases. If the additional criterion is so effective as to outperform age and sex,
then volume would be reduced. This requires the additional criterion to be orthogonal to
the existing ones. However, the incidence of hospitalization increases with age and is higher
among women than men. Therefore, adding this particular criterion is likely to cause volume
to increase. Second, the question arises of whether capping the volume makes this effect more
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or less important in terms of its opportunity cost (i.e. incentives for risk selection). Generally,
three cases can be distinguished.
• The benchmark case is no cap on risk adjustment and the introduction of an additional
criterion. This reduces the variance in HCE to be borne by insurers, thus mitigating
incentives for risk selection.
• The cap is imposed but not binding initially; additionally it becomes binding with the
introduction of the additional criterion. Therefore the opportunity cost of the cap was
zero at the beginning. It would become positive but still small if the volume had to be
reduced from CHF 5.1 to 5 bn. (say since the effect on insurer behavior is still limited).
However, a future reduction from CHF 5.5 to 5 bn. or from CHF 6 to 5 bn. would cause
opportunity cost to rise progressively.
• The third alternative is the introduction of an additional criterion when the cap is
already binding. On the one hand, this would serve to reduce the net HCE falling on
health insurers. On the other hand, the restriction on volume becomes even more bind-
ing. The first effect mitigates incentives for risk selection, while the second strengthens
them. The net effect remains ambiguous.
Note that the volume of risk adjustment can always be reduced by permitting health insurers
to charge premiums that are more in line with true risk. For example, suppose smokers pay
an additional premium of CHF 50 per year. This would decrease the difference between
HCE and premium revenue by CHF 50 ceteris paribus and hence the variance of payments
and hence the risk to be borne by the health insurer. Incentives for risk selection decrease.
The advantage of more risk-rated premiums is that the volume of risk adjustment declines
endogenously without inducing more efforts at risk selection; its drawback is deviating from
community-rating. Conversely, the advantage of capping the volume of risk adjustment is
that community-rating can be retained, while its downside is that incentives for risk selection
are strengthened.
5.6.1 Empirical illustration
Since the unit of reference for Swiss risk adjustment is the canton, the effects of limiting its
volume can be illustrated by using data for the canton of Zurich. Expected HCE was estimated
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using a two-part model along the lines of Steinmann et al. (2007). However, dummy variables
instead of continuous variables were used for age. Other dummies are female sex and canton
of residence.
Figure 5.2 shows that the estimated age profile of HCE comes close to that of the three
insurers that provided the data. However, the increase of HCE with higher age at the national
level is underestimated. Figure 5.3 provides more detail by exhibiting the differences between
official average and estimated HCE based on the data of the three insurers. At young ages,
HCE is underestimated compared to both the official countrywide average and the three
insurers’ data. The fit of the Equation is close to perfect between ages 46 and 70. Thereafter,
underestimation becomes more important again. Still, estimated HCE seem to fit the Swiss
average sufficiently well to derive estimates of the effect a cap on volume may have.
The estimated volume of risk adjustment in its present form is CHF 5.375 bn. between
insured. Let this amount be reduced to CHF 4.5 bn.. Table 5.5 illustrates the effects of such
a reduction for the canton of Zurich (number of insured: 1,032,600). Initially the youngest
age class of women pays a premium that exceeds expected HCE by some CHF 1,600, used to
finance the higher HCE of Zurich residents above 50 years of age. Capping the volume of risk
adjustment would reduce this excess by CHF 216. On the other hand, the highest age group
of females currently receives more than CHF 11,000 from risk adjustment. This cross-subsidy
would be reduced by CHF 435. An exception is the class of 51-55 year old women, which
changes from receivers to neutral. These amounts are to be compared with the average Zurich
premium, which was about CHF 4’000 in 2005.
For insurers, volatility of HCE to be borne increases. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate estimated
risk adjustment payments before and after limiting their volume. For comparison, the current
risk adjustment payments are displayed as well. The limitation yields a flattened age profile
of risk adjustment payments (as expected). For women the reduction is barely visible in the
lower age classes but is maximum at high ages. However, the small number of women in these
classes cause total amounts to be negligible.
For men, the picture is slightly different. Below age 55, estimated econometric values consis-
tently overestimate payments into the risk adjustment scheme, and between ages 66 and 75,
overestimate payments from the scheme. Again, the very large deviations in the two highest
age groups do not matter much because they concern only few individuals.
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Figure 5.2: HCE of women by age, estimated from 3 insurers and official data, Switzerland,
2005
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Naturally, capping the volume of risk adjustment between individuals has an impact on
insurers as well. In order to simulate this impact, an additional 22 insurers (covering jointly
some 60 percent of the population) were asked to provide aggregate HCE values per age and
sex class.
The percentage change between insurers must always be lower than that between insureds
since part of the redistribution occurs within the insurance pool. The total volume of risk
adjustment between consumers of CHF 5.375 bn. accordingly drops to CHF 1.12 bn. between
insurers. Taking the canton of Zurich as the example, this figure is derived as follows. Out
of the 1,032,600 insured, 172,671 do not belong to one of the 25 insurers sampled. They
hypothetically form one large insurer. This procedure causes the volume of risk adjustment
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Figure 5.3: Difference in HCE between estimated from 3 insurers and official data, women,
Switzerland, 2005
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between insurers to be too low. This underestimation should however not influence the per-
centage reduction very much (because both before and after values are biased).
The redistribution between insurers operating in Switzerland would drop from an estimated
CHF 1.12 bn. to CHF 0.98 bn. or 12.5 percent as of 2005. In an extreme case, insurers may
change from paying to receiving, specifically if they mainly enrol 51-55 year old women or
56-60 year old men (see Table 5.5 again).
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter addresses two issues that have been debated in Swiss health policy. On the
one hand, the risk adjustment formula may be refined by including an indicator variable,
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Table 5.5: Capping the volume of risk adjustment; effects at the individual level, CHF, 2005
Women Amount Change New Amount
19-25 −1617.94 +236.01 −1381.93
26-30 −1102.57 +236.01 −866.55
31-35 −771.98 +236.01 −535.96
36-40 −829.99 +236.01 −593.98
41-45 −788.65 +236.01 −552.64
46-50 −349.55 +236.01 −113.54
51-55 283.26 −283.26 0.00
56-60 855.08 −434.50 420.58
61-65 1479.27 −434.50 1044.77
66-70 2125.63 −434.50 1691.13
71-75 2885.94 −434.50 2451.43
76-80 4190.96 −434.50 3756.46
81-85 5983.00 −434.50 5548.50
86-90 8643.28 −434.50 8208.78
90+ 11250.27 −434.50 10815.77
Men Amount Change New Amount
19-25 −2347.19 +236.01 −2111.18
26-30 −2289.83 +236.01 −2053.81
31-35 −2191.42 +236.01 −1955.41
36-40 −2072.80 +236.01 −1836.78
41-45 −1800.35 +236.01 −1564.34
46-50 −1478.97 +236.01 −1242.95
51-55 −548.42 +236.01 −312.40
56-60 222.80 −222.80 0.00
61-65 1222.62 −434.50 788.11
66-70 2084.59 −434.50 1650.08
71-75 3300.86 −434.50 2866.36
76-80 3275.79 −434.50 2841.29
81-85 4851.05 −434.50 4416.55
86-90 7161.99 −434.50 6727.48
90+ 9419.37 −434.50 8984.86
“Hospitalization or stay in a nursing home during the previous year”. On the other hand, as
a response to an increase of 80 percent in the volume of risk adjustment since its inception
in 1996, there is a desire to cap it. The concern is that a share of up to 31 percent of revenue
may undermine insurers’ incentive to compete for consumers. However, such a limit has its
opportunity cost in the guise of strengthened incentives for risk selection by health insurers.
The present study uses individual data provided by three health insurers. In a first step, they
are compared to official nationwide averages to assess their representativeness. The market
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Figure 5.4: Estimated, reduced and official risk adjustment payments, women in Zurich, 2005
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share of the three is above average in the northern and eastern parts and below average in
the northwestern and French-speaking parts of Switzerland. Overall, the data seem to accord
with official statistics to a sufficient degree to justify more detailed investigation. However,
risk adjustment payments in favor of older women are consistently too low resulting in a
calculated total volume that is too low.
Inclusion of the additional criterion, “hospitalization or living in a nursing home during the
previous year” is found to inflate the volume by 40 percent on average, depending on the
canton. Volume would increase most in cantons that currently redistribute a relatively low
amount. Age and sex would lose importance as risk adjusters throughout.
A cap on the volume of risk adjustment could be imposed at the nationwide level (capping
total volume), the level of health insurers, and the level of individual contribution into and
from the scheme by consumers. Limiting total volume turns out to be the most plausible
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Figure 5.5: Estimated, reduced and official risk adjustment payments, men in Zurich, 2005
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and least complicated solution. There are however implications for consumers (less cross-
subsidizing of premiums), the cantons (likely more premium subsidies), and the confederation
(more matching grants) and insurers (more efforts at risk selection). The effect on insurers
constitutes the optimization problem.
The politically determined objective function is to minimize variance (and therefore the
incentive for risk selection), subject to the volume of risk adjustment not exceeding a specified
level. The solution is derived by minimizing positive and negative half-variances subject to
this restriction. The optimum calls for a uniform reduction of positive and negative risk
adjustments.
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Table 5.6: Reduction of the volume between insurers
Before After Change
Volume between consumers 5.375 bn. 4.500 bn. -16.3%
Volume between insurers 1.123 bn. 0.982 bn. -12.5%
Since an additional criterion is introduced in order to improve the effectiveness of existing
risk adjustment the opportunity cost of the cap could considerably decrease. However, this
refinement causes volume to increase. Therefore its net effect is ambiguous.
An empirical simulation of the optimal type of cap in one Swiss canton illustrates the argu-
ment. It is shown that a reduction to CHF 4.5 bn. (-16 percent) at the national level would
reduce the volume of risk adjustment between insurers as well (-12.5 percent). The financial
burden drops slightly for those up to age 55; they are juxtaposed by less cross-subsidization
in favor of those above 55. The relative change for women is larger than for men throughout.
Variance of HCE financed by insurers grows, strengthening their incentives for risk selection.
In all, this research uncovers several uneasy tradeoffs. If community-rating is to be maintained,
refining the risk adjustment scheme appears to be desirable in order to mitigate remaining
incentives for risk selection. However, this is likely to increase the volume of redistribution
even further, which after all forces low risks to contribute more than a fair premium to
health insurance, often in spite of their efforts at containing moral hazard. This would call
for capping the volume of risk adjustment - which in turn has the opportunity costs in the
guise of a strengthened interest in risk selection on the part of health insurers. Moreover,
these opportunity costs may well increase when the risk adjustment formula is extended.
Future research will have to also take into account the weakening of insurer’s incentives for
product innovation caused by risk adjustment [as illustrated by Zweifel (2007)].
Appendix
Appendix A
Suppose the population of a Swiss canton consists of one man and one woman of the same
age. The man’s expected HCE is 1 and the woman’s, 1.3. The volume of risk adjustment
would therefore be,
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V =
|RAM |+ |RAF |
2
=
0.3
2
= 0.15, (5.A.1)
with RAM being the risk adjustment payment by the man and RAF , the payment received
by the woman. Replacing RAM and RAF by the corresponding expressions from Equation
(5.1) yields
V = (|LM − L¯|+ |LF − L¯|) · 12 . (5.A.2)
A change in the volume can be obtained by reducing the allowable HCE of women, as shown
by the total derivative
dV = (| − ∂L¯
∂LF
|+ |1− ∂L¯
∂LF
|)dLF · 12 . (5.A.3)
Now impose a reduction of the volume of one third, or 0.05. Therefore, one has
dV = −0.05 = (| − 0.5|+ |0.5|)dLF · 12 . (5.A.4)
This can be solved to yield
→ dLF = −0.1. (5.A.5)
Thus, the reduction of the volume of risk adjustment by 33 percent is achieved by reducing
the allowable HCE of women from 1.3 to 1.2. In other words, only two thirds of the excess
HCE of women would continue to be compensated by risk adjustment.
Appendix B
Assume a hypothetical risk adjustment scheme distinguishing four groups with different ex-
pected HCE,
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n0 = 3 ; L¯0 = 1
n1 = 4 ; L¯1 = 2
n2 = 2 ; L¯2 = 5
n3 = 1 ; L¯3 = 10.
This yields the following average HCE, payments to and from risk adjustment for each group,
and unrestricted volume,
n = n0 + n1 + n2 + n3
L¯ = 3.1
RA0 = −2.1
RA1 = −1.1
RA2 = 1.9
RA3 = 6.9
V = 10.7.
Now suppose the objective is to cap the volume at V¯ = 10 with a minimal increase in the
variance that needs to be covered by insurance companies. The first order conditions for
negative payments (payments to the risk adjustment scheme) are,
∂Z
∂R̂A0
=
−2(RA0 − R̂A0)n0
n
− λn0 = 0
∂Z
∂R̂A1
=
−2(RA1 − R̂A1)n1
n
− λn1 = 0
∂Z
∂λ
= R̂A0n0 + R̂A1n1 − V¯ = 0. (5.B.1)
where λ can be solved for from the first FOC,
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λ =
−2(RA0 − R̂A0)
n
. (5.B.2)
Equation (5.B.2) shows the determinants of the opportunity cost caused by a limit on the
volume of risk adjustment. First, the greater the population at risk (n), the smaller this cost.
Second, the greater the difference between the risk adjustment payment with and without
the cap (RA0 − R̂A0), the higher this cost. Alternatively, the system (5.B.1) can be solved
to yield,
(RA0 − R̂A0) = (RA1 − R̂A1)
R̂A0n0 + R̂A1n1 = V¯ . (5.B.3)
It is evident that the optimal reduction will always be the same across risk categories. Solving
this system of two Equations in the two unknowns yields the following solution for the negative
payments (payments to risk adjustment),
R̂A0 =
V¯ − −RA1n1 +RA0n1
n0 + n1
=
−10− (−1.1 · 4) + (−2.1 · 4)
7
= −2
R̂A1 =
V¯ − −RA0n0 +RA1n0
n0 + n1
=
−10− (−2.1 · 3) + (−1.1 · 3)
7
= −1.
(5.B.4)
Plugging Equation (5.B.4) into the formula for the volume yields V¯ − = −10 (the negative
value is due to the fact that these are payments into the risk adjustment scheme).
The positive payments (payments from the risk adjustment scheme) can be derived in an
analogous way,
R̂A2 =
V¯ + −RA3n3 +RA2n3
n2 + n3
=
10− (6.9 · 1) + (1.9 · 1)
3
= 1.66¯
R̂A3 =
V¯ + −RA2n2 +RA3n2
n2 + n3
=
10− (1.9 · 2) + (6.9 · 2)
3
= 6.66¯
(5.B.5)
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which plugged into the formula for the volume again yields V¯ + = 10.
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Chapter 6
Can guaranteed renewability
survive in the presence of death?
6.1 Introduction
This chapter starts by noting that there are basically two solutions for dealing with risk
selection (i.e. high-risk individuals remaining uninsured) in long-term health insurance. One
is to impose community rating by law; the other is to make contracts incentive-compatible.
The latter, market-based solution has been investigated by Pauly, Kuhnreuther and Hirth
(1995), PKH henceforth, and Cochrane (1995) in their seminal contributions. They derive
long-term insurance contracts that exhibit a feature of time consistency. In PKH this sequence
of incentive-compatible short-term contracts results in guaranteed renewability (GR). As
envisioned by Cochrane (1995, p. 447) these contracts must be renegotiation-proof, satisfying
a participation constraint in that all parties are always willing to sign the next contract under
all future circumstances. GR contracts achieve time-consistency by frontloading the sequence.
As pointed out by Frick (1998), however, frontloading may be excessive for individuals who
have limited capital endowment. Yet, the empirical evidence presented in Herring and Pauly
(2006) suggests that this is not a problem in reality.
The present chapter adds to the debate by complementing the set of transition probabilities
as follows. Whereas Pauly et al. (1995) consider only the likelihood of a favorable risk turning
to an unfavorable one during the planning period, the possibility of returning to favorable risk
status is accounted for as well. It will be shown that this causes frontloading to be less than
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in the PKH model, with the amount of reduction increasing in the probability of returning to
favorable risk status. Premiums depend on the difference between expected cost pertaining
to a weighted average of high and low risks and that pertaining to low risks. Moreover, when
the Markov process is complemented by death as a terminal state, the amount of frontloading
is reduced even more.
These statements are supported by a hypothetical comparison between the premium derived
in this chapter and the illustration presented by PKH. Moreover, it is shown that once death
and the cost of dying are included in the model, the critical value of time preference that is still
compatible with GR decreases causing demand for GR contracts to increase. In conclusion,
GR can be said not only to survive in the presence of death but to mitigate the problems of
adverse selection, cream skimming, and risk rating described by Patel and Pauly (2002). In
private health insurance, demand for (unrestricted) GR insurance contracts is enhanced once
the underlying Markov model is specified more completely.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature
on guaranteed renewable and long-term insurance. Section 6.3 presents the model and derives
the predictions, which are then used to compare the critical value of time preference derived
by Frick (1998) with the value that follows from the completed model (section 6.4). Section
6.5 illustrates a more general approach. Section 6.6 concludes.
6.2 Related Literature
There are two ways to counter risk selection and its associated problems in long-term health
insurance, with risk selection defined as high-risk individuals remaining uninsured. One is to
introduce mandatory community-rating as is the case in employer-contracted health insurance
in the United States and individually-contracted health insurance in Switzerland. The other
is to have risk-averse consumers pay a surcharge for GR. This second solution is prevalent in
the U.S. individual health insurance market. Note that this requires health insurers to have
the right to risk rate premiums.1 Risk-averse consumers buy health insurance voluntarily,
with the premium development ensuring time consistency. Patel and Pauly (2002, p. 283)
describe the policy choice in the following way: The alternative to guaranteed renewability,
1Interestingly, Herring and Pauly (2001) show that in fact premiums vary more strongly with risk in
community-rated areas than in risk-rated areas of the United States.
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for people concerned about adverse selection, risk rating, or cream skimming, is, as Paul
Ginsburg notes, ‘setting strong (regulatory) rules for this market.’ Those rules usually entail
some kind of community rating or limits on risk rating. Such rules themselves cause adverse
selection and cream skimming, so they tend to beget still more restrictions on the kinds of
policies that can be offered.
However, GR is unlikely to work perfectly either. In particular, individuals typically pay less
than under perfect risk rating, presumably because insurers fear the bad publicity ‘excessive
premiums’ may trigger. Therefore, some adverse side effects of imperfect risk rating remain,
e.g. a lock-in of high risks who want to make do with a GR contract [Patel and Pauly (2002)].
Still, GR is a market-based mechanism that at least partially overcomes the problem of
uncertainty about long-term health status.
The theory of long-term health insurance was initially developed by PKH and Cochrane
(1995). Long-term insurance contracts are defined as a sequence of short-term contracts that
are incentive compatible, in accordance with the participation constraint and renegotiation-
proof, as stated in the prior section. Through applying game theory and backward induction
PKH derive an incentive-compatible contract sequence with declining premiums. GR thus
may be a way to ensure long-term health insurance for an entire population, provided how-
ever everyone is actually capable and willing to prepay the frontloading in GR insurance.
Cochrane (1995), however, uses a multi-period utility function in discrete time. His solution
is an additional account from which so-called bidirectional severance payments (equal to the
increased present value of premiums or expected future cost) avoid ex-post defection by one
party (this can also be an individual who gets healthier unexpectedly).
The starting point of this chapter is the optimal contract in PKH, who deduces a time-
consistent premium schedule from expected cost development over time. The more the plan-
ning period is extended into the far future, the larger becomes the initial prepayment to
ensure GR. At least in the United States, the longest observable time horizon is defined by
eligibility for Medicare (age 65). In countries without a scheme similar to Medicare, the plan-
ning period is limited by the expected time of death. In these countries, transition between
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health states must include death as well in an attempt to derive a time-consistent optimal
health insurance contract.2
However, consider a U.S. worker who enters the private insurance market at age 20 and
remains in it until the age of 65. Even in this case prepayment to ensure GR can be a heavy
financial burden and even outright unaffordable for young individuals in the presence of credit
market imperfections. Frick (1998) shows that imperfect capital markets in combination with
differing subjective rates of time preference result in some consumers failing to purchase a
GR contract. Indeed, a critical value of time preference exists with consumers who are below
dropping out of GR.
Assuming that the number of high-loss periods is fixed and the same for everyone, Pauly et al.
(1998) derive a level premium schedule for group health insurance (e.g. employer-contracted).
In fact, a double pooling mechanism can be created (at the group level and at the insurer level,
through combining several groups with the same insurer). Obviously, such a double pooling
serves to reduce frontloading for GR [Pauly et al. (1998)]. The level premium schedule should
of course be sustainable even in the case of credit market imperfections [not noted by Pauly
et al. (1998)]. However, all it takes to obtain it is to assume a positive interest rate paid on
the frontloading surcharge and a uniform premium rebate at the end for all those remaining
in the GR pool. This double pooling mechanism may already work in reality, since Herring
and Pauly (2001) analyzing individual records found that premiums are not fully risk rated
in the U.S. market for individually contracted health insurance even in states where it is
permitted.
Two other recent empirical contributions deal with GR contracts. Brown III and Conelly
(2005a) evaluate the Australian government’s initiative to foster long-term private health
insurance using a GR model with probabilities published in Herring and Pauly (2006). They
find that Australia’s lifetime cover is subject to adverse selection the way it is set up currently.
However, GR may constitute a voluntary alternative to lifetime cover because it avoids penal-
izing loading in later years of life, since GR premiums contain an upfront surcharge instead.
In a second contribution, Brown III and Conelly (2005b) extend the PKH model to 35 periods,
allowing for age dependent loss probabilities. They hypothesize that the existence of large
2Death should be endogenously modelled to depict reality even in the case where such a system exists [see
a short discussion on endogenizing death in Steinmann et al. (2007)]. Whenever a system like Medicare does
not exist, however, modelling death is even more important.
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cross-subsidies from healthy, younger individuals to less healthy, older ones is one of the key
factors preventing the young from voluntarily buying health insurance. Moreover, they argue
that by substituting to prepayment, GR contracts may overcome market failure resulting in
consumers lacking cover for a future deterioration of their risk status.
Finally Herring and Pauly (2006) estimate the amount of frontloading in existing GR health
insurance in the United States. They construct a risk-rated GR premium profile and com-
pare it to the observed development of premiums during the life of the contract. They find
an amazing degree of similarity between the predicted and the actual time paths in U.S. in-
dividually contracted private health insurance. While acknowledging the importance of their
assumptions in obtaining this result, they fail to relax them where possible.
This chapter seeks to remedy this, mainly by introducing death as the ‘absorbing state’ (in
Markovian language). This important modification of course raises the question of whether
the GR concept survives in the face of death. The finding is that the presence of death actually
enhances the feasibility of GR because it causes the upfront GR surcharge to be lower.
6.3 The Model
The main element for calculating a lifetime health insurance premium that is compatible with
GR is a set of transition probabilities (see Figure 6.1). As in PKH, there is a probability p12
of an insured turning from a low risk (with expected future cost plL, where pl is the common
loss probability and L the size of the loss) to a high risk (characterized by ph ≥ pl and/or
H ≥ L, respectively). Accordingly, p11 is the probability of remaining in low-risk status.
Unlike PKH, the model contains important additional probabilities. First, high risks are
assumed to return to low-risk status with probability p21 > 0. Accordingly, they also have a
probability (p22) of remaining high risks. However, they may die (p24 > 0), which is also true
of low risks, with probability p13 > 0.3 The transition probabilities are collected in Matrix A,
3In a recent empirical contribution, Herring and Pauly (2006) present evidence suggesting that the prob-
ability to die for high and low risks differs significantly. To keep matters simple the graphical presentation
could only model death once with an average probability to die for the whole population. This, however, would
not depict reality and therefore both states of death are modelled. While both states may differ in terms of
probability of death and its respective cost engendered, they are both absorbing (p33 = p44 = 1).
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A =

p11 p12 p13 0
p21 p22 0 p24
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 . (6.1)
Clearly, PKH deal with a special case of Equation (6.1), viz. p21 = p13 = p24 = 0 and p22 = 1,
while the loss probabilities in the low risk state are p11 = 1 − pl and p12 = pl, respectively.
These restrictions are relaxed step by step below.
Figure 6.1: Underlying Markov process
Death
LowRisk High Risk
p11
p12
p21 p22
p24p13
p33 p44
Death
(pL)l (p H)h
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6.3.1 Positive probability of returning to favorable risk status
Neglecting the two absorbing states of death but assuming p21 > 0, the transition matrix A
of Equation (6.1) reduces to Matrix B,
B =
 p11 p12
p21 p22
 . (6.2)
In order to compare the results with PKH calculations, their values p11 = 0.9 and p12 = 0.1
are adopted here. Moreover, p21 = 0.25 (fixing p22 at 0.75) is assumed.4
Table 6.1 displays the development of the share of high and low risks in the PKH model
and in its modification. The loss probability is derived by weighting the state-dependent loss
probabilities [(pl) and (ph)] with the respective share. Intuitively a positive probability of
returning to favorable risk status should lower long-run premiums and hence the amount of
frontloading. This is illustrated in Table 6.1 using the same parameter values as PKH (details
are provided in appendix A). Appendix A also shows that premiums depend on the difference
between expected cost pertaining to a weighted average of favorable and unfavorable risks
and that pertaining to favorable risks.
During the first two periods, the modification p21 = 0.25 > 0 does not have an effect. However,
from then on the share of high risks approaches 0.1248 rather than 0.3439. The loss probability
begins to change in period three already, converging to 0.12496 rather than 0.16878. In
combination the lifetime premium amounts to PMod. = 59.376 rather than PPKH = 68.908,
a reduction of 13.8 percent. Note that a two-period model would fail to indicate this change,
being subject to the restriction that the premium of the last period must be less or equal to
the actuarially fair premium for a low-risk individual. Otherwise, low risks would not take
out insurance. However, because the last-period premium and the probability of transition
from low to high risk status are given while p21 > 0 is not relevant yet, the second to last
period premium is determined as well and cannot differ from the value calculated by PKH.
4In a binary distribution with probabilities pi, (1− pi), the mean waiting period for transition from state 1
to state 2 is D = 1/pi, see e.g. Bhattacharyya and Johnson (1977). Pauly et al. (1998) assume D = 4 in their
GR group insurance model, therefore pi = p21 = 0.25.
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Table 6.1: PKH model and modification
Period
PKH → p21 = 0
Loss Pr.
Modified → p21 = 0.25
Loss Pr.High Risks Low Risks High Risks Low Risks
1 0.0000 1.0000 0.10000 0.0000 1.0000 0.10000
2 0.1000 0.9000 0.12000 0.1000 0.9000 0.12000
3 0.1900 0.8100 0.13800 0.1200 0.8800 0.12400
4 0.2710 0.7290 0.16230 0.1240 0.8760 0.12480
5 0.3439 0.6561 0.16878 0.1248 0.8752 0.12496
PPKH = 68.908∗ PMod. = 59.376∗
∗ No discounting for simplicity
Therefore, in order to see the effect of p21 > 0, the Markov process must go on for more than
two periods.
Equation (6.2) can be manipulated to establish a relationship between PKH and the GR
group insurance model by Pauly et al. (1998). The steady-state distribution vector v of an
ergodic Markov process satisfies,
v′ ×B = v′. (6.3)
The following system of Equations therefore solves for the steady state distribution vector v,
L+H = 1 (6.4)[
L H
]
×
 p11 p12
p21 p22
 = [ L H ] (6.5)
Solving for L and H yields,
L =
p21
1 + p21 − p11 = 0.714 (6.6)
H =
p12
1 + p12 − p22 = 0.286. (6.7)
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In the long run 71.4 percent of the insured belong to the favorable and 28.6 percent to the
unfavorable risk category, respectively.5
6.3.2 Introducing Death I: Time of Death
At this point, death is reintroduced as an absorbing state. However, the time of death proves
to be very important. In analogy to PKH, the argument always assumes that the individual
starts in the low-risk state at time t, while the analysis stops at time t+ 1.
Figure 6.2 (a) illustrates the PKH timing. Once the premium is paid, cost may accrue. Then
risk status may change, before period t + 1 starts. Accordingly, premiums must satisfy the
following restriction in a two-period model,
Pt + Pt+1 = plL+ p11plL+ p12phH. (6.8)
A one-period contract would require the premium for low risks to be no higher than their
expected cost. Therefore Pt+1 can be set equal to plL. This in turn implies that the premium
in period t is given by,
Pt,a = plL+ p12(phH − plL), (6.9)
where Pt,a is the premium in period t with the timing illustrated in Figure 6.2 (a) and
p11 = 1− p12 since p13 = 0. Pt,a is the premium derived in PKH.
Now death is introduced. Let the change in risk status take place before the premium is
paid [see Figure 6.2 (b)]. Because death and change in risk status occur at the beginning of
the period, only low risks are offered GR insurance in period t and only survivors pay the
premium in period t+ 1. Premiums must now satisfy,
Pt + (1− p13)Pt+1 = plL+ p11plL+ p12phH + p13Cl, (6.10)
where Cl is the extra cost of dying as a low risk. Again substituting Pt+1 = plL and rear-
ranging terms, one has,
5Pauly et al. (1998) as well as Nickel (2005) derive the same steady-state distribution. Level contributions
are then calculated from this steady state.
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Figure 6.2: The crucial importance of time of death
(a)PKH (b) Eugster I
(c) Eugster II
Pt,b = p11plL+ p12phH + p13(Cl + plL) (6.11)
Pt,b = plL+ p12(phH − plL) + p13Cl, (6.12)
since p11+p13 = 1−p12. Three possible scenarios emerge from introducing death as a terminal
state:
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• A positive probability of death (p13 > 0) reduces the probability of remaining in the
low-risk status but leaves the probability of transition from low- to high-risk status
unchanged (p11 ↓, p12 →).
• A positive probability of death (p13 > 0) reduces the probability of transition from
low- to high-risk status but leaves the probability of remaining in the low-risk status
unchanged (p11 →, p12 ↓).
• A positive probability of death (p13 > 0) reduces both the probability of transition from
low- to high-risk status and the probability of remaining in the low-risk state (p11 ↓,
p12 ↓).
Figure 6.2 (c) introduces a third possible modification. Here, transition occurs at the end of
the period after cost accrued. In analogy to Figure 6.2 (b) only survivors pay the premium
in period t + 1. However, everyone is offered a contract in period t since the change in risk
status occurs at the end of the period after the premium is paid. This timing implies the
following set of restrictions on the premium,
Pt + (1− p13)Pt+1 = plL+ p13Cl + p11plL+ p12phH + p11p13Cl + p12p24Ch, (6.13)
where Ch is the extra cost of dying as a high risk. Now Pt+1 must also cover the extra cost of
dying as a low risk. The restriction Pt+1 = plL+ p13Cl is imposed on Equation (6.13). This
implies that the premium in period t is reduced to,
Pt,c = p11plL+ p12phH + p13(plL+ p13Cl) + p11p13Cl + p12p24Ch (6.14)
= plL+ p12(phH − plL) + p13Cl + p12(p24Ch − p13Cl). (6.15)
In full analogy to Figure 6.2 (b), three scenarios can be distinguished. Note that both pre-
miums including death are lower than or equal to PKH as long as zero excess cost of dying
is assumed (Cl = Ch = 0). The first two terms on the RHS of Equation (6.15) serve to cover
expected health loss, with the first term referring to a low risk during period t and the second,
to the possible increase in expected cost weighted with the probability of becoming a high
risk in period t + 1. Up to this point, Equation (6.15) is in full analogy of the PKH model.
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With (Cl > 0 and Ch > 0), however, there are two additional terms that are due to death as
a terminal state. One of them is for the expected extra cost of dying in t as a low risk, the
other, for the possible increase or decrease in the extra cost of dying due to a transition from
low- to high-risk status at the end of period t.
6.3.3 Introducing Death II: Extra Cost of Dying
During the past few years, there has been a growing literature revolving around the ‘red
herring’ that claims the influence of age on health care expenditure to be dwarfed by that
of closeness to death [e.g. see Lubitz and Riley (1993), Zweifel et al. (1999), Werblow et al.
(2007), or Steinmann et al. (2007)]. This subsection seeks to elucidate the impact of the extra
cost of dying (Ch, Cl > 0) on the GR premium, again using Figure 6.2.
As to Figure 6.2 (a), the PKH case, the cost of dying is not considered. Figure 6.2 (b) and
Equation (6.12) again constitute a more complex case and all three scenarios [defined below
Equation (6.12)] can be distinguished. Scenario one clearly increases the premium in period t
while scenarios two and three depend on the relationship between the cost of dying as a low
risk and the difference in expected cost between low and high risks.
Finally, turn to Figure 6.2 (c). In the first scenario, Pt,c clearly increases compared to Pt,a.
Turning to scenario two and three one can distinguish no less than nine subcases. The upshot
is that there are many parameter constellations that cause the GR premium with death to
be lower in the first period than calculated by PKH (Pt,a). This in turn implies that critical
time preference that is still compatible with GR insurance is lowered (i.e. generating a higher
demand for GR insurance contracts as shown in section 6.5.2).
6.4 Credit Rationing Revisited
As stated in the literature review, Frick (1998) argues that consumers with limited income
may be subject to credit rationing in imperfect capital markets, rendering them incapable
of financing the GR surcharge upfront. In this section, his argument is revisited, using the
different chronologies developed in Figure 6.2 and the corresponding premium structures.
Following Frick (1998) this multi-period model considers two periods only and assumes log-
Guaranteed Renewability and Death 129
arithmic utility. The optimization problem then reads (with y denoting constant per period
income to finance premiums),
max
P1,P2H
U(y − P1) + p12βU(y − P2H) + p11βU(y − P2L)
s.t. P1 + p12P2H + p11P2L = plL+ p11plL+ p12phH
P2L = plL (6.16)
Here, P1 is the first-period premium paid by everyone as a low risk, while the second-period
premium differs between risks. The second-period premium paid by those who become high
risks P2H differs from that paid by low risks P2L, with β ≤ 1 being the subjective discount
rate. The Lagrangian and its first-order conditions yield,
U ′[y − P1] = βU ′[y − P2H ] (6.17)
plL+ p12phL = P1 + p12P2H . (6.18)
Note that consumers can attain these conditions only given the assumption that a new insurer
may enter the market in any period. An optimization over just two periods is therefore
sufficient. It is revealed that the higher the time preference β of individuals, the higher is the
premium P2H that individuals are willing to accept. Figure 6.3 illustrates.
Figure 6.3: Consumer’s risk utility function
U[ ]y
y
y-P1y-P2H
U[ ]y-P2H
U[ ]y-P1 A
B
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Let the risk utility function of a consumer who has paid P1 and hence has first-period dis-
posable income (y − P1) pass through point A. Given that the consumer remains in the
contract and pays premium P2H from his second period income, let the risk utility function
pass through point B, with higher marginal utility. Now with β = 1 (no time preference),
points A and B would have to coincide to make marginal utilities equal in both periods.
However, if marginal utility U ′[y−P2H ] is multiplied by β < 1 (indicating positive time pref-
erence), point A must lie to the right of point B, indicating that a second-period premium
P2H > P1 is acceptable in optimization. As one can glean from Equation (6.18), P2H only
enters the budget constraint of individuals if p12 > 0, i.e. a positive probability of becoming
an unfavorable risk. Therefore, Equations (6.17) and (6.18) together imply that the insurers
have some scope in skimming off willingness to pay by consumers who have both marked
time-preference and a positive probability of becoming a high risk.
The formula derived by Frick (1998) can be generalized to include additional probabilities and
manipulated to derive long-term premium paths, permitting to calculate it for any contract
length. However, the major contribution by Frick (1998) is to prove the existence of a critical
value of time preference β¯ separating individuals who buy GR insurance from those who do
not. Based on logarithmic utility and the actuarially fair premium per period, one obtains
these threshold values of β¯ for all three chronologies in Figure 6.2,
β¯a =
y − phH
y − plL (as in PKH); (6.19a)
β¯b =
y − phH
y − plL− p13Cl ; (6.19b)
β¯c =
y − phH − p24Ch
y − plL− p13Cl . (6.19c)
Compared to PKH [Equation (6.19a)], chronology (b) results in a higher rather than lower
critical value of time preference. A lower value of β¯ is only possible in chronology (c). How-
ever, the outcome depends on the relative magnitude of p24Ch and p13Cl. As pointed out in
section 6.3, Herring and Pauly (2006) estimate the probability of death to be significantly
larger for high risks. The cost of death with regard to different risks has never been studied
econometrically and would be an interesting topic for future research.
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6.5 A More General Approach
Alternatively the optimization problem can retain the second-period, community-rated pre-
mium. A consumer considering a future change in risk status now optimizes,
max
P1,P2
U(y − P1) + (1− p13)βU(y − P2) (6.20)
s.t. P1 + (1− p13)P2 = plL+ p11plL+ p12phH
P2 ≤ plL
where exemplary the constraint in form of Equation (6.8) is used. The corresponding first
order conditions are,
U ′[y − P1] = βU ′[y − P2] + µ(1− p13) (6.21)
P1 + (1− p13)P2 = plL+ p11plL+ p12phH (6.22)
Two cases can be distinguished,
• P2 = plL → µ ≥ 0. This would imply U ′[y − P1] ≥ βU ′[y − P2].
• P2 < plL → µ = 0. This would imply U ′[y − P1] = βU ′[y − P2].
In the first case, the constrained second-period premium prohibits the financial burden on
consumers from increasing later (see Figure 6.3 again, with β = 1, the optimal value for
consumers could even be a point like C, to the right of point A). The second case is similar to
the result derived by Frick (1998), where consumers want to equate first- and second-period
marginal utilities. This means that premium Pt+1 exceeds Pt and would be the same again
only in the special case of β = 1 (A and C coincide in Figure 6.3).
6.5.1 Positive Rate of Interest and Increasing Health Care Cost
Up to this point, the main question to be answered has been whether GR contracts are
likely to be sustainable in the presence of death. While the answer tends to be positive with
regard to the timing presented in Figure 6.2 (c), there are additional issues confronting policy
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makers. On the one hand there is the unrelenting increase in the cost of health care which
poses a challenge to any health insurer seeking to write GR contracts. On the other hand
increases in the cost of health care relax the second-period premium constraint. In addition,
financing the upfront GR surcharge would be more affordable if consumers’ payments were
credited with a positive rate of interest. With g > 0 denoting the rate of cost increase and
i > 0 the rate of interest paid on the GR frontloading, the budget constraints [Equations
(6.8), (6.10), and (6.13)] become,
(1 + i)Pt + Pt+1 = (1 + i)plL+ p11plL(1 + g) + p12phH(1 + g) (6.23a)
(1 + i)Pt + (1− p13)Pt+1 = (1 + i)plL+ p11plL(1 + g) + p12phH(1 + g)+
p13Cl(1 + g) (6.23b)
(1 + i)Pt + (1− p13)Pt+1 = (1 + i)plL+ (1 + i)p13Cl + p11plL(1 + g) + p12phH(1 + g)+
p11p13Cl(1 + g) + p12p24Ch(1 + g) (6.23c)
The time of death and its impact on the critical rate of time preference β¯ is analyzed in the
next section. Generally, a positive probability of death continues to lower β¯, thus causing
demand for GR insurance contracts to increase.
6.5.2 Determining the Critical Value of Time Preference
The optimization problem composed of Equation (6.20) and restrictions (6.23a)-(6.23c) are
now examined and a numerical example will be used to illustrate the influence of time of
death, continuing and comparing the three chronologies introduced in section 6.3.2.
To keep the results comparable to Pauly et al. (1995) and Frick (1998), Table 6.2 first contains
the same parameter values, with the probability of falling ill (pl) set equal to the probability
of transition from low- to high-risk status (p12) and the probability of remaining in high-risk
status set equal to the probability of positive health care cost in the high-risk state (ph = p22).
The calculation proceeds as follows. Suppose β = 1. Unconstrained individuals equate mar-
ginal utilities across periods, as stated below Equation (6.22). In order to check whether
being unconstrained is possible (with β = 1), the maximum premium that a low-risk status
consumer is willing to pay in t + 1 is substituted into the restrictions ensuring that premi-
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Table 6.2: Parameter values assumed
Chronology (a), no death (PKH) Chronologies (b) and (c), with death
p11 = 0.9 ph = 0.25 p11 = 0.9 L = 20
p12 = 0.1 L = 20 p12 = 0.07 H = 20
p13 = 0 H = 20 p13 = 0.03 Y = 100
p21 = 0.75 Y = 100 p21 = 0.65 i = 0.1
p22 = 0.25 i = 0.1 p22 = 0.25 g = 0.1
p24 = 0 g = 0.1 p24 = 0.1 Cl = 5
pl = 0.1 pl = 0.1 Ch = 2
ph = 0.25
ums cover expected cost. Inserting the values given in Table 6.2 into Equation (6.23a), one
obtains6,
(1 + i)Pt,a + Pt+1 = (1 + i)plL+ p11plL(1 + g) + p12phH(1 + g)
Pt,a = 2.3.
Every consumer is constrained in chronology (a), because Pt,a > Pt+1 = plL(1 + g) = 2.2.
The lowest possible value of time preference compatible with unconstrained optimization can
be derived by dividing first-period by second-period marginal utility, with both premiums
set to their actuarially fair per-period values (the fair per-period premium in t+1 is the low
risks’ expected cost and any remaining costs are paid in period t),
U ′[Y − Pt,fair]
U ′[Y − Pt+1,fair] = β¯. (6.24)
The RHS of Table 6.2 displays the parameter values used for the two chronologies (b) and
(c) that deal with death. Assuming one quarter high-risk individuals (approximately the
steady-state distribution of section 6.3.1), average death probability in this population is
pDeath = 0.047.7 For chronology (b) they are plugged into Equation (6.23b),
6An alternative way of arriving at the same result is to set premiums in both periods equal and solve for
a uniform premium across periods using the budget constraint. If the result exceeds the maximum possible
premium in the later period, then even the most patient individuals (β = 1) are restricted in this optimization.
7Life Expectancy at birth for Swiss men is 77.2 years with average probability of death at age 77 being
0.049 [see Federal Statistical Office (BFS) (2007)]. Since GR may be used as a lifetime contract this end of
life setting is assumed to model the last two periods.
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(1 + i)Pt,b + (1− p13)Pt+1 = (1 + i)plL+ p11plL(1 + g) + p12phH(1 + g) +
p13Cl(1 + g)
Pt,b = 2.236.
This value again exceeds the maximum premium a low-risk consumer is willing to pay in the
second period, viz. 2.2 as before. Turning to chronology (c) one has,
(1 + i)Pt,c + (1− p13)Pt+1 = (1 + i)plL+ (1 + i)p13Cl + p11plL(1 + g) + p12phH(1 + g) +
p11p13Cl(1 + g) + p12p24Ch(1 + g)
Pt,c = 2.363.
This falls short of the maximum acceptable value of Pt+1 = 2.365. Table 6.3 summarizes the
effect of each parameter on both premiums [in chronology (c)] and states whether an increase
in the respective parameter helps to achieve Pt+1 ≥ Pt.
Table 6.3: Derivatives of both premiums and their effects
Parameter ∂Pt
∂Parameter
∂Pt+1
∂Parameter Effect
i −Rp12((phH − plL) + (p24Ch − p13Cl))/(1 + i) 0 X
g p12((phH − plL) + (p24Ch − p13Cl))/(1 + i) plL+ p13Cl (X)
Cl p13(1− p12R) p13(1 + g) X
Ch p12p24R 0 –
plL 1− p12R 1 + g X
phH p12R 0 –
p24 p12ChR 0 –
Note: (X) = (contingent on parameter values) increasing this parameter relaxes the con-
straint; – = increasing this parameter tightens the constraint; R = (1 + g)/(1 + i).
On the one hand this is true whenever Pt is increased less than Pt+1. On the other hand
this occurs when Pt is decreased more than Pt+1. Increasing the rate of interest paid on
prepayments, expected health care costs, or the cost of dying as a low risk all relax the
second-period premium constraint. Increasing the rate of growth in health care costs just
does so if p12(phH+p24Ch) < (1+ i+p12)(plL+p13Cl). However, every parameter associated
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with the high-risk state aggravates the second-period premium constraint. The outcome of
changing a transition probability in the low-risk state crucially depends on the remaining
parameters and the effect on its composite probabilities (see appendix B).
More generally, there is a critical combination of cost growth (g) and interest rate (i) that
can achieve uniform premiums over two periods.8 The locus of critical values in Figure 6.4
is derived by assuming that the second- and the first-period premium are the same. Figure
6.4 first displays the PKH case (zero probability of death). Any combination of (g, i) lying to
the origin from this locus cannot achieve uniform premiums. This is only possible whenever
growth in the cost of health care exceeds 17.8 percent. If the insurer earns positive interest
on the GR frontloading, this critical value drops close to 10 percent. However, the steep slope
of the locus makes clear that the easying element is cost growth (g) since it directly affects
the restriction on the second-period premium. The second locus of Figure 6.4 corresponds to
chronology (c) (positive probability of death). With the parameter values given, (g) may be
below 11 percent p.a. and uniform premiums are possible. Increasing the rate of interest in
this case lowers the respective growth rate to almost 5 percent.
Figure 6.4: Combination of i and g that are compatible with GR
i
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
g
0
0.20.150.10.050
1
2
Rateof interest paid
on frontloading (i)
Growth of health care
cost (g)
Prob. of death 0.03 [chronology (c)]
Prob. of death 0.00 [chronology (a)]
8Any individual with β = 1 would prefer uniform premiums, while those with β < 1 would prefer Pt < Pt+1.
If uniform premiums are not viable because Pt+1 < Pt always holds every individual will always be constrained.
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Another locus of interest is the net gain in expected utility from a GR contract as a function
of time preference β. The expected utility gained from GR insurance less the present value of
the associated penalty through the restricted second-period premium with parameters again
taken from the RHS of Table 6.2 is displayed in Figure 6.5 [deriving Figure 6.5 is illustrated
in appendix C using the chronology from Figure 6.2 (c)]. As could be expected, consumers
with a high level of time preference (β < 0.526) would rather have no insurance than a GR
contract since the utility reduction outweighs the benefit from insurance. However, there is
a group of (rather patient) consumers who benefit from a GR contract. On the other hand,
imposing a GR mandate probably would result in an overall efficiency loss.
Figure 6.5: Net expected utility of GR insurance as a function of time preference
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Figure 6.5 derives the lower critical value (βˆc) for chronology (c) and is drawn for consumers
with Lagrange multiplier µ ≥ 0 in the optimization problem [Equation (6.20)]. Therefore,
the constraint on their second-period premium is binding. If this constraint is relaxed, one
obtains a second, upper critical value (β¯c) for chronology (c). This value may be compared
with the value that would result from Equation (6.19c). The critical value in the model by
Frick (1998) is lower because the community-rating of Pt+1 is retained here.
Figure 6.6 displays the critical values of the ‘more general approach’ that are based on the
same calibrations as Figures 6.4 and 6.5. One can distinguish the following three types.
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• Individuals with strong preference for current consumption β < 0.526 will not buy GR
insurance because the GR surcharge contained in their first-period premium exceeds
their expected utility gain from a GR contract.
• Individuals with a moderate to low preference for current consumption 0.526 ≤ β <
0.999 do buy GR insurance but would prefer shifting more of the premium burden to
the later period.
• Very patient individuals 0.999 ≤ β ≤ 1 also opt for the GR contract. They would not
even have wanted to shift more of the premium burden to the later period.
Figure 6.6: Upper and lower critical values of time preference
1
Buying,not Restricted
Buying, Restricted
Not Buying
0 =0.526
=0.999
This third set would be empty if death had not been considered (as in PKH and depicted
in Figure 6.4 where the point i = g = 0.1 is to the left of the locus without death) because
this serves to shift critical β¯ values up towards 1. Therefore, GR not only survives but may
actually thrive in the presence of death.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter takes the contribution by Pauly, Kuhnreuther and Hirth (1995) – PKH – on
guaranteed renewability (GR) as its starting point. However, PKH implicitly assume that
there is only one possible and permanent transition, from low-risk status to high-risk status.
This neglects two important possibilities. First, some insureds do revert back to low-risk
status, as has been documented e.g. by Beck and Zweifel (1998) for an observation period of
five years and taken into account by Pauly et al. (1998) in their calibration of GR contracts
in U.S. group health insurance. Second, there is always the transition to death that has been
neglected up to now in any theoretical contribution. Therefore, the question arises of whether
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an individual GR insurance contract ‘survives’ these modifications or becomes a concept void
of practical relevance.
One way to answer this question is to determine the value of time preference that is just
compatible with GR. Consumers who discount the future heavily do not want to pay the
GR surcharge in the guise of frontloading because they are strongly interested in current
consumption, while patient consumers tend to opt for it. If the critical value distinguishing
these two types is increased by the two modifications considered, then the set of GR pur-
chasers shrinks, possibly to an empty set. If it is lowered, they serve to enhance GR in health
insurance.
However, this test turns out not to be sufficient in all cases. Notably, including the probability
of transition from high- to low-risk status does not affect this critical value of time preference
while still serving to reduce lifetime premiums by 13.8 percent, thus making GR more attrac-
tive in the example given in section 6.3.1. When death is accounted for as a terminal state,
the critical value of time preference is not affected in all cases either. The outcome strongly
depends on the time of death and its respective cost. This is illustrated for the model by
Frick (1998) and the alternative approach (section 6.5.2). Thus, GR is found to survive well
in the presence of death. This is also true when the cost of health care increases and interest
is being paid on the frontloading provided by consumers. However, the rate of interest turns
out to be far less important. Of course, these statements are conditional on the parameter
values entering simulations. Analyzing the effect of the remaining parameter values using the
more general approach reveals that results are most sensible to changes in low risks’ cost of
health care, their probability and their cost of death. Future research should therefore also
address the empirical question of the ratio between different risks’ cost of dying. In addition,
the consequence of using alternative utility functions should be studied.
Finally, consumers may face even harsher credit rationing than assumed here when having to
come up with the GR surcharge early in their life cycle. Nevertheless, this research permits
to conclude that GR constitutes a possible solution to the problem of insuring the risk of
deteriorating health status without any particular mandate by public policy.
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Appendix A
The optimal premium schedule is derived along the lines of the PKH model. However, the
possibility of transition from high- to low-risk status is taken into account [cost of dying is
dealt with later; therefore, (Cl = Ch = p13 = p24 = 0)]. The example calculated is limited
to five periods since Equations increase in complexity without adding insights (indeed, a
three-period formulation suffices, as shown below and stated by PKH who also demonstrate
the solution to be a subgame perfect equilibrium, with insurers always wanting to offer the
pertinent contract).
Expected cost is given by:
ECt = ProblowEClow + ProbhighEChigh; (6.A.1)
where EC is expected cost, Problow is the probability of being in the low-risk status t periods
from now (defined analogously for the high-risk status).
The corresponding state probabilities can be calculated by raising the transition matrix A
to its various powers and assuming an initial distribution in the form of row vector (a). The
second-period probability values are therefore,
(
1 0 0 0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=a
·A ·A = a ·A2
=
[
(p211 + p12p21)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Problow
(p12p22 + p11p12)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probhigh
(p11p13 + p13)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probdeathlow
(p12p24)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probdeathhigh
]
.
where probabilities are defined in Equation (6.1) of the main text.
Expected cost is calculated for low and high risks respectively as indicated by Equation
(6.A.1), e.g. EClow = pl · L with pl denoting the probability of having positive cost and L,
average health care cost pertaining to a low risk. Expected cost for high risk is defined in the
same way.
Turning to the five-period formulation, one obtains
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EC1 =plL (6.A.2)
EC2 =p11plL+ p12phH (6.A.3)
EC3 =(p211 + p12p21)plL+ (p12p22 + p11p12)phH (6.A.4)
EC4 =(p311 + 2p11p12p21 + p12p21p22)plL (6.A.5)
+ (p211p12 + p
2
12p21 + p12p
2
22 + p11p12p22)phH
EC5 =(p411 + 3p
2
11p12p21 + 2p11p12p21p22 + p
2
12p
2
21 + p12p21p
2
22)plL (6.A.6)
+ (p311p12 + p
2
11p12p22 + 2p11p
2
12p21 + p11p12p
2
22 + 2p
2
12p21p22 + p12p
3
22)phH.
Here, pl and ph are as defined above, while H and L are average health care cost of high (low)
risks. For GR, premiums must reflect expected lifetime costs; e.g. the premium in period five
equals expected health care cost in the first period (P5 = EC1; see PKH). This yields the
following premium schedule,
P1 =p311plL (6.A.7)
+ p12([p211p21 + p11p21p22 + p12p
2
21 + p21p
2
22]plL+ [p11p12p21 + 2p12p21p22 + p
3
22]phH)
+ p11p12([p11p21 + p21p22]plL+ [p12p21 + p222]phH)
+ p211p12(p21plL+ p22phH) + p
3
11p12(phH − plL)
P2 =p211plL+ p12([p11p21 + p21p22]plL+ [p12p21 + p
2
22]phH) (6.A.8)
+ p11p12(p21plL+ p22phH) + p211p12(phH − plL)
P3 =p11plL+ p12(p21plL+ p22phH) + p11p12(phH − plL) (6.A.9)
P4 =plL+ p12(phH − plL) (6.A.10)
P5 =plL. (6.A.11)
These formulae yield the values presented in Table 6.1 of the text. The assumptions are
L = H; p11 = 1 − pl; p12 = pl; p13 = p24 = p21 = 0; p22 = 1 (PKH; LHS of Table 6.1) and
L = H; p11 = 1− pl; p12 = pl; p13 = p24 = 0; p21 = 1− ph; p22 = ph respectively (Modified;
RHS of Table 6.1). The parameter values are pl = 0.1, ph = 0.25, and L = 20.
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As stated in the text GR premiums depend on weighted averages rather than the difference
between expected cost pertaining to high and low risks. This is shown for the third period as
follows. Adding (+p12plL− p12plL) to the RHS of Equation (6.A.9) yields,
P3 = p11plL+ p12(p21plL+ p22phH) + p11p12(phH − plL) + p12plL− p12plL. (6.A.12)
Rearranging terms on the RHS, one obtains,
P3 = (p11 + p12)plL+ p12(p21plL+ p22phH − plL) + p11p12(phH − plL)
= plL+ p12(p21plL+ p22phH − plL) + p11p12(phH − plL). (6.A.13)
The first term on the RHS of Equation (6.A.13) covers expected health care cost of a low
risk during the current period. The second term covers the risk of an insured turning into a
high risk in period two, the second to last period of the contract. The fact that she or he may
become a low risk again in period three is accounted for by taking a weighted average of the
cost pertaining to low and high risk respectively. The last term covers the risk of a person
turning into a high risk in period three, in full analogy with PKH.
Appendix B
This appendix evaluates the effect of changing transition probabilities in the low-risk state
and their corresponding effects on premiums Pt and Pt+1 for the timing depicted in Figure
6.2 (c). The actuarially fair premium Pt+1 = (1 + g)(plL+ p13Cl) and Equation (6.23c) with
Pt+1 replaced form the starting point,
Pt+1 = (1 + g)(plL+ p13Cl) (6.B.1)
Pt = plL+ p13Cl + (6.B.2)
1 + g
1 + i
(p11plL+ p12phH + p11p13Cl + p12p24Ch − (1− p13)(plL+ p13Cl)).
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The derivatives with respect to the transition probabilities are,
∂Pt
∂p11
=
∂p13
∂p11
Cl +RX +
∂p12
∂p11
RY +
∂p13
∂p11
RZ (6.B.3)
∂Pt+1
∂p11
=
∂p13
∂p11
(1 + g)Cl (6.B.4)
∂Pt
∂p12
=
∂p13
∂p12
Cl +
∂p11
∂p12
RX +RY +
∂p13
∂p12
RZ (6.B.5)
∂Pt+1
∂p12
=
∂p13
∂p12
(1 + g)Cl (6.B.6)
∂Pt
∂p13
= Cl +
∂p11
∂p13
RX +
∂p12
∂p13
RY +RZ (6.B.7)
∂Pt+1
∂p13
= (1 + g)Cl (6.B.8)
where R, X, Y , and Z are defined as follows,
R = (1 + g)/(1 + i) (6.B.9)
X = plL+ p13Cl (6.B.10)
Y = phH + p24Ch (6.B.11)
Z = plL+ p13Cl − p12Cl. (6.B.12)
Without additional assumptions regarding the remaining parameter values and the effect on
composite probabilities [three scenarios in analogy of the scenarios defined below Equation
(6.12) can be deduced] no predictions can be derived.
Appendix C
The calculation of net gain in expected utility due to GR health insurance is considered here.
As in Frick (1998), a logarithmic risk utility function is assumed. For the utility gained from
insurance (4EU), in the first period one is left with,
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M EU1 = (1− p13){ln[pl(y − L) + (1− pl)y]− pl ln[y − L]− (1− pl) ln[y]}
= 0.0020. (6.C.1)
With cost growth g and interest i, one obtains for the second period,
M EU2 = {(1− p13)p11 + (1− p24)p12}
{ln[(p11pl + p12ph)(y − L(1 + g)) + (p11(1− pl) + p12(1− ph))y]}
−{(1− p13)p11 + (1− p24)p12}{(p11pl + p12ph) ln[y − L(1 + g)]}
−{(1− p13)p11 + (1− p24)p12}{(p11(1− pl) + p12(1− ph)) ln[y]}
= 0.1027 (6.C.2)
EU2 is much larger than EU1 because every insured is a low risk in the first period, whereas
the probability of loss is much higher in the next period. In total, the utility premium obtained
is,
M EU = M EU1 + β(1− p13) M EU2
= 0.0020 + 0.0996β > 0 (6.C.3)
The loss in expected utility caused by the binding restriction P2 = plL can be calculated
by determining the optimal first-period premium P ∗1 when the Lagrange-multiplier is µ = 0
in the optimization problem in Equation (6.20). This value is used to calculate the increase
in expected utility (M EU∗1 > 0) in period 1 which is the difference between the optimized
utility and the utility with a binding restriction,
P ∗1 =
106.7β − 92.1211
1.1 + 1.067β
; (6.C.4)
M EU∗1 = ln
[
100− 106.7β − 92.1211
1.1 + 1.067β
]
− 4.5797. (6.C.5)
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However, in period 2 the binding restriction causes a reduction in expected utility (M EU∗2 <
0) compared to the optimized value of P ∗2 . The reduction is given by,
P ∗2 = 100− 110β +
1.1β(106.7β − 92.1211)
1.1 + 1.067β
; (6.C.6)
M EU∗2 = ln
[
110β − 1.1β(106.7β − 92.1211)
1.1 + 1.067β
]
− 4.5812. (6.C.7)
The total reduction of expected utility from the binding constraint therefore amounts to,
M EU∗ = M EU∗1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+β(1− p13)M EU∗2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0 (6.C.8)
The difference between (C.3) and (C.8) is the net gain in expected utility from having GR
insurance.
Mn EU =M EU− M EU∗ (6.C.9)
With the parameter values taken from Table 6.2 the critical value for Mn EU = 0 of βˆ is
0.526. Figure 6.5 illustrates the difference as a function of β.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The conclusion is first confined to a short discussion of policy implications, and then proceeds
to possible extensions and improvements with regard to the unpublished chapters 4, 5, and
6.
Chapters 2 and 3 clearly imply that policy makers need to pay attention when increasing
health care expenditure or social security in general. The findings disclose that in both cases
additional expenditure is created through a feedback process. Chapter 4’s analysis suggests
that positive short-term correlations increase the variance in consumer’s assets and policy
makers should pay attention to such positive correlations. However, chapter 4’s empirical
estimations also reveal the absence of long-term common trends. Domestic and international
hedging of private lines of insurance seems possible, thus enabling insurers to offer combined
contracts. This calls for reducing any barriers to trade. Chapter 5 shows that when pre-
miums are community-rated any cap on the volume of risk adjustment induces additional
risk-selection efforts by competing health insurers. When policy makers consider an addi-
tional criterion in the formula of risk-adjustment, and a cap at the same time, they must
evaluate each additional criterion and its impact on risk selection again. Admittedly, a more
efficient way to reduce volume would be to allow insurers to set premiums that vary with
some risk factors. Finally, the model in chapter 6 illustrates that imposing a guaranteed re-
newability (GR) mandate would result in an overall efficiency loss. Indeed, a large fraction
of the population would voluntarily participate in GR without such a mandate.
Various improvements and extensions can be identified with regard to chapters 4 to 6. A
great improvement to chapter 4 would be to use individual level data. Possible aggregation of
147
148
individual level data to firm levels would allow using copulas to gain in depth understanding
of (nonlinear) dependence structures between different lines of insurance at the firm level [see
Embrechts et al. (2003)]. Ideally this data could be combined with information on wealth,
health, and wisdom [this could be done with the new anonymous Swiss AHV/AVS number
and data from health insurers, see Widmer et al. (2007) for a similar idea regarding premium
subsidies in health insurance]. Testing the theory using individual level data would dissolve
the problem of possible aggregation bias. Individual companies could estimate their combined
risk across several lines of insurance within and across countries using copulas in addition to
the analysis of short-term correlations and long-term common trends. Analyzing short-term
linear correlations define a legitimate approach if the hypothesis of a multivariate normal
distribution (Gauss-Copula) cannot be rejected. Combining the results of both econometric
methods seems like a valuable path for future research.
One can think of many extensions to chapter 5. Arguably, the discussion must revolve around
improving the formula of risk adjustment. Adding additional criteria to the formula will most
likely affect its volume – an effect that nonetheless can be assessed using empirical methods.
The additional criteria that could be included have been subject to an extensive discussion
and are cited in section 5.3. Changing the formula of risk adjustment when premiums are
community-rated will affect risk selection between competing health insurers. This observa-
tion defines the starting point in order to advance the theory presented in chapter 5. The
reduction in variance when including an additional criterion in the formula of risk adjustment
and the increase due to an imposed cap should simultaneously be combined in one optimiza-
tion. Optimizing and calculating the effect of several additional criteria should then illustrate
which additional criterion induces the least risk-selection efforts in combination with a cap.
In addition, different measures of risk could replace the chosen objective function. Either
value at risk, or expected loss at risk, would disclose whether the (uniform) reductions per
risk class derived in chapter 5 are still optimal.
Chapter 6 develops a theoretical model and derives results that could easily be tested with
individual level data from a health insurer. One future research question would be to deter-
mine the relationship between cost of death for low and high risks. This can be accomplished
both when data on specific risks is available [as in Herring and Pauly (2006)], or when data
on health care expenditure is available to derive health status from past expenditure [as in
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Lehmann and Zweifel (2004)]. Those GR premiums that also cover the cost of dying can
therefore be split into two parts, and estimation based on individual level data could derive
life-time GR premiums. Furthermore, the model could be adapted for use in life insurance,
or for housing insurance in flood and earthquake areas (the death state could denote com-
plete destruction of housing). In fact, the model is usefully adopted to almost any kind of
insurance contracts. A further theoretical enhancement of the process depicted in chapter 6
could be to compare community-rated and risk-rated GR premiums. The community-rated
premium schedule mirrors expected cost, while the risk-rated GR premium reverses it. Fixing
the duration of the contract and the subjective discount rate of a consumer both contract’s
utility could be derived and compared. With everyone starting in low-risk status as in chapter
6, very impatient individuals should prefer community-rated premiums. In addition, chapter
6 also points to the importance of chronology. Calculating an accurate GR premium sched-
ule involves determining whether the premium is paid before or after transition. Extending
research to include chronologies in different countries or states would shed light on the re-
gional value of critical subjective time preference when death is included. More extensions
with regard to alternative utility functions, modelling age dependent loss probabilities, or
supplementary risk states will result in enlightening additional conclusions.
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